TY - CHAP A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - True right against formal right: The body of right and the limits of property T2 - Hegel's philosophy of right: critical perspectives on freedom and history N2 - The conception of property at the basis of Hegel’s conception of abstract right seems committed to a problematic form of “possessive individualism.” It seems to conceive of right as the expression of human mastery over nature and as based upon an irreducible opposition of person and nature, rightful will, and rightless thing. However, this chapter argues that Hegel starts with a form of possessive individualism only to show that it undermines itself. This is evident in the way Hegel unfolds the nature of property as it applies to external things as well as in the way he explains our self-ownership of our own bodies and lives. Hegel develops the idea of property to a point where it reaches a critical limit and encounters the “true right” that life possesses against the “formal” and “abstract right” of property. Ultimately, Hegel’s account suggests that nature should precisely not be treated as a rightless object at our arbitrary disposal but acknowledged as the inorganic body of right. Y1 - 2022 SN - 9781003081036 SN - 9780367532321 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003081036-10 SP - 147 EP - 168 PB - Routledge CY - London ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - The stage of difference: On the second nature of civil society in Kant and Hegel T2 - Naturalism and social philosophy Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-1-5381-7492-0 SN - 978-1-5381-7493-7 SP - 35 EP - 64 PB - Rowman & Littlefield CY - Lanham ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - Genus-being: On Marx's dialectical naturalism T2 - Nature and naturalism in classical German philosophy N2 - In his 1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx famously claims that the human being is or has a ‘Gattungswesen.’ This is often understood to mean that the human being is a ‘species-being’ and is determined by a given ‘species-essence.’ In this chapter, I argue that this reading is mistaken. What Marx calls Gattungswesen is precisely not a ‘species-being,’ but a being that, in a very specific sense, transcends the limits of its own given species. This different understanding of the genus- character of the human being opens up a new perspective on the naturalism of the early Marx. He is not informed by a problematic speciesist and essentialist naturalism, as is often assumed, but by a different form of naturalism which I propose to call ‘dialectical naturalism.’ The chapter starts (I) by developing Hegel’s account of genus which provides us with a useful background for (II) understanding Marx’s original notion of a genus-being and its practical, social, developmental character. In the last section, I show that (III) the actualization of our genus-being thus depends on the production of a specific type of ‘second nature’ that is at the heart of Marx’s dialectical naturalism. Y1 - 2022 SN - 978-0-367-54172-9 SN - 978-1-003-09205-6 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003092056-13 SP - 246 EP - 278 PB - Routledge CY - New York ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Gentry, Gerad T1 - Hegel’s logic of purposiveness T2 - Kantian legacies in German idealism N2 - I argue that Hegel’s Logic traces an emergent-purposive, logical method that entails two key identities in reason. These identities are (1) between a logic of freedom and necessity, and (2) between the possibilities of a priori and a posteriori reasoning in a purposive method. The purposive method of the Logic is the basis for these identities and, in Hegel’s view, facilitates the transition from Kant’s transcendental idealism to absolute idealism. I suggest that this method is Hegel’s attempt to rework a critique of philosophy according to Kant’s insight about the principle grounding the formal purposiveness of the faculties, what Hegel calls, “one of Kant’s greatest services to philosophy.” Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-032-00160-9 SN - 978-1-138-36736-4 SN - 978-0-429-42982-8 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429429828 SP - 36 EP - 70 PB - Routledge CY - New York ; London ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Gentry, Gerad T1 - Introduction BT - the legacies of Kant in German Idealism T2 - Kantian legacies in German Idealism N2 - Kant wrote in the Critique of Pure Reason, “For the law of reason to seek unity is necessary, since without it we would have no reason, and without that, no coherent use of the understanding, and, lacking that, no sufficient mark of empirical truth.” This unity of reason, taken as a holistic condition, was central to the convictions of the idealists. To them, Kant layed bare the right path forward, but also fundamental failings in his execution of a critique of reason which needed to be overcome in order for reason to secure its own, internal end. In this chapter, I discuss key themes in the positive inheritance of Kant’s thought in classical German philosophy and offer an overview of the arguments and significances of each contribution to this volume. The aim is not to minimize important differences between Kant and post-Kantian Idealists, but rather to emphasize core retentions of Kant’s thought. Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-0-42942-982-8 SN - 978-1-032-00160-9 SN - 978-1-138-36736-4 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429429828 SP - 1 EP - 12 PB - Routledge CY - New York ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - Self-knowledge and knowledge of nature T2 - Reading Rödl : On Self-Consciousness and Objectivity N2 - In this chapter, I consider the unity of self-consciousness and objectivity. Starting from the notion that the objective character and the self-conscious character of thought seem in tension, I discuss Sebastian Rödl’s Self-Consciousness and Objectivity and his thesis that this tension is merely apparent. This resolution suggests an immediate route to absolute idealism. I recall two Hegelian objections against such an immediate route. Against this background, it transpires that the dissolution of the apparent opposition of objectivity and self-consciousness can only be a preliminary step, opening our eyes to an actual opposition animating the pursuit of knowledge: the opposition of knowledge of nature and self-knowledge. This actual opposition cannot be removed as merely apparent and instead has to be sublated through articulation of its speculative unity. I consider two paradigms for the exposition of such a speculative unity: Kant’s account of judgments of beauty, and Hegel’s account of the speculative unity of life and self-consciousness. I close by contrasting these two approaches with Rödl’s characterization, which strikes me as one-sided. Absolute idealism, properly understood, requires us to develop the speculative unity of knowledge of nature and self-knowledge from both sides, showing us that knowledge of nature is self-knowledge, but equally: that self-knowledge requires knowledge of ourselves as nature. Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-1-03-234951-0 SN - 978-1-00-095669-6 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003324638 SP - 195 EP - 223 PB - Taylor & Francis Group CY - Milton ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Kaya, Gizem A1 - Kopshteyn, Georgy ED - Kubbe, Ina ED - Varraich, Aiysha T1 - Dispersing the fog BT - a philosophical analysis of institutional corruption applied to the MENA region T2 - Corruption and informal practices in the Middle East and North Africa N2 - Countries in the Middle East generally fare poorly in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. One of the biggest challenges for the anti-corruption-regime in the Middle East are the many forms of corruption that are not being recognised as such on the local level, if assessed against a culturally relativistic benchmark. Our paper seeks to establish a unifying ground by providing a functional analysis of corruption which is both, normatively guiding and culturally sensitive. We demarcate our work as follows: (1) our reference point will be the phenomenon of institutional corruption, whereas (2) our working definition of corruption will conceive of corruption as a violation of role-specific norms that is motivated by the role-occupier’s private motives. In an attempt to offer a comprehensive approach, corruption will be viewed on two differing levels. On the external level, we will begin with an investigation of features within a norm-order that typically instantiate corruption. We will argue that corruption is externally conditioned by an authority’s inability to enforce and (re)establish the norms of conduct that ought to be action-guiding in office. This changes the expectation-structure within a norm-order and erodes public trust in the authorities, giving rise to willing perpetrators. Complementing this, the internal level of our framework will emphasize the motivational deficits of corrupt acts. It will be argued that this deficit can typically be found in societies that lack civic virtues. This, we suspect, is the functional reason why corrupt societies have such a hard time to overcome the problem: they lack both features and are, as a consequence, caught in a vicious circle as they struggle to strengthen civil society and consolidate institutional structures – whereas corruption increasingly disappears from the radar as it becomes accepted reality. Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-0-367-82285-9 SN - 978-0-367-42226-4 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4324/9780367822859-2 SP - 23 EP - 42 PB - Routledge CY - London ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Krüger, Hans-Peter T1 - Closed environment and open world BT - On the significance of Uexkull's biology for Helmuth Plessner's natural philosophy T2 - Jakob von Uexküll and philosophy: life, environments, anthropology N2 - According to Plessner, both adaptation and selection can be conceived not just as requested by the environment but also as actively proceeding from the organism. In this respect, Plessner finds in Uexküll’s new biology a powerful counterweight to the constraints of Darwinism. However, despite all the points in common in their respective understanding of the problem, Plessner reproaches to Uexküll to have entirely missed the intermediate layer of the lived body [Leib] between the organism and its environment. Unlike Uexküll, concerning the more developed animals, Plessner took up elements of animal psychology from Wolfgang Köhler and Frederik Jacobus Johannes Buytendijk. Finally, Plessner finds insufficiencies also in Uexküll’s distinction between the notion of world and the notion of environment, which would lead to the parallel positing of different environments. In reaction to Uexküll’s leveling of all environments, Plessner drafted a philosophical-anthropological spectrum between the intelligent way of living observed in the great apes, whose intelligence had been demonstrated, and the co-wordly life of the symbolic mind as seen in the personal sphere of human life. Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-0-429-27909-6 SN - 978-0-367-23273-3 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429279096 SP - 89 EP - 105 PB - Routledge CY - London ER -