TY - JOUR A1 - Baehrens, Konstantin A1 - Voigt, Frank T1 - Die Problemgeschichte wird tatsächlich zur Geschichte der Probleme BT - Geschichtliche Totalität und Augenblick bei Walter Benjamin und Georg Lukacs JF - Material und Begriff ; Arbeitsverfahren und theoretische Beziehungen Walter Benjamins Y1 - 2019 SN - 978-3-86754-322-4 SP - 193 EP - 242 PB - Argument CY - Hamburg ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ette, Ottmar ED - Vogel, Jacob T1 - Schreiben zwischen den Welten JF - Europa : die Gegenwart unserer Geschichte ; Band III, Globale Verflechtungen Y1 - 2019 SN - 978-3-8062-4021-4 SP - 419 EP - 427 PB - wbg Theiss CY - Darmstadt ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Haag, Johannes A1 - Hoeppner, Till T1 - Denken und Welt – Wege kritischer Metaphysik T1 - Thinking and World - Ways of more critical Metaphysics JF - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung N2 - Wird Metaphysik realistisch verstanden, so ist sie mit dem Anspruch verbunden, in objektiver Weise von der grundlegenden Beschaffenheit und Ordnung der Welt (oder Realität, Wirklichkeit etc.) zu handeln. Damit beansprucht sie die Möglichkeit von Objektivität, d. h. die Möglichkeit der Repräsentation der grundlegenden Beschaffenheit und Ordnung einer Welt, die von uns und unserer Repräsentation verschieden ist. Realistisch verstandene Metaphysik verfährt dogmatisch, wenn sie ihre eigene Möglichkeit einfach voraussetzt. Eine dogmatische Metaphysik ist unkritisch, weil sie ohne eine Untersuchung der Frage betrieben wird, wie eine objektive und adäquate Repräsentation der grundlegenden Beschaffenheit und Ordnung der Welt überhaupt möglich ist. Im Unterschied dazu nennen wir eine realistische Metaphysik in einem vorläufigen Sinne kritisch, sofern sie ihren Ausgang von einer Untersuchung dieser Möglichkeit nimmt und erst auf der Grundlage positiver Ergebnisse dieser Untersuchung einen – vor diesem Hintergrund nunmehr gerechtfertigten – Objektivitätsanspruch erhebt. N2 - We begin by considering two common ways of conceiving critical metaphysics. According to the first (and polemical) conception, critical metaphysics analyses nothing more than the form of thought and thereby misses the proper point of metaphysics, namely to investigate the form of reality. According to the second (and affirmative) conception, critical metaphysics starts from the supposed insight that the form of reality can’t be other than the form of thought and it is thus not necessary to analyse anything but that form. We argue that the first conception is too weak while the second is too strong. Then we sketch an alternative conception of critical metaphysics, a conception we find expressed both in Kant’s B-Deduction and in the way Barry Stroud has recently investigated the possibilities of metaphysics. According to such a conception, a properly critical metaphysics needs to proceed in two steps: first, it needs to analyze the most general and necessary form of any thought that is about an objective reality at all; second, it needs to investigate how that form of thought relates to the reality it purports to represent. But unlike Kant, Stroud remains sceptical regarding the possibility of a satisfying transition from thought to reality in metaphysics. We argue that this dissatisfaction can be traced back to a notion of objectivity and reality in terms of complete mind-independence. Then we sketch an alternative notion of objectivity and reality in terms of distinctness from subjects and acts of thinking, and argue that it is that notion that allows Kant, with his Transcendental Idealism, to make the transition required for any satisfying metaphysics, namely that from the form of thought to reality. KW - critical metaphysics KW - Stroud KW - Kant KW - objectivity KW - transcendental idealism Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2019-0006 SN - 0012-1045 SN - 2192-1482 VL - 67 IS - 1 SP - 76 EP - 97 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Krüger, Hans-Peter T1 - How is the Human Life-Form of Mind Really Possible in Nature? BT - Parallels Between John Dewey and Helmuth Plessner JF - Human studies N2 - J. Dewey and H. Plessner both and independently of one another treated the central question of what new task philosophy must set itself if the assumption is correct that the life-form of mind, i.e., the mental life-form of humans, arose in nature and must also sustain itself in the future within nature. If nature has to reconceived so as to make the irreducible qualities of life and mind truly possible, then it can no longer be restricted to the role of physical material. Conversely humans cannot no longer take on the role of God outside and independent of nature. Instead these philosophers distinguish between three plateaus (Dewey) or stages (Plessner), between physical (inorganic) nature, psycho-physical (living) nature and the nature that is mental life. This distinction is drawn such that a connection between the plateaus is truly possible. The third level, that of the mental form of life, answers mentally within conduct to the break with the first two levels. Hence it depends in the future as well on the continuously renewed difference (between the precarious and the stable for Dewey, between immediacy and mediation for Plessner) in our experience of nature. Within this difference nature as a whole remains an open unknown, which is why we can credit Dewey with a philosophy of diversified and negative holism, Plessner with a differential philosophy of the negativity of the absolute. KW - Evolution of the human KW - Non-reductive naturalism KW - Open holism KW - Life forms KW - Philosophical anthropology KW - Presuppositions of evolution Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-017-9429-5 SN - 0163-8548 SN - 1572-851X VL - 42 IS - 1 SP - 47 EP - 64 PB - Springer CY - Dordrecht ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Montemayor, Carlos T1 - On the human uniqueness of the temporal reasoning system JF - Behavioral and brain sciences : an international journal of current research and theory with open peer commentary N2 - A central claim by Hoerl & McCormack is that the temporal reasoning system is uniquely human. But why exactly? This commentary evaluates two possible options to justify the thesis that temporal reasoning is uniquely human, one based on considerations regarding agency and the other based on language. The commentary raises problems for both of these options. Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19000335 SN - 0140-525X SN - 1469-1825 VL - 42 PB - Cambridge Univ. Press CY - New York ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Müller, Christian Th. ED - Vogel, Jakob T1 - Die Kalaschnikow, eine Kriegsikone JF - Europa : die Gegenwart unserer Geschichte ; Band III, Globale Verflechtung Y1 - 2019 SN - 978-3-8062-4021-4 SP - 261 EP - 264 PB - wbg Theiss CY - Darmstadt ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Pirwitz, Anne T1 - Romanian Migrants in Western Europe BT - Expectations, Challenges and the Importance of their Networks JF - Philologica Jassyensia N2 - This article aims to sum up the main results of a research project made in 2016 and 2017 about the situation of 1190 Romanian migrants in Western Europe and to give an overview about the push and pull factors, transnational family structures, as well as the challenges and difficulties of the Romanian survey respondents living in Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy. It also considers the role of personal networks which represent an important motor of migration and constitute the main motive for the choice of a certain destination region. These migration networks lead to the construction of transnational social spaces between Romania and the destination country and have high influence in the search for housing or jobs but can also influence the integration process abroad. KW - Romanian migration KW - migration networks KW - transnational families KW - labor migration Y1 - 2019 SN - 1841-5377 SN - 2247-8353 VL - 15 IS - 1 SP - 221 EP - 230 PB - Editura Tracus Arte CY - Bucharest ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Rosso, Enrico T1 - Ein „Zusammengehen ohne Zusammenkommen“. Der Entstehungsprozess des intellektuellen Netzwerkes um die Zeitschrift Die Kreatur JF - Naharaim N2 - Eine Gruppe, gar eine innerlich verbundene Gemeinschaft, können Intellektuelle im Normalfall nur bilden, soweit sie von gleichem Denken und Wollen bewegt werden […]. Wo dagegen die von den Intellektuellen vertretenen Ansichten weit divergieren, da kann es nur unter sehr kritischen Umständen geschehen, daß die verschieden gearteten (sozialen, politischen, rechtlichen, kulturellen, religiösen) Standpunkte und Anliegen – auf Zeit – sich zusammenfinden […]. Das polemische Element, das kritischen Intellektuellen ja wesensmäßig zu eigen ist, bringt am ehesten eine gemeinsame Front zwischen ihnen zustande. N2 - This research article aims to deliver an analytical representation of the intellectual environment of the culture journal Die Kreatur (1926-1930), a religious-dialogical quarterly edited by Martin Buber, Joseph Wittig, and Viktor von Weizsacker and enlivened by some of the most prominent figures of German-Jewish interwar culture (among others W. Benjamin, H. S. Bergman, E. Rosenstock-Huessy, F. Rosenzweig, E. Simon, and L. Strauss). Building on a recognition of the problematic relationship between the dialogical model claimed in the programmatic foreword of the journal and the group narratives enacted by its key contributors, the study attempts to outline the formation process of the intellectual plexus of the journal and to provide a differentiated analysis of its singular constituents via a sociologically informed framework. The representation of the intellectual network of Die Kreatur in accordance with the model of a "circle of circles" provides insight into the elusive dialectic of interaction and divergence that determines the relations between the main actors of the journal and thus contributes to unfold the interplay of biographical intersections and conceptual synergies, as well as incongruities, frictions, and contradictory instances that determines its editorial and philosophical profile. T2 - A "Going Together without Coming Together". The Process of Creating the intellectual Network around the magazine Die Kreatur KW - German-Jewish Literature KW - Cultural Journal KW - Buber KW - Martin KW - Rosenzweig KW - Franz KW - Die Kreatur Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/naha-2019-0006 SN - 1862-9148 SN - 1862-9156 VL - 13 IS - 1-2 SP - 73 EP - 97 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Rosso, Enrico T1 - Moskauer Passagen BT - eine konzeptionelle Arbeit am Moskau-Aufsatz im Licht des Verhältnisses Benjamins zum Zeitschriftenprojekt Die Kreatur JF - Material und Begriff ; Arbeitsverfahren und theoretische Beziehungen Walter Benjamins Y1 - 2019 SN - 978-3-86754-322-4 SP - 102 EP - 134 PB - Argument CY - Hamburg ER - TY - JOUR A1 - von Kalckreuth, Moritz Alexander T1 - Wie viel Religionsphilosophie braucht es für eine Philosophie der Person? JF - Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie N2 - Der vorliegende Beitrag erörtert das Verhältnis einer Philo-sophie der Person zur Religionsphilosophie bzw. einer Philosophie religiöser Phänomene. Dabei soll die These vertreten werden, dass der personale Lebenszusammenhang bestimmte Phänomene aufweist, die nur in einem religiösen Kontext adäquat verstanden werden können. Die Interpretation dieser Phänomene kann einen Zugang zu bestimmten Aspekten von Personalität ermöglichen, die von den meisten Persontheorien der Gegenwart kaum beachtet werden. KW - person KW - personhood KW - religion KW - emotion KW - numinous KW - Max Scheler Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/nzsth-2019-0004 SN - 0028-3517 SN - 1612-9520 VL - 61 IS - 1 SP - 67 EP - 83 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - von Kalckreuth, Moritz Alexander T1 - Expansivität, Objektivität und Aktualität des Betroffenseins T1 - Expansiveness, objectivity, and actuality in affection T1 - ЭКСПАНСИВНОСТЬ, ОБЪЕКТИВНОСТЬ И АКТУАЛЬНОСТЬ АФФЕКТИВНОСТИ BT - Nicolai Hartmenn's Theory of Person, it's position in his Ontology of Intellectual Being and it's relations to Phenomenology BT - Nicolai Hartmanns Theorie der Person, ihre Verortung in seiner Ontologie geistigen Seins und ihr Verhältnis zur Phänomenologie BT - ТЕОРИЯ ЛИЧНОСТИ НИКОЛАЯ ГАРТМАНА, ЕЕ МЕСТО В ЕГО ОНТОЛОГИИ ДУХОВНОГО БЫТИЯ И ЕЕ ОТНОШЕНИЕ К ОНТОЛОГИИ JF - Horizon : studies in phenomenology : Studien zur Phänomenologie : fenomenologičeskie issledovanija : études phénoménologiques N2 - The aim of this paper is to discuss Nicolai Hartmann’s conception of personhood as developed in his philosophy of spiritual being. Many contemporary accounts of personhood are systematically focused on rational phenomena as self-consciousness or practical reasoning, which are understood as ‘conditions of personhood’. Apart from having some technical problems, those accounts limit our self-under-standing as persons on distinct rational properties and often fail to consider the sociocultural aspects of the personal situation. Nicolai Hartmann — although respecting the role of reason — understands personhood particularly as participation in a shared spiritual sphere called Objektiver Geist (objective spirit), which includes various intersubjective phenomena as languages, religion, moral, arts, and the sciences. Being part of this sphere seems to be more fundamental than having distinct rational properties, which requests a spiritual frame to be exerted. Further it is shown that Hartmann’s ontology of person also includes a notion of being affected by the existential weight of situations and other person’s actions — an idea often maintained by phenomenological positions. By regarding rational, intersubjective and affective aspects, Hartmann’s philosophy of person succeeds in offering a broad articulation of our self-understanding and may also be seen as providing a background to understand certain phenomena that are part of the personal situation. N2 - Целью данного исследования является анализ концепции личности у Николая Гартмана, разработанной в контексте его философии духовного бытия. Многие современные концепции личности фокусируются систематическим образом на рациональном феномене самосознания или практическом основании, которые и понимаются как «условия личности». Кроме того, что эти концепции имеют ряд технических проблем для своей реализации, они ограничивают са- мопонимание личности определенными рациональными свойствами и зачастую не способны учитывать социокультурный аспект личностной жизни. Николай Гартман — несмотря на его уважительное отношение к рациональному осмыслению — понимает личность в контексте ее участия в общей духовной сфере, названной объективным духом, который включает в себя различные интерсубъективные феномены, такие как языки, религия, мораль, искусство и наука. Способ бытия как часть этой сферы, по-видимому, более фундаментален, чем обладание конкретными рациональными свойствами, что в свою очередь предполагает наличие духовных ограничений. Также в статье показывается, что онтология личности у Гартмана подразумевает понятие аффектации экзистенциальной тяжестью ситуации и воздействием других личностей, что, в свою очередь, является расхожей идеей в феноменологии. Если принимать в расчет рациональные, интерсубъективные и аффективные аспекты, то философия личности Гартмана предлагает широкий спектр самопонимания личности и предлагает условия для постижения определенных феноменов, образующих личностную ситуацию. KW - Nicolai Hartmann KW - personhood KW - person KW - spiritual being KW - phenomenology KW - ontology KW - body KW - affection Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-1-211-229 SN - 2226-5260 SN - 2311-6986 VL - 8 IS - 1 SP - 211 EP - 229 PB - St. Petersburg University Press CY - St. Petersburg ER -