TY  - JOUR
A1  - Bruttel, Lisa Verena
A1  - Gueth, Werner
T1  - Asymmetric voluntary cooperation
BT  - a repeated sequential best-shot experiment
JF  - International Journal of Game Theory
N2  - This paper tests the robustness of voluntary cooperation in a sequential best shot game, a public good game in which the maximal contribution determines the level of public good provision. Thus, efficiency enhancing voluntary cooperation requires asymmetric behavior whose coordination is more difficult. Nevertheless, we find robust cooperation irrespective of treatment-specific institutional obstacles. To explain this finding, we distinguish three behavioral patterns aiming at both, voluntary cooperation and (immediate) payoff equality.
KW  - Best shot game
KW  - Coordination
KW  - Transfer
KW  - Refund
KW  - Experiment
Y1  - 2018
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0633-y
SN  - 0020-7276
SN  - 1432-1270
VL  - 47
IS  - 3
SP  - 873
EP  - 891
PB  - Springer
CY  - Heidelberg
ER  -