TY - JOUR A1 - Andres, Maximilian A1 - Bruttel, Lisa A1 - Friedrichsen, Jana T1 - How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion BT - a machine learning approach JF - European economic review N2 - This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices. KW - cartel KW - collusion KW - communication KW - machine learning KW - experiment Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104331 SN - 0014-2921 SN - 1873-572X VL - 152 SP - 1 EP - 18 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Andres, Maximilian A1 - Bruttel, Lisa A1 - Friedrichsen, Jana T1 - The leniency rule revisited BT - experiments on cartel formation with open communication JF - International journal of industrial organization N2 - The experimental literature on antitrust enforcement provides robust evidence that communication plays an important role for the formation and stability of cartels. We extend these studies through a design that distinguishes between innocuous communication and communication about a cartel, sanctioning only the latter. To this aim, we introduce a participant in the role of the competition authority, who is properly incentivized to judge the communication content and price setting behavior of the firms. Using this novel design, we revisit the question whether a leniency rule successfully destabilizes cartels. In contrast to existing experimental studies, we find that a leniency rule does not affect cartelization. We discuss potential explanations for this contrasting result. KW - cartel KW - judgment of communication KW - corporate leniency program KW - price competition KW - experiment Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102728 SN - 0167-7187 VL - 76 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Ziemann, Niklas T1 - How do people discount over spatial distance? JF - German economic review N2 - This paper studies how individuals discount the utility they derive from their provision of goods over spatial distance. In a controlled laboratory experiment in Germany, we elicit preferences for the provision of the same good at different locations. To isolate spatial preferences from any other direct value of the goods being close to the individual, we focus on goods with “existence value.” We find that individuals put special weight on the provision of these goods in their immediate vicinity. This “vicinity bias” represents a spatial analogy to the “present bias” in the time dimension. KW - spatial discounting KW - existence value KW - charitable giving KW - experiment Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/ger-2021-0106 SN - 1465-6485 SN - 1468-0475 VL - 24 IS - 1 SP - 33 EP - 67 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Stolley, Florian T1 - Getting a yes BT - an experiment on the power of asking JF - Journal of behavioral and experimental economics N2 - This paper studies how the request for a favor has to be devised in order to maximize its chance of success. We present results from a mini-dictator game, in which the recipient can send a free-form text message to the dictator before the latter decides. We find that putting effort into the message, writing in a humorous way and mentioning reasons why the money is needed pays off. Additionally, we find differences in the behavior of male and female dictators. Only men react positively to efficiency arguments, while only women react to messages that emphasize the dictators power and responsibility. KW - dictator game KW - communication KW - inequality KW - text analysis KW - experiment Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2020.101550 SN - 2214-8043 VL - 86 PB - Elsevier CY - New York ER -