TY - JOUR A1 - Tsebelis, George A1 - Thies, Michael A1 - Cheibub, José Antonio A1 - Dixon, Rosalind A1 - Bogéa, Daniel A1 - Ganghof, Steffen T1 - Review symposium BT - beyond presidentialism and parliamentarism JF - European political science N2 - Steffen Ganghof’s Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: Democratic Design and the Separation of Powers (Oxford University Press, 2021) posits that “in a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not” (Ganghof, 2021). To consider, examine and theorise about this, Ganghof urges engagement with semi-parliamentarism. As explained by Ganghof, legislative power is shared between two democratically legitimate sections of parliament in a semi-parliamentary system, but only one of those sections selects the government and can remove it in a no-confidence vote. Consequently, power is dispersed and not concentrated in the hands of any one person, which, Ganghof argues, can lead to an enhanced form of parliamentary democracy. In this book review symposium, George Tsebelis, Michael Thies, José Antonio Cheibub, Rosalind Dixon and Daniel Bogéa review Steffen Ganghof’s book and engage with the author about aspects of research design, case selection and theoretical argument. This symposium arose from an engaging and constructive discussion of the book at a seminar hosted by Texas A&M University in 2022. We thank Prof José Cheibub (Texas A&M) for organising that seminar and Dr Anna Fruhstorfer (University of Potsdam) for initiating this book review symposium. KW - semi-parliamentary government KW - presidentialism KW - parliamentary government KW - separation of powers KW - legislatures KW - executives KW - parliamentary democracy Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-023-00426-9 SN - 1680-4333 SN - 1682-0983 PB - Palgrave Macmillan CY - Basingstoke ER - TY - THES A1 - Ganghof, Steffen A1 - Stecker, Christian T1 - Das institutionelle Design parlamentarischer Demokratien : zum Zusammenspiel von Wahl- und Gesetzessystemen Y1 - 2009 SN - 978- 3-531-15297-4 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Ganghof, Steffen A1 - Schulze, Kai ED - Wenzelburger, Georg ED - Zohlnhöfer, Reimut T1 - Vetospieler und Institutionen T2 - Handbuch Policy-Forschung N2 - Der Beitrag widmet sich zwei überaus fruchtbaren theoretischen Ansätzen in der Policy-Forschung und darüber hinaus: der Vetospielertheorie und Vetopunkt-Ansätzen. Neben den Grundzügen beider Ansätze stellen wir grundlegende Entwicklungslinien und Probleme dieser Literaturen anhand beispielhafter Studien dar. Es zeigt sich, dass beide Ansätze teils kontroverse Annahmen treffen, zu denen es plausible Alternativen gibt. Zum Beispiel kann das Verhalten von Koalitionsparteien im Policy-Prozess anders als von der Vetospielertheorie angenommen modelliert werden. Die kausalen Effekte bestimmter Institutionen oder Vetopunkte können zudem je nach Kontext variieren. Diesem Kontext sollte größere Beachtung geschenkt werden. KW - Vetospieler KW - Vetopunkte KW - formale Modelle KW - Präferenzen KW - Kontext Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-3-658-34559-4 SN - 978-3-658-34560-0 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-34560-0_4 SP - 101 EP - 125 PB - Springer CY - Wiesbaden ET - 2., aktualisierte und erweiterte ER - TY - THES A1 - Ganghof, Steffen A1 - Hönnig, Christoph A1 - Stecker, Christian T1 - Einleitung : Parlamente, Vetospieler und Agendakontrolle Y1 - 2009 SN - 978- 3-531-15297-4 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ganghof, Steffen A1 - Eppner, Sebastian A1 - Pörschke, Alexander T1 - Australian bicameralism as semi-parliamentarism BT - patterns of majority formation in 29 democracies JF - Australian Journal of Political Science N2 - The article analyses the type of bicameralism we find in Australia as a distinct executive-legislative system – a hybrid between parliamentary and presidential government – which we call ‘semi-parliamentary government’. We argue that this hybrid presents an important and underappreciated alternative to pure parliamentary government as well as presidential forms of the power-separation, and that it can achieve a certain balance between competing models or visions of democracy. We specify theoretically how the semi-parliamentary separation of powers contributes to the balancing of democratic visions and propose a conceptual framework for comparing democratic visions. We use this framework to locate the Australian Commonwealth, all Australian states and 22 advanced democratic nation-states on a two-dimensional empirical map of democratic patterns for the period from 1995 to 2015. KW - Executive-legislative relations KW - bicameralism KW - parliamentary government KW - presidential government KW - visions of democracy Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2018.1451487 SN - 1036-1146 SN - 1363-030X VL - 53 IS - 2 SP - 211 EP - 233 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group CY - Abingdon ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ganghof, Steffen A1 - Eppner, Sebastian A1 - Pörschke, Alexander T1 - Semi-parliamentary government in perspective BT - concepts, values, and designs JF - Australian Journal of Political Science N2 - The article responds to four commentaries on the concept of semi-parliamentary government and its application to Australian bicameralism. It highlights four main points: (1) Our preferred typology is not more ‘normative’ than existing approaches, but applies the criterion of ‘direct election’ equally to executive and legislature; (2) While the evolution of semi-parliamentary government had contingent elements, it plausibly also reflects the ‘equilibrium’ nature of certain institutional configurations; (3) The idea that a pure parliamentary system with pure proportional representation has absolute normative priority over ‘instrumentalist’ concerns about cabinet stability, identifiability and responsibility is questionable; and (4) The reforms we discuss may be unlikely to occur in Australia, but deserve consideration by scholars and institutional reformers in other democratic systems. KW - Executive-legislative relations KW - bicameralism KW - visions of democracy KW - parliamentary government KW - presidential government Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2018.1451488 SN - 1036-1146 SN - 1363-030X VL - 53 IS - 2 SP - 264 EP - 269 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group CY - Abingdon ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ganghof, Steffen T1 - A new political system model BT - Semi-parliamentary government JF - European Journal for Political Research N2 - Semi-parliamentary government is a distinct executive-legislative system that mirrors semi-presidentialism. It exists when the legislature is divided into two equally legitimate parts, only one of which can dismiss the prime minister in a no-confidence vote. This system has distinct advantages over pure parliamentary and presidential systems: it establishes a branch-based separation of powers and can balance the ‘majoritarian’ and ‘proportional’ visions of democracy without concentrating executive power in a single individual. This article analyses bicameral versions of semi-parliamentary government in Australia and Japan, and compares empirical patterns of democracy in the Australian Commonwealth as well as New South Wales to 20 advanced parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. It discusses new semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require formal bicameralism, and pays special attention to semi-parliamentary options for democratising the European Union. KW - semi-parliamentarism KW - bicameralism KW - Australia KW - New South Wales KW - Japan Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12224 SN - 0304-4130 SN - 1475-6765 VL - 57 IS - 2 SP - 261 EP - 281 PB - Wiley CY - Hoboken ER - TY - GEN A1 - Ganghof, Steffen T1 - Designing Democratic Constitutions BT - The Search for Optimality T2 - Postprints der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe N2 - This article analyses salient trade-offs in the design of democracy. It grounds this analysis in a distinction between two basic models of democracy: simple and complex majoritarianism. These models differ not only in their electoral and party systems, but also in the style of coalition-building. Simple majoritarianism concentrates executive power in a single majority party; complex majoritarianism envisions the formation of shifting, issue-specific coalitions among multiple parties whose programs differ across multiple conflict dimensions. The latter pattern of coalition formation is very difficult to create and sustain under pure parliamentary government. A separation of powers between executive and legislature can facilitate such a pattern, while also achieving central goals of simple majoritarianism: identifiable cabinet alternatives before the election and stable cabinets afterward. The separation of powers can thus balance simple and complex majoritarianism in ways that are unavailable under parliamentarism. The article also compares the presidential and semi-parliamentary versions of the separation of powers. It argues that the latter has important advantages, e.g., when it comes to resolving inter-branch deadlock, as it avoids the concentration of executive power in a single human being. T3 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe - 120 KW - electoral systems KW - parliamentary government KW - presidential government KW - semi-parliamentary government Y1 - 2020 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-445408 SN - 1867-5808 IS - 120 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ganghof, Steffen T1 - The Empirical Uses of Theoretical Models BT - the Case of Veto Player Theory JF - Political studies review N2 - Veto player theory is a powerful approach to comparative politics. This article argues that the debate about its explanatory success would benefit from more systematic distinctions. The theory not only comes in different theoretical variants, it is also used in radically different ways empirically. Starting from recent debates about the ‘testing’ of theoretical models, the article distinguishes five ways in which theoretical models can be used empirically: contrastive, axiomatic, exploratory, presumptive and modular. The typology is applied to veto player theory and illustrated with exemplary studies and debates. The article concludes that each type raises different questions that should be answered in individual studies. Moreover, while veto player theory has an excellent track record on four empirical uses, the picture on its contrastive use is far more nuanced. More explicitly contrastive testing of the theory is desirable. KW - veto player theory KW - theory testing KW - empirical implications of theoretical models KW - contrastive empiricism Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/1478-9302.12098 SN - 1478-9299 SN - 1478-9302 VL - 15 SP - 49 EP - 59 PB - Sage Publ. CY - London ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ganghof, Steffen T1 - Review article: Democratic inclusiveness : a reinterpretation of Lijphart's patterns of democracy N2 - This contribution to the study or democratic inclusiveness advances three main claims, based on Lijphart's original data First, his measurement of executive inclusiveness is incoherent and invalid. Secondly, executive inclusiveness is best explained by the interaction of many parties and strong legislative veto points. This implies that executive inclusiveness should not be contained in either of Lijphart's two dimensions of democracy. Thirdly, parties have incentives to economize on the costs of inclusive coalitions by avoiding strong legislative veto points, and these incentives are greater in parliamentary than in presidential systems. Hence. Lijphart's favourite version of consensus democracy - characterized by a parliamentary system and a high degree of executive inclusiveness - is unlikely to be a behavioural-institutional equilibrium. Y1 - 2010 UR - http://journals.cambridge.org/jid_JPS U6 - https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123410000128 SN - 0007-1234 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ganghof, Steffen T1 - Equality-based comparison how to justify democratic institutions in the Real World JF - Politics N2 - Political scientists regularly justify particular democratic institutions. This article explores two desiderata for such justifications. The first is a formal equality baseline which puts the burden of justification on those who favour more unequal institutions. This baseline is seen as an implication of the rule of law. The second desideratum, the comparison requirement, builds on the first: adequate justifications of particular institutions must compare them to the best alternative, and this comparison must consider the costs for political equality. The two desiderata are applied to political science debates about the proportionality of the electoral system and bicameral systems of legislative decision-making. KW - electoral systems KW - second chambers KW - political equality KW - institutional design KW - public justification Y1 - 2013 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.12002 SN - 0263-3957 VL - 33 IS - 2 SP - 101 EP - 111 PB - Wiley-Blackwell CY - Hoboken ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ganghof, Steffen T1 - Does public reason require super-majoritarian democracy? Liberty, equality, and history in the justification of political institutions JF - Politics, philosophy & economics N2 - The project of public-reason liberalism faces a basic problem: publicly justified principles are typically too abstract and vague to be directly applied to practical political disputes, whereas applicable specifications of these principles are not uniquely publicly justified. One solution could be a legislative procedure that selects one member from the eligible set of inconclusively justified proposals. Yet if liberal principles are too vague to select sufficiently specific legislative proposals, can they, nevertheless, select specific legislative procedures? Based on the work of Gerald Gaus, this article argues that the only candidate for a conclusively justified decision procedure is a majoritarian or otherwise 'neutral' democracy. If the justification of democracy requires an equality baseline in the design of political regimes and if justifications for departure from this baseline are subject to reasonable disagreement, a majoritarian design is justified by default. Gaus's own preference for super-majoritarian procedures is based on disputable specifications of justified liberal principles. These procedures can only be defended as a sectarian preference if the equality baseline is rejected, but then it is not clear how the set of justifiable political regimes can be restricted to full democracies. KW - public-reason liberalism KW - democracy KW - coercion KW - political equality KW - majority rule KW - Gerald Gaus Y1 - 2013 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X12447786 SN - 1470-594X VL - 12 IS - 2 SP - 179 EP - 196 PB - Sage Publ. CY - Thousand Oaks ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ganghof, Steffen T1 - Bicameralism as a form of government (Or: Why Australia and Japan do not have a parliamentary system) JF - Parliamentary affairs : a journal of representative politics N2 - The article analyses a certain type of bicameralism not merely as a form of legislative organisation, but as a form of government-as a hybrid between parliamentarism and presidentialism. A new typology of pure and hybrid forms of government is proposed, which classifies bicameralism in Australia and Japan as chamber-independent government. This type is systematically compared with other forms of government, including hybrids like semi-presidentialism, elected prime-ministerial government in Israel (from 1996 to 2002) and assembly-independent government in Switzerland. The article highlights how chamber-independent government has the potential to combine different visions of democracy without leading to presidentialisation of political parties. Y1 - 2014 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gss081 SN - 0031-2290 SN - 1460-2482 VL - 67 IS - 3 SP - 647 EP - 663 PB - Oxford Univ. Press CY - Oxford ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ganghof, Steffen T1 - The order of public reason a theory of freedom and morality in a diverse and bounded world JF - Politische Vierteljahresschrift : Zeitschrift der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft Y1 - 2012 SN - 0032-3470 VL - 53 IS - 4 SP - 692 EP - 695 PB - Nomos CY - Hannover ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ganghof, Steffen T1 - The Regime-Trilemma: On the Relationship between the Executive and Legislature in advanced Democracies JF - Politische Vierteljahresschrift : Zeitschrift der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft N2 - A comprehensive typology of basic executive formats is presented and linked to a discussion of tradeoffs in the design of executive-legislative relations. The focus is on the tradeoffs between three goals: (1) programmatic parties, (2) identifiable cabinets and (3) issue -specific legislative coalitions. To include semi-presidentialism into the typology in a logically consistent manner, a heretofore neglected executive format has to be defined, which is labelled semi-parliamentarism. Based on a discussion of Australian states, it is argued that semi-parliamentarism has the potential to mitigate the trilemma. KW - executive-legislative relations KW - semi-parliamentarism KW - bicameralism Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5771/0032-3470-2016-1-27 SN - 0032-3470 SN - 1862-2860 VL - 57 SP - 27 EP - + PB - Nomos CY - Hannover ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ganghof, Steffen T1 - Research Design in Political Science - Causal perspectives versus contrastive theory testing JF - Austrian journal of political science N2 - Die politikwissenschaftliche Literatur unterscheidet zwei Grundtypen von Forschungsdesigns: x- und y-zentriert. Dieser Beitrag argumentiert, dass ein „kontrastives“ Forschungsdesign als dritter Grundtyp abgegrenzt werden sollte. Die drei Designs unterscheiden sich durch die Anzahl der betrachteten Theorien und dadurch, ob mehrere Theorien konkurrierend oder komplementär sind. Die typologische Abgrenzung des kontrastiven Designs verdeutlicht auch die Vor- und Nachteile x- und y-zentrierter Designs. Anhand verschiedener Beispielstudien (experimentell und nicht-experimentell, quantitativ und qualitativ) werden die Charakteristika der drei Designs sowie ihre Kombinationsmöglichkeiten herausgearbeitet. Darüber hinaus wird das kontrastive Design als verbindendes Element zwischen den quantitativen und qualitativen Forschungs-„Kulturen“ hervorgehoben. The political science literature distinguishes two basic types of research designs: x- and y-centered. The article argues for the distinction of a third basic type: the "contrastive" design. The three designs differ in the number of relevant theories and in whether they see theories as competing or complementary. The typological differentiation of the contrastive research design helps to clarify the pros and cons of x- and y-centered designs. The article uses exemplary studies (experimental and observational, quantitative and qualitative) to illustrate the characteristics of the three designs as well as the possibilities of combining them. The contrastive design also constitutes a common element of the quantitative and qualitative research, "cultures". KW - Forschungsdesign, kausale Perspektiven, Theorietest, x-zentriert, y-zentriert, Experimente KW - research design KW - causal perspectives KW - theory test KW - effects of causes KW - causes of effects KW - experiments Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.15203/ozp.1037.vol45iss1 SN - 2313-5433 VL - 45 SP - 1 EP - 12 PB - Österreichische Gesellschaft für Politikwissenschaft CY - Wien ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ganghof, Steffen T1 - Designing Democratic Constitutions BT - The Search for Optimality JF - Politics and Governance N2 - This article analyses salient trade-offs in the design of democracy. It grounds this analysis in a distinction between two basic models of democracy: simple and complex majoritarianism. These models differ not only in their electoral and party systems, but also in the style of coalition-building. Simple majoritarianism concentrates executive power in a single majority party; complex majoritarianism envisions the formation of shifting, issue-specific coalitions among multiple parties whose programs differ across multiple conflict dimensions. The latter pattern of coalition formation is very difficult to create and sustain under pure parliamentary government. A separation of powers between executive and legislature can facilitate such a pattern, while also achieving central goals of simple majoritarianism: identifiable cabinet alternatives before the election and stable cabinets afterward. The separation of powers can thus balance simple and complex majoritarianism in ways that are unavailable under parliamentarism. The article also compares the presidential and semi-parliamentary versions of the separation of powers. It argues that the latter has important advantages, e.g., when it comes to resolving inter-branch deadlock, as it avoids the concentration of executive power in a single human being. KW - electoral systems KW - parliamentary government KW - presidential government KW - semi-parliamentary government Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v7i4.2239 SN - 2183-2463 VL - 7 IS - 4 SP - 243 EP - 253 PB - Cogitatio Press CY - Lisbon ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ganghof, Steffen T1 - Reconciling Representation and Accountability: Three Visions of Democracy Compared JF - Government & opposition : an international journal of comparative politics N2 - An egalitarian approach to the fair representation of voters specifies three main institutional requirements: proportional representation, legislative majority rule and a parliamentary system of government. This approach faces two challenges: the under-determination of the resulting democratic process and the idea of a trade-off between equal voter representation and government accountability. Linking conceptual with comparative analysis, the article argues that we can distinguish three ideal-typical varieties of the egalitarian vision of democracy, based on the stages at which majorities are formed. These varieties do not put different relative normative weight onto equality and accountability, but have different conceptions of both values and their reconciliation. The view that accountability is necessarily linked to ‘clarity of responsibility’, widespread in the comparative literature, is questioned – as is the idea of a general trade-off between representation and accountability. Depending on the vision of democracy, the two values need not be in conflict. KW - visions of democracy KW - political equality KW - accountability Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2015.15 SN - 0017-257X SN - 1477-7053 VL - 51 SP - 209 EP - 233 PB - Cambridge Univ. Press CY - Cambridge ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ganghof, Steffen T1 - Four Visions of Democracy: Powell's Elections as Instruments of Democracy and beyond JF - Political studies review N2 - The article critically reviews the conceptual ideas of G. Bingham Powell's Elections as Instruments of Democracy and explores ways to develop them further. Powell's conceptual alternative to the Westminster model - the 'proportional' vision of democracy - comes in two variants, one focusing on proportional representation ( PR) and the other on proportional legislative influence. If one focuses on the former, it is possible to distinguish four visions of parliamentary democracy based on the main stage at which majorities are formed. The four stages are: party, alliance, cabinet, and law formation. The corresponding normative visions can be placed on a conceptual continuum between 'simple' and 'complex' majoritarianism. This article discusses the goals and trade-offs associated with them as well as their underlying institutional designs. It also re-emphasises Powell's insight that the congruence between policy makers and the median voter in a unidimensional policy space is a more appropriate normative standard for some visions of democracy than for others. KW - G. Bingham Powell KW - visions of democracy KW - ideological congruence KW - simple majoritarianism KW - complex majoritarianism Y1 - 2015 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/1478-9302.12069 SN - 1478-9299 SN - 1478-9302 VL - 13 IS - 1 SP - 69 EP - 79 PB - Wiley-Blackwell CY - Hoboken ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Ganghof, Steffen ED - Tausendpfund, Markus T1 - Typen von Forschungsdesigns T2 - Forschungsstrategien in den Sozialwissenschaften N2 - Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungsdesigns umfassen alle wesentlichen Entscheidungen, die im Forschungsprozess getroffen werden müssen. Der Beitrag unterscheidet drei rundlegende Typen von Forschungsdesigns: x-zentriert, y-zentriert und kontrastiv. Das x-zentrierte Design versucht einen theoretisch spezifizierten kausalen Effekt zu identifizieren und dessen Größe möglichst genau und ohne Verzerrungen zu schätzen. Das y-zentrierte Design versucht mehrere komplementäre Theorien über kausale Effekte so zu kombinieren, dass bestimmte Phänomene möglichst gut erklärt werden. Das kontrastive Design vergleicht die Erklärungskraft von zwei oder mehr konkurrierenden Theorien. Die Unterscheidung der drei Typen ist für qualitative Fallstudien ebenso relevant wie für Experimente oder statistische Studien mit Beobachtungsdaten. Der Beitrag grenzt die drei Typen voneinander ab, erklärt ihre jeweiligen Annahmen und diskutiert ihre Vor- und Nachteile sowie die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen ihrer Kombination. Daneben diskutiert er den Unterschied zwischen Modellen und Theorien sowie die Bedeutung des Sparsamkeitsprinzips bei der Entwicklung und Bewertung wissenschaftlicher Theorien und Erklärungen. Y1 - 2022 SN - 978-3-658-36971-2 SN - 978-3-658-36972-9 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-36972-9_11 SP - 257 EP - 286 PB - Springer VS CY - Wiesbaden ER -