TY - JOUR A1 - Ranaee, Mahdi T1 - Rezension zu: Pasnau, Robert: After certainty: a history of our epistemic ideals and illusions. - Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. - 384 pp. - ISBN: 978-0-19-885218-6 JF - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2020-2013 SN - 0003-9101 SN - 1613-0650 VL - 103 IS - 1 SP - 189 EP - 194 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ranaee, Mahdi T1 - Book review: de Boer, Karin: Kant’s reform of metaphysics: the critique of pure reason reconsidered. - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. - 290 pp. - ISBN: 978-11-0889798-3 JF - International journal of philosophical studies Y1 - 2021 SN - 9781108897983 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2021.1873545 SN - 0967-2559 SN - 1466-4542 VL - 29 IS - 1 SP - 121 EP - 126 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group CY - Abingdon ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - This other life that knows itself as life BT - comments on Karen Ng's Hegel's concept of life JF - European journal of philosophy N2 - In this paper, I discuss Karen Ng's reconstruction of Hegel's concept of life. On Ng's account, Hegel's conception of life has a remarkable double role to play: Life is both the proper object of judgment as well as a fundamental characterization of the activity of the judging subject. In a first step, I highlight the insight that Ng's account sheds on the internal connection of life and self-consciousness and the peculiar normativity of life. In a second step, I raise three concerns about Ng's strong focus on the logical notion of life which she characterizes as non-empirical and a priori. I argue that in order to uncover the full significance of the notion of life for Hegel we have to turn to his Philosophy of Nature and Spirit. Y1 - 2022 SN - 978-0-19-094761-3 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12745 SN - 0966-8373 SN - 1468-0378 N1 - Rezension zu: Ng, Karen: Hegel's concept of life : self-consciousness, freedon, logic. - New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020. - xiii, 319 p. - ISBN 978-0-19-094761-3 VL - 29 IS - 4 SP - 1136 EP - 1144 PB - Wiley-Blackwell CY - Oxford ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Haag, Johannes T1 - Intuiting the Original Unity? BT - Modality and Intellectual Intuition in Hölderlin’s Urteil und Sein JF - Kantian legacies in German idealism Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-032-00160-9 SP - 161 EP - 185 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group CY - New York ; London ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Spiegel, Thomas Jussuf T1 - The Scientific Weltanschauung BT - (Anti-)Naturalism in Dilthey, Jaspers and Analytic Philosophy JF - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy N2 - Different forms of methodological and ontological naturalism constitute the current near-orthodoxy in analytic philosophy. Many prominent figures have called naturalism a (scientific) image (Sellars, W. 1962. “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man.” In Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception, Reality, 1–40. Ridgeview Publishing), a Weltanschauung (Loewer, B. 2001. “From Physics to Physicalism.” In Physicalism and its Discontents, edited by C. Gillett, and B. Loewer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Stoljar, D. 2010. Physicalism. Routledge), or even a “philosophical ideology” (Kim, J. 2003. “The American Origins of Philosophical Naturalism.” Journal of Philosophical Research 28: 83–98). This suggests that naturalism is indeed something over-and-above an ordinary philosophical thesis (e.g. in contrast to the justified true belief-theory of knowledge). However, these thinkers fail to tease out the host of implications this idea – naturalism being a worldview – presents. This paper draws on (somewhat underappreciated) remarks of Dilthey and Jaspers on the concept of worldviews (Weltanschauung, Weltbild) in order to demonstrate that naturalism as a worldview is a presuppositional background assumption which is left untouched by arguments against naturalism as a thesis. The concluding plea is (in order to make dialectical progress) to re-organize the existing debate on naturalism in a way that treats naturalism not as a first-order philosophical claim, but rather shifts its focus on naturalism’s status as a worldview. KW - naturalism KW - ideology KW - Dilthey KW - Jaspers KW - scientific image KW - worldview Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2021-0016 SN - 2626-8329 SN - 2626-8310 VL - 2 IS - 2 SP - 259 EP - 276 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ; Boston ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - The struggle for recognition and the authority of the second person JF - European journal of philosophy N2 - In this introductory paper, I discuss the second-personal approach to ethics and the theory of recognition as two accounts of the fundamental sociality of the human form of life. The first section delineates the deep affinities between the two approaches. They both put a reciprocal social constellation front and center from which they derive the fundamental norms of moral and social life and a social conception of freedom. The second section discusses three points of contrast between the two approaches: The accounts differ in that the second-personal approach opts for a narrower conception of recognition focusing on mutual moral accountability, whereas recognition theory suggests a broader conception including relations of love, respect, and esteem. Secondly, the accounts differ as to how they conceive of the interrelation of the I-thou and the I-We relationship. Finally, they differ with regard to the way they think of struggles for recognition. Whereas the second-personal approach suggests that we can understand struggles on the basis of a transcendental infrastructure of second-personal address, the theory of recognition considers norms of recognition as themselves constituted by dialectical social struggles. The paper closes with a reflection on the ways in which both approaches can help us understand the social vulnerability of the human form of life. Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12675 SN - 0966-8373 SN - 1468-0378 VL - 29 IS - 3 SP - 552 EP - 561 PB - Wiley-Blackwell CY - Oxford ER - TY - GEN A1 - Spiegel, Thomas Jussuf T1 - The Scientific Weltanschauung BT - (Anti-)Naturalism in Dilthey, Jaspers and Analytic Philosophy T2 - Postprints der Universität Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe N2 - Different forms of methodological and ontological naturalism constitute the current near-orthodoxy in analytic philosophy. Many prominent figures have called naturalism a (scientific) image (Sellars, W. 1962. “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man.” In Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception, Reality, 1–40. Ridgeview Publishing), a Weltanschauung (Loewer, B. 2001. “From Physics to Physicalism.” In Physicalism and its Discontents, edited by C. Gillett, and B. Loewer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Stoljar, D. 2010. Physicalism. Routledge), or even a “philosophical ideology” (Kim, J. 2003. “The American Origins of Philosophical Naturalism.” Journal of Philosophical Research 28: 83–98). This suggests that naturalism is indeed something over-and-above an ordinary philosophical thesis (e.g. in contrast to the justified true belief-theory of knowledge). However, these thinkers fail to tease out the host of implications this idea – naturalism being a worldview – presents. This paper draws on (somewhat underappreciated) remarks of Dilthey and Jaspers on the concept of worldviews (Weltanschauung, Weltbild) in order to demonstrate that naturalism as a worldview is a presuppositional background assumption which is left untouched by arguments against naturalism as a thesis. The concluding plea is (in order to make dialectical progress) to re-organize the existing debate on naturalism in a way that treats naturalism not as a first-order philosophical claim, but rather shifts its focus on naturalism’s status as a worldview. T3 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe - 177 KW - naturalism KW - ideology KW - Dilthey KW - Jaspers KW - scientific image KW - worldview Y1 - 2022 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-542910 SN - 1866-8380 IS - 2 SP - 259 EP - 276 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Fuchs, Susanne A1 - Koenig, Laura L. A1 - Gerstenberg, Annette T1 - A longitudinal study of speech acoustics in older French females BT - analysis of the filler particle euh across utterance positions JF - Languages : open access journal N2 - Aging in speech production is a multidimensional process. Biological, cognitive, social, and communicative factors can change over time, stay relatively stable, or may even compensate for each other. In this longitudinal work, we focus on stability and change at the laryngeal and supralaryngeal levels in the discourse particle euh produced by 10 older French-speaking females at two times, 10 years apart. Recognizing the multiple discourse roles of euh, we divided out occurrences according to utterance position. We quantified the frequency of euh, and evaluated acoustic changes in formants, fundamental frequency, and voice quality across time and utterance position. Results showed that euh frequency was stable with age. The only acoustic measure that revealed an age effect was harmonics-to-noise ratio, showing less noise at older ages. Other measures mostly varied with utterance position, sometimes in interaction with age. Some voice quality changes could reflect laryngeal adjustments that provide for airflow conservation utterance-finally. The data suggest that aging effects may be evident in some prosodic positions (e.g., utterance-final position), but not others (utterance-initial position). Thus, it is essential to consider the interactions among these factors in future work and not assume that vocal aging is evident throughout the signal. KW - aging KW - prosody KW - voice quality KW - fundamental frequency KW - formants KW - filler KW - particles Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.3390/languages6040211 SN - 2226-471X VL - 6 IS - 4 PB - MDPI CY - Basel ER - TY - BOOK ED - Gentry, Gerad T1 - Kantian legacies in German idealism T3 - Routledge studies in nineteenth-century philosophy N2 - Scholarship on German Idealism typically couches the systems of Idealism in terms of a rejection of or departure from Kant's critical philosophy. The few accounts that do look to the positive influence of Kant on the Idealists typically focus on the perceived need among the Idealists to revise Kant's system due to various shortcomings arising from his dualism. This volume seeks to reverse this norm. It does this by bringing together an original set of critical reflections on the ways in which the German Idealists maintain specific and fundamental Kantian qualities in their own systems. At the same time, the aim of this volume is not a reduction of German Idealism to Kant's thought. Instead, this volume highlights a set of core ways in which the German Idealists retain specific, fundamentally Kantian principles and qualities. To that extent, this volume paves the way for new interpretations by laying the ground for identifying those significant components of German Idealism that can defensibly be called "Kantian. Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-032-00160-9 SN - 978-1-138-36736-4 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429429828 SN - 978-0-429-42982-8 PB - Routledge CY - New York ; London ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Brenner, Leon S. T1 - The autistic mirror in the real BT - Autism in Lacan’s mirror stage JF - Theory & psychology N2 - The mirror stage is one of Jacques Lacan's most well-received metapsychological models in the English-speaking world. In its many renditions Lacan elucidates the different forms of identification that lead to the construction of the Freudian ego. This article utilizes Lacan's mirror stage to provide a novel perspective on autistic embodiment. It develops an integrative model that accounts for the progression of four distinct forms of autistic identification in the mirror stage; these forms provide the basis for the development of four different clinical trajectories in the treatment of autism. This model is posed as an alternative to the clinical and diagnostic framework associated with the autistic spectrum disorder. KW - autism KW - Lacan KW - mirror stage KW - psychoanalysis KW - theory Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543211034569 SN - 0959-3543 SN - 1461-7447 VL - 31 IS - 6 SP - 950 EP - 972 PB - Sage Publ. CY - London ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Gentry, Gerad T1 - Hegel’s logic of purposiveness T2 - Kantian legacies in German idealism N2 - I argue that Hegel’s Logic traces an emergent-purposive, logical method that entails two key identities in reason. These identities are (1) between a logic of freedom and necessity, and (2) between the possibilities of a priori and a posteriori reasoning in a purposive method. The purposive method of the Logic is the basis for these identities and, in Hegel’s view, facilitates the transition from Kant’s transcendental idealism to absolute idealism. I suggest that this method is Hegel’s attempt to rework a critique of philosophy according to Kant’s insight about the principle grounding the formal purposiveness of the faculties, what Hegel calls, “one of Kant’s greatest services to philosophy.” Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-032-00160-9 SN - 978-1-138-36736-4 SN - 978-0-429-42982-8 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429429828 SP - 36 EP - 70 PB - Routledge CY - New York ; London ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Gentry, Gerad T1 - Introduction BT - the legacies of Kant in German Idealism T2 - Kantian legacies in German Idealism N2 - Kant wrote in the Critique of Pure Reason, “For the law of reason to seek unity is necessary, since without it we would have no reason, and without that, no coherent use of the understanding, and, lacking that, no sufficient mark of empirical truth.” This unity of reason, taken as a holistic condition, was central to the convictions of the idealists. To them, Kant layed bare the right path forward, but also fundamental failings in his execution of a critique of reason which needed to be overcome in order for reason to secure its own, internal end. In this chapter, I discuss key themes in the positive inheritance of Kant’s thought in classical German philosophy and offer an overview of the arguments and significances of each contribution to this volume. The aim is not to minimize important differences between Kant and post-Kantian Idealists, but rather to emphasize core retentions of Kant’s thought. Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-0-42942-982-8 SN - 978-1-032-00160-9 SN - 978-1-138-36736-4 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429429828 SP - 1 EP - 12 PB - Routledge CY - New York ER - TY - THES A1 - Seiberth, Luz Christopher T1 - Intentionality in Sellars BT - a Transcendental Account of Finite Knowledge T2 - Routledge studies in American philosophy N2 - This book argues that Sellars’ theory of intentionality can be understood as an advancement of a transcendental philosophical approach. It shows how Sellars develops his theory of intentionality through his engagement with the theoretical philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The book delivers a provocative reinterpretation of one of the most problematic and controversial concepts of Sellars' philosophy: the picturing-relation. Sellars' theory of intentionality addresses the question of how to reconcile two aspects that seem opposed: the non-relational theory of intellectual and linguistic content and a causal-transcendental theory of representation inspired by the philosophy of the early Wittgenstein. The author explains how both parts cohere in a transcendental account of finite knowledge. He claims that this can only be achieved by reading Sellars as committed to a transcendental methodology inspired by Kant. In a final step, he brings his interpretation to bear on the contemporary metaphilosophical debate on pragmatism and expressivism. Intentionality in Sellars will be of interest to scholars of Sellars and Kant, as well as researchers working in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the history of nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy. Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-032-11493-4 SN - 978-1-032-11758-4 SN - 978-1-003-22136-4 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003221364 PB - Routledge CY - New York, NY ER -