TY - RPRT A1 - Andres, Maximilian A1 - Bruttel, Lisa T1 - Communicating Cartel Intentions T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - While the economic harm of cartels is caused by their price-increasing effect, sanctioning by courts rather targets at the underlying process of firms reaching a price-fixing agreement. This paper provides experimental evidence on the question whether such sanctioning meets the economic target, i.e., whether evidence of a collusive meeting of the firms and of the content of their communication reliably predicts subsequent prices. We find that already the mere mutual agreement to meet predicts a strong increase in prices. Conversely, express distancing from communication completely nullifies its otherwise price-increasing effect. Using machine learning, we show that communication only increases prices if it is very explicit about how the cartel plans to behave. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 77 KW - cartel KW - collusion KW - communication KW - machine learning KW - experiment Y1 - 2024 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-638469 SN - 2628-653X IS - 77 ER - TY - GEN A1 - de Haas, Samuel A1 - Paha, Johannes T1 - Non-controlling minority shareholdings and collusion T2 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe N2 - This article merges theoretical literature on non-controlling minority shareholdings (NCMS) in a coherent model to study the effects of NCMS on competition and collusion. The model encompasses both the case of a common owner holding shares of rival firms as well as the case of cross ownership among rivals. We find that by softening competition, NCMS weaken the sustainability of collusion under a greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. Such effects exist, in particular, in the presence of an effective competition authority. T3 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe - 166 KW - collusion KW - common ownership KW - cross ownership KW - minority shareholdings Y1 - 2020 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-595993 SN - 0889-938X SN - 1573-7160 SN - 1867-5808 IS - 3 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Andres, Maximilian A1 - Bruttel, Lisa A1 - Friedrichsen, Jana T1 - How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion BT - a machine learning approach JF - European economic review N2 - This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices. KW - cartel KW - collusion KW - communication KW - machine learning KW - experiment Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104331 SN - 0014-2921 SN - 1873-572X VL - 152 SP - 1 EP - 18 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - de Haas, Samuel A1 - Paha, Johannes T1 - Non-controlling minority shareholdings and collusion JF - Review of industrial organization N2 - This article merges theoretical literature on non-controlling minority shareholdings (NCMS) in a coherent model to study the effects of NCMS on competition and collusion. The model encompasses both the case of a common owner holding shares of rival firms as well as the case of cross ownership among rivals. We find that by softening competition, NCMS weaken the sustainability of collusion under a greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. Such effects exist, in particular, in the presence of an effective competition authority. KW - collusion KW - common ownership KW - cross ownership KW - minority shareholdings Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-020-09758-y SN - 0889-938X SN - 1573-7160 VL - 58 IS - 3 SP - 431 EP - 454 PB - Springer CY - Dordrecht ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Andres, Maximilian A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Friedrichsen, Jana T1 - How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion BT - a machine learning approach T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 53 KW - cartel KW - collusion KW - communication KW - machine learning KW - experiment Y1 - 2022 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-562234 SN - 2628-653X ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Andres, Maximilian A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Friedrichsen, Jana T1 - Choosing between explicit cartel formation and tacit collusion – An experiment T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - Numerous studies investigate which sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation but little is known as to how these sanctions work. We contribute to understanding the inner workings of cartels by studying experimentally the effect of sanctioning institutions on firms’ communication. Using machine learning to organize the chat communication into topics, we find that firms are significantly less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing when sanctioning institutions are present. At the same time, average prices are lower when communication is less explicit. A mediation analysis suggests that sanctions are effective in hindering cartel formation not only because they introduce a risk of being fined but also by reducing the prevalence of explicit price communication. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 19 KW - cartel KW - collusion KW - communication KW - machine learning KW - experiment Y1 - 2020 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-473885 SN - 2628-653X IS - 19 ER -