TY - JOUR A1 - Lilliestam, Johan A1 - Patt, Anthony A1 - Bersalli, Germán T1 - On the quality of emission reductions BT - observed effects of carbon pricing on investments, innovation, and operational shifts. A response to van den Bergh and Savin (2021) JF - Environmental and Resource Economics N2 - To meet the Paris Agreement targets, carbon emissions from the energy system must be eliminated by mid-century, implying vast investment and systemic change challenges ahead. In an article in WIREs Climate Change, we reviewed the empirical evidence for effects of carbon pricing systems on technological change towards full decarbonisation, finding weak or no effects. In response, van den Bergh and Savin (2021) criticised our review in an article in this journal, claiming that it is "unfair", incomplete and flawed in various ways. Here, we respond to this critique by elaborating on the conceptual roots of our argumentation based on the importance of short-term emission reductions and longer-term technological change, and by expanding the review. This verifies our original findings: existing carbon pricing schemes have sometimes reduced emissions, mainly through switching to lower-carbon fossil fuels and efficiency increases, and have triggered weak innovation increases. There is no evidence that carbon pricing systems have triggered zero-carbon investments, and scarce but consistent evidence that they have not. Our findings highlight the importance of adapting and improving climate policy assessment metrics beyond short-term emissions by also assessing the quality of emission reductions and the progress of underlying technological change. KW - Carbon pricing KW - Climate policy KW - Decarbonisation KW - Technological change KW - Energy transition Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-022-00708-8 SN - 0924-6460 SN - 1573-1502 VL - 83 IS - 3 SP - 733 EP - 758 PB - Springer CY - Dordrecht ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Kalkuhl, Matthias A1 - Steckel, Jan Christoph A1 - Edenhofer, Ottmar T1 - All or nothing BT - climate policy when assets can become stranded JF - Journal of environmental economics and management N2 - This paper develops a new perspective on stranded assets in climate policy using a partial equilibrium model of the energy sector. Political-economy related aspects are considered in the government's objective function. Lobbying power of firms or fiscal considerations by the government lead to time inconsistency: The government will deviate from a previously announced carbon tax which creates stranded assets. Under rational expectations, we show that a time-consistent policy outcome exists with either a zero carbon tax or a prohibitive carbon tax that leads to zero fossil investments - an "all-or-nothing" policy. Although stranded assets are crucial to such a bipolar outcome, they disappear again under time-consistent policy. Which of the two outcomes (all or nothing) prevails depends on the lobbying power of owners of fixed factors (land and fossil resources) but not on fiscal revenue considerations or on the lobbying power of renewable or fossil energy firms. KW - Climate policy KW - Optimal control KW - Political economy KW - Public finance KW - Credible policy KW - Time inconsistency Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.012 SN - 0095-0696 SN - 1096-0449 VL - 100 PB - Elsevier CY - San Diego ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Diluiso, Francesca A1 - Annicchiarico, Barbara A1 - Kalkuhl, Matthias A1 - Minx, Jan Christoph T1 - Climate actions and macro-financial stability BT - the role of central banks JF - Journal of environmental economics and management N2 - Limiting global warming to well below 2 degrees C may pose threats to macroeconomic and financial stability. In an estimated Euro Area New Keynesian model with financial frictions and climate policy, we study the possible perils of a low-carbon transition and evaluate the role of monetary policy and financial regulation. We show that, even for very ambitious climate targets, transition costs are moderate along a timely and gradual mitigation pathway. Inflation volatility strongly increases for disorderly climate policy, demanding a strong monetary response by central banks. In reaction to an adverse financial shock originating in the fossil sector, a green quantitative easing policy can provide an effective stimulus to the economy, but its stabilizing properties do not significantly differ from those of market neutral asset purchase programs. A financial regulation, encouraging the decarbonization of the banks' balance sheets via ad hoc capital requirements, can significantly reduce the severity of a financial crisis, but prolongs the recovery phase. Our results suggest that the involvement of central banks in climate actions must be carefully designed to be in compliance with their mandate and to avoid unintended trade-offs. KW - Climate policy KW - Green transition KW - Monetary policy KW - Capital requirements KW - Green quantitative easing KW - Euro area Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2021.102548 SN - 0095-0696 SN - 1096-0449 VL - 110 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER -