TY - THES A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - Sinn und Gedächtnis : die Zeitlichkeit des Sinns und die Figuren ihrer Reflexion Y1 - 2007 SN - 978-3-7705-4519-3 PB - Fink CY - Paderborn, München ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - This other life that knows itself as life BT - comments on Karen Ng's Hegel's concept of life JF - European journal of philosophy N2 - In this paper, I discuss Karen Ng's reconstruction of Hegel's concept of life. On Ng's account, Hegel's conception of life has a remarkable double role to play: Life is both the proper object of judgment as well as a fundamental characterization of the activity of the judging subject. In a first step, I highlight the insight that Ng's account sheds on the internal connection of life and self-consciousness and the peculiar normativity of life. In a second step, I raise three concerns about Ng's strong focus on the logical notion of life which she characterizes as non-empirical and a priori. I argue that in order to uncover the full significance of the notion of life for Hegel we have to turn to his Philosophy of Nature and Spirit. Y1 - 2022 SN - 978-0-19-094761-3 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12745 SN - 0966-8373 SN - 1468-0378 N1 - Rezension zu: Ng, Karen: Hegel's concept of life : self-consciousness, freedon, logic. - New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020. - xiii, 319 p. - ISBN 978-0-19-094761-3 VL - 29 IS - 4 SP - 1136 EP - 1144 PB - Wiley-Blackwell CY - Oxford ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - The struggle for recognition and the authority of the second person JF - European journal of philosophy N2 - In this introductory paper, I discuss the second-personal approach to ethics and the theory of recognition as two accounts of the fundamental sociality of the human form of life. The first section delineates the deep affinities between the two approaches. They both put a reciprocal social constellation front and center from which they derive the fundamental norms of moral and social life and a social conception of freedom. The second section discusses three points of contrast between the two approaches: The accounts differ in that the second-personal approach opts for a narrower conception of recognition focusing on mutual moral accountability, whereas recognition theory suggests a broader conception including relations of love, respect, and esteem. Secondly, the accounts differ as to how they conceive of the interrelation of the I-thou and the I-We relationship. Finally, they differ with regard to the way they think of struggles for recognition. Whereas the second-personal approach suggests that we can understand struggles on the basis of a transcendental infrastructure of second-personal address, the theory of recognition considers norms of recognition as themselves constituted by dialectical social struggles. The paper closes with a reflection on the ways in which both approaches can help us understand the social vulnerability of the human form of life. Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12675 SN - 0966-8373 SN - 1468-0378 VL - 29 IS - 3 SP - 552 EP - 561 PB - Wiley-Blackwell CY - Oxford ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - Gattungswesen BT - Zur Sozialität der menschlichen Lebensform JF - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung N2 - In which sense can human beings be conceived as social animals? To elucidate this question, the present paper (I) distinguishes the logical sociality of all living beings from the material sociality of social animals and the political sociality of self-conscious social animals. (II) The self-conscious political sociality that characterises the human genus-being requires a complex interplay of first and second person through which alone we can participate in our form of life and determine its content. (III) The human form of life thus constituted is characterised by a particularly open, and at the same time precarious, membership which involves specific forms of vulnerability and power. (IV) Against this background, forms of objective spirit are necessary which grant us a generalized recognition and relieve us from the contingency of each particular second-personal recognition, without abandoning the openness of the sociality of the human form of life. This double requirement has led to paradoxical institutions in modern society which strive to protect and ensure the sociality of the human form of life precisely by naturalising and individualising our access to it. KW - sociality KW - recognition KW - species-being KW - G. W. F. Hegel KW - Karl Marx KW - Stanley Cavell Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2022-0023 SN - 0012-1045 SN - 2192-1482 VL - 70 IS - 3 SP - 373 EP - 399 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - Genus-being: On Marx's dialectical naturalism T2 - Nature and naturalism in classical German philosophy N2 - In his 1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx famously claims that the human being is or has a ‘Gattungswesen.’ This is often understood to mean that the human being is a ‘species-being’ and is determined by a given ‘species-essence.’ In this chapter, I argue that this reading is mistaken. What Marx calls Gattungswesen is precisely not a ‘species-being,’ but a being that, in a very specific sense, transcends the limits of its own given species. This different understanding of the genus- character of the human being opens up a new perspective on the naturalism of the early Marx. He is not informed by a problematic speciesist and essentialist naturalism, as is often assumed, but by a different form of naturalism which I propose to call ‘dialectical naturalism.’ The chapter starts (I) by developing Hegel’s account of genus which provides us with a useful background for (II) understanding Marx’s original notion of a genus-being and its practical, social, developmental character. In the last section, I show that (III) the actualization of our genus-being thus depends on the production of a specific type of ‘second nature’ that is at the heart of Marx’s dialectical naturalism. Y1 - 2022 SN - 978-0-367-54172-9 SN - 978-1-003-09205-6 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003092056-13 SP - 246 EP - 278 PB - Routledge CY - New York ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - The art of second nature BT - Modern culture after Kant JF - Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5840/gfpj20224312 SN - 0093-4240 SN - 2153-9197 VL - 43 IS - 1 SP - 33 EP - 69 PB - Philosophy Documentation Center CY - New York ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Khurana, Thomas ED - Berger, Christian ED - Frey, Michael ED - Priesemuth, Florian T1 - Ein Recht gegen das Recht BT - der Körper des Rechts und die Grenzen des Eigentums T2 - Rechte des Körpers Y1 - 2022 SN - 978-3-11-078466-4 SN - 978-3-11-078498-5 SN - 978-3-11-078506-7 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110784985-004 SP - 45 EP - 60 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin, Boston ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - Self-knowledge and knowledge of nature T2 - Reading Rödl : On Self-Consciousness and Objectivity N2 - In this chapter, I consider the unity of self-consciousness and objectivity. Starting from the notion that the objective character and the self-conscious character of thought seem in tension, I discuss Sebastian Rödl’s Self-Consciousness and Objectivity and his thesis that this tension is merely apparent. This resolution suggests an immediate route to absolute idealism. I recall two Hegelian objections against such an immediate route. Against this background, it transpires that the dissolution of the apparent opposition of objectivity and self-consciousness can only be a preliminary step, opening our eyes to an actual opposition animating the pursuit of knowledge: the opposition of knowledge of nature and self-knowledge. This actual opposition cannot be removed as merely apparent and instead has to be sublated through articulation of its speculative unity. I consider two paradigms for the exposition of such a speculative unity: Kant’s account of judgments of beauty, and Hegel’s account of the speculative unity of life and self-consciousness. I close by contrasting these two approaches with Rödl’s characterization, which strikes me as one-sided. Absolute idealism, properly understood, requires us to develop the speculative unity of knowledge of nature and self-knowledge from both sides, showing us that knowledge of nature is self-knowledge, but equally: that self-knowledge requires knowledge of ourselves as nature. Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-1-03-234951-0 SN - 978-1-00-095669-6 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003324638 SP - 195 EP - 223 PB - Taylor & Francis Group CY - Milton ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - Die "europäischen Wilden" BT - Kants Verteidigung und Kritik des Kolonialismus JF - Historische Urteilskraft Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-3-86102-231-2 SN - 2626-8094 VL - 5 SP - 15 EP - 18 PB - Stiftung Deutsches Historisches Museum CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - Altera Natura: Das Anthropozän als ästhetisches Problem JF - Dritte Natur N2 - Der Kunst wird seit langem nachgesagt, dem Subjekt ein anderes Verhältnis zur Natur zu eröffnen, als dies die gewöhnliche theoretische oder praktische Erkenntnis ermöglicht. Statt die Natur zum distanzierten Objekt unserer Betrachtung zu machen oder zum bloßen Material und Mittel unserer praktischen Konstruktionen, erschließt sich uns in der Kunst eine Intelligibilität der Natur, die weiter reicht als unsere Begriffe, und eine Natürlichkeit unserer selbst, die uns mit dem verbindet, was uns sonst bloß gegenübersteht. Vor diesem Hintergrund scheint es nicht verwunderlich, dass die jüngeren Diskussionen um das problematische Verhältnis zur Natur, die das Anthropozän geprägt haben, immer wieder den Blick auf die Kunst richten und ihr Vermögen hervorheben, den problematischen modernen Gegensatz von Subjekt und Objekt, Geist und Natur zu überwinden, der uns in diese missliche Lage gebracht hat. Wenn die Kunst hier aber weiterführen soll, dann muss sie über die klassischen ästhetischen Paradigmen des Schönen und des Erhabenen hinausführen. Das Schöne träumt von einer Passung von Subjekt und Natur, die im Anthropozän gerade in Frage steht, und das Erhabene verwendet die Übermacht der Natur als Vehikel, um eine Macht im intelligiblen Subjekt zu markieren, die von der natürlichen Übermacht unberührt bleibt. Diese klassischen Figuren ästhetischer Erfahrung verstellen so, wie tiefgreifend wir das Naturverhältnis neu bestimmen müssen, um auf das Anthropozän zu antworten. Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-3-7518-0704-3 SN - 2625-9885 VL - 6 IS - 1 SP - 175 EP - 190 PB - Matthes & Seitz CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - Dialektische Anthropologie – oder romantischer Idealismus? JF - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2023-0026 SN - 0012-1045 SN - 2192-1482 VL - 71 IS - 2 SP - 304 EP - 311 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - True right against formal right: The body of right and the limits of property T2 - Hegel's philosophy of right: critical perspectives on freedom and history N2 - The conception of property at the basis of Hegel’s conception of abstract right seems committed to a problematic form of “possessive individualism.” It seems to conceive of right as the expression of human mastery over nature and as based upon an irreducible opposition of person and nature, rightful will, and rightless thing. However, this chapter argues that Hegel starts with a form of possessive individualism only to show that it undermines itself. This is evident in the way Hegel unfolds the nature of property as it applies to external things as well as in the way he explains our self-ownership of our own bodies and lives. Hegel develops the idea of property to a point where it reaches a critical limit and encounters the “true right” that life possesses against the “formal” and “abstract right” of property. Ultimately, Hegel’s account suggests that nature should precisely not be treated as a rightless object at our arbitrary disposal but acknowledged as the inorganic body of right. Y1 - 2022 SN - 9781003081036 SN - 9780367532321 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003081036-10 SP - 147 EP - 168 PB - Routledge CY - London ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - The stage of difference: On the second nature of civil society in Kant and Hegel T2 - Naturalism and social philosophy Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-1-5381-7492-0 SN - 978-1-5381-7493-7 SP - 35 EP - 64 PB - Rowman & Littlefield CY - Lanham ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen BT - Husserl – Wittgenstein – Cavell T2 - Trouble Every Day : Zum Schrecken des Alltäglichen Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-3-8467-6721-4 SN - 978-3-7705-6721-8 U6 - https://doi.org/10.30965/9783846767214_006 SP - 91 EP - 105 PB - Brill Fink CY - Paderborn ER -