TY - JOUR A1 - Dörfler, Thomas T1 - Why rules matter: shaping security council sanctions policy in counterterrorism and beyond JF - Journal of global security studies N2 - Sanctions are critical to the Security Council's efforts to fight terrorism. What is striking is that the Council's sanctions regimes are subject to detailed sets of rules and decision criteria. The scholarship on human rights in counterterrorism assumes that rights advocacy and court litigation have prompted this development. The article complements this literature by highlighting an unexplored internal driver of legal-regulatory decision-making and explores how mixed-motive interest constellations among Security Council members have affected the extent of committee regulations and the content of decisions taken by sanctions committees. Based on internal documents and diplomatic cables, a comparative analysis of the Iraq sanctions regime and the counterterrorism sanctions regime demonstrates that mixed-motive interest constellations among Security Council members provide incentives to elaborate rules to guide decision-making resulting in legal-regulatory sanctions governance, even if the human rights of targeted individuals are not at stake. For comparative leverage and to assess the limits of the proposed mechanism, the analysis is briefly extended to other sanctions regimes targeting individuals (Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan). The findings have implications for this essential tool of the Security Council to react to threats to peace as diverse as counterterrorism, nonproliferation, and internal armed conflict. N2 - Les sanctions jouent un rôle essentiel dans la lutte du Conseil de sécurité contre le terrorisme. Ce qui est frappant, c'est que les régimes de sanctions du Conseil sont soumis à un ensemble détaillé de règles et de critères de décision. La recherche sur les droits de l'homme dans le cadre de la lutte contre le terrorisme suppose que la défense des droits et les litiges devant les tribunaux sont à l'origine de cet état de fait. L'article vient compléter cette littérature en soulignant un facteur interne inexploré dans la prise de décisions légales/réglementaires. Il analyse les répercussions des constellations de divers intérêts chez les membres du Conseil de sécurité sur l’étendue des réglementations de comité et le contenu des décisions prises par les comités de sanctions. En s'appuyant sur des documents internes et des câbles diplomatiques, une analyse comparative du régime de sanctions de l'Irak et du régime de sanctions de lutte contre le terrorisme démontre que ces constellations de divers intérêts chez les membres du Conseil de sécurité motivent l’élaboration de règles pour guider la prise de décisions débouchant sur une gouvernance de sanctions légales/réglementaires, même quand les droits de l'homme des personnes ciblées ne sont pas en jeu. À des fins de comparaison, et pour évaluer les limites du mécanisme proposé, l'analyse fait l'objet d'un bref élargissement à d'autres régimes de sanctions ciblant des personnes (RDC et Soudan). Les conclusions s'accompagnent d'implications pour cet outil essentiel du Conseil de sécurité dans la réaction aux menaces pour la paix : lutte contre le terrorisme, non-prolifération et conflit armé interne. N2 - Las sanciones son fundamentales para los esfuerzos del Consejo de Seguridad en la lucha contra el terrorismo. Lo sorprendente es que los regímenes de sanciones del Consejo están sujetos a detallados conjuntos de normas y criterios de decisión. Los académicos especializados en cuestión de derechos humanos en la lucha antiterrorista parten de la base de que la defensa de los derechos y los litigios ante los tribunales han impulsado esta tendencia. Este artículo complementa esta bibliografía poniendo de relieve un impulsor interno inexplorado de la toma de decisiones jurídico-normativas y analiza cómo las constelaciones de intereses de motivación mixta entre los miembros del Consejo de Seguridad han afectado al alcance de las normativas de los comités y al contenido de las decisiones adoptadas por los comités de sanciones. Basándose en documentos internos y telegramas diplomáticos, un análisis comparativo del régimen de sanciones contra Irak con el régimen de sanciones antiterroristas demuestra que las constelaciones de intereses de motivación mixta entre los miembros del Consejo de Seguridad proporcionan incentivos para la elaboración de normas que guíen la toma de decisiones dando lugar a una gobernanza jurídica-normativa de las sanciones, aun cuando no estén en juego los derechos humanos de las personas sancionadas. A efectos comparativos y con el fin de evaluar los límites del mecanismo propuesto, el análisis se amplía someramente a otros regímenes de sanciones dirigidos a individuos (RDC y Sudán). Las conclusiones tienen implicaciones para esta herramienta esencial del Consejo de Seguridad a fin de reaccionar ante amenazas a la paz tan diversas como la lucha antiterrorista, la no proliferación y los conflictos armados internos. KW - Security Council KW - committee governance KW - UN sanctions KW - due process KW - counterterrorism KW - Iraq KW - Conseil de sécurité KW - gouvernance de comité KW - sanctions de l’ONU KW - procédure officielle KW - lutte contre le terrorisme KW - Irak KW - Consejo de Seguridad KW - Gobernanza de los Comités KW - Sanciones de la ONU KW - Proceso debido KW - Lucha antiterrorista KW - Irak Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac041 SN - 2057-3170 SN - 2057-3189 VL - 8 IS - 1 PB - Oxford University Press CY - Oxford ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Dörfler, Thomas T1 - The effect of expert recommendations on intergovernmental decision-making BT - North Korea, Iran, and non-proliferation sanctions in the Security Council JF - International relations : the journal of the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies N2 - The article explores whether and to what extent expert recommendations affect decision-making within the Security Council and its North Korea and Iran sanctions regimes. The article first develops a rationalist theoretical argument to show why making many second-stage decisions, such as determining lists of items under export restrictions, subjects Security Council members to repeating coordination situations. Expert recommendations may provide focal point solutions to coordination problems, even when interests diverge and preferences remain stable. Empirically, the article first explores whether expert recommendations affected decision-making on commodity sanctions imposed on North Korea. Council members heavily relied on recommended export trigger lists as focal points, solving a divisive conflict among great powers. Second, the article explores whether expert recommendations affected the designation of sanctions violators in the Iran sanctions regime. Council members designated individuals and entities following expert recommendations as focal points, despite conflicting interests among great powers. The article concludes that expert recommendations are an additional means of influence in Security Council decision-making and seem relevant for second-stage decision-making among great powers in other international organisations. KW - decision-making KW - expert recommendations KW - international organisation KW - rationalism KW - sanctions KW - Security Council Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178211033941 SN - 0047-1178 SN - 1741-2862 VL - 36 IS - 2 SP - 237 EP - 261 PB - Sage CY - London ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Gehring, Thomas A1 - Dorsch, Christian A1 - Dörfler, Thomas T1 - Precedent and doctrine in organisational decision-making BT - the power of informal institutional rules in the United Nations Security Council’s activities on terrorism JF - Journal of international relations and development N2 - We examine how and under what conditions informal institutional constraints, such as precedent and doctrine, are likely to affect collective choice within international organisations even in the absence of powerful bureaucratic agents. With a particular focus on the United Nations Security Council, we first develop a theoretical account of why such informal constraints might affect collective decisions even of powerful and strategically behaving actors. We show that precedents provide focal points that allow adopting collective decisions in coordination situations despite diverging preferences. Reliance on previous cases creates tacitly evolving doctrine that may develop incrementally. Council decision-making is also likely to be facilitated by an institutional logic of escalation driven by institutional constraints following from the typically staged response to crisis situations. We explore the usefulness of our theoretical argument with evidence from the Council doctrine on terrorism that has evolved since 1985. The key decisions studied include the 1992 sanctions resolution against Libya and the 2001 Council response to the 9/11 attacks. We conclude that, even within intergovernmentally structured international organisations, member states do not operate on a clean slate, but in a highly institutionalised environment that shapes their opportunities for action. KW - decision-making KW - doctrine KW - international organisations KW - precedent KW - Security Council KW - terrorism Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-017-0101-5 SN - 1581-1980 SN - 1408-6980 VL - 22 IS - 1 SP - 107 EP - 135 PB - Palgrave Macmillan CY - Basingstoke ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Hosli, Madeleine O. A1 - Dörfler, Thomas ED - Lesage, Dries ED - Van de Graaf, Thijs T1 - The United Nations Security Council BT - the Challenge of Reform T2 - Rising powers and multilateral institutions (International Political Economy Series) N2 - The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the most important multilateral institutions having the ambition to shape global governance and the only organ of the global community that can adopt legally binding resolutions for the maintenance of international peace and security and, if necessary, authorize the use of force. Created in the aftermath of World War II by its victors, the UNSC’s constellation looks increasingly anachronistic, however, in light of the changing global distribution of power. Adapting the institutional structure and decision-making procedures of the UNSC has proven to be one of the most difficult challenges of the last decades, while it is the institution that has probably been faced with the most vociferous calls for reform. Although there have been changes to the informal ways in which outside actors are drawn into the UNSC’s work and activities, many of the major players in the current international system seem to be deprived from equal treatment in its core patterns of decision-making. Countries such as Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, alongside emerging African nations such as Nigeria and South Africa, are among the states eager to secure permanent representation on the Council. By comparison, selected BRICS countries, China and Russia - in contrast to their role in other multilateral institutions - are permanent members of the UNSC and with this, have been “insiders” for a long time. This renders the situation of the UNSC different from global institutions, in which traditionally, Western powers have dominated the agenda. KW - Security Council KW - Winning Coalition KW - Veto Player KW - Social Choice Theory KW - Decision Probability Y1 - 2015 SN - 978-1-349-48504-8 SN - 978-1-137-39760-7 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137397607_8 SP - 135 EP - 152 PB - Palgrave Macmillan CY - London ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Gehring, Thomas A1 - Dörfler, Thomas T1 - Constitutive mechanisms of UN Security Council practices BT - precedent pressure, ratchet effect, and council action regarding intrastate conflicts JF - Review of International Studies N2 - Based upon the current debate on international practices with its focus on taken-for-granted everyday practices, we examine how Security Council practices may affect member state action and collective decisions on intrastate conflicts. We outline a concept that integrates the structuring effect of practices and their emergence from interaction among reflective actors. It promises to overcome the unresolved tension between understanding practices as a social regularity and as a fluid entity. We analyse the constitutive mechanisms of two Council practices that affect collective decisions on intrastate conflicts and elucidate how even reflective Council members become enmeshed with the constraining implications of evolving practices and their normative implications. (1) Previous Council decisions create precedent pressure and give rise to a virtually uncontested permissive Council practice that defines the purview for intervention into such conflicts. (2) A ratcheting practice forces opponents to choose between accepting steadily reinforced Council action, as occurred regarding Sudan/Darfur, and outright blockade, as in the case of Syria. We conclude that practices constitute a source of influence that is not captured by the traditional perspectives on Council activities as the consequence of geopolitical interests or of externally evolving international norms like the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P). KW - Security Council KW - International Practices KW - Constitutive Mechanism KW - Responsibility to Protect KW - Precedent KW - Ratchet Effect Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210518000268 SN - 0260-2105 SN - 1469-9044 VL - 45 IS - 1 SP - 120 EP - 140 PB - Univ. CY - Cambridge ER -