TY - JOUR A1 - Haag, Johannes T1 - A kantian critique of sellars transcendental realism JF - Wilfrid Sellars, Idealism, and Realism: Understanding Psychological Nominalism Y1 - 2017 SN - 978-1-4742-3895-3 SN - 978-1-4742-3893-9 SN - 978-1-4742-3894-6 SP - 149 EP - 171 PB - Bloomsbury CY - London ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Fuchs, Susanne A1 - Koenig, Laura L. A1 - Gerstenberg, Annette T1 - A longitudinal study of speech acoustics in older French females BT - analysis of the filler particle euh across utterance positions JF - Languages : open access journal N2 - Aging in speech production is a multidimensional process. Biological, cognitive, social, and communicative factors can change over time, stay relatively stable, or may even compensate for each other. In this longitudinal work, we focus on stability and change at the laryngeal and supralaryngeal levels in the discourse particle euh produced by 10 older French-speaking females at two times, 10 years apart. Recognizing the multiple discourse roles of euh, we divided out occurrences according to utterance position. We quantified the frequency of euh, and evaluated acoustic changes in formants, fundamental frequency, and voice quality across time and utterance position. Results showed that euh frequency was stable with age. The only acoustic measure that revealed an age effect was harmonics-to-noise ratio, showing less noise at older ages. Other measures mostly varied with utterance position, sometimes in interaction with age. Some voice quality changes could reflect laryngeal adjustments that provide for airflow conservation utterance-finally. The data suggest that aging effects may be evident in some prosodic positions (e.g., utterance-final position), but not others (utterance-initial position). Thus, it is essential to consider the interactions among these factors in future work and not assume that vocal aging is evident throughout the signal. KW - aging KW - prosody KW - voice quality KW - fundamental frequency KW - formants KW - filler KW - particles Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.3390/languages6040211 SN - 2226-471X VL - 6 IS - 4 PB - MDPI CY - Basel ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Sala, Lorenzo A1 - Kabeshkin, Anton T1 - A priori philosophy of nature in Hegel and German rationalism JF - British journal for the history of philosophy : Bjhp N2 - Hegel's many remarks that seem to imply that philosophy should proceed completely a priori pose a problem for his philosophy of nature since, on this reading, Hegel offers an a priori derivation of empirical results of natural sciences. We show how this perception can be mitigated by interpreting Hegel's remarks as broadly in line with the pre-Kantian rationalist notion of a priori and offer reasons for doing so. We show that, rather than being a peculiarity of Hegel's philosophy, the practice of demonstrating a priori the results of empirical sciences was widespread in the pre-Kantian rationalist tradition. We argue that this practice was intelligible in light of the notion of a priori that was still quite prominent during Hegel's life. This notion of a priori differs from Kant's in that, while the latter's notion concerns propositions, the former concerned only their demonstration. According to it, the same proposition could be demonstrated both a posteriori and a priori. Post-Kantian idealists likewise developed projects of demonstrating specific scientific contents a priori. We then make our discussion more concrete by examining a particular case of an a priori derivation of a natural law, namely the law of fall, by both Leibniz and Hegel. KW - Hegel KW - Philosophy of Nature KW - a priori KW - Wolff KW - Leibniz Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2022.2044753 SN - 0960-8788 SN - 1469-3526 VL - 30 IS - 5 SP - 797 EP - 817 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group CY - London ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Haag, Johannes T1 - Analytic Kantianism BT - Sellars and McDowell on Sensory Consciousness JF - Con-textos kantianos : international journal of philosophy N2 - Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell can both be read as proponents of Analytic Kantianism. However, their accounts differ in important detail. In particular, McDowell has criticized Sellars’s account of sensory consciousness in a number of papers (most notably in LFI and SC), both as a reading of Kant and on its systematic merits. The present paper offers a detailed analysis of this criticism and a defense of Sellars’s position against the background of a methodology of transcendental philosophy. KW - Kant KW - Sellars KW - McDowell KW - Transcendental Philosophy KW - perception KW - intuition KW - judgment Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1092766 SN - 2386-7655 SP - 18 EP - 41 PB - Instituto de Filosofía del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas CY - Madrid ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bruno, Daniele T1 - Being fully excused for wrongdoing JF - Pacific philosophical quarterly N2 - On the classical understanding, an agent is fully excused for an action if and only if performing this action was a case of faultless wrongdoing. A major motivation for this view is the apparent existence of paradigmatic types of excusing considerations, affecting fault but not wrongness. I show that three such considerations, ignorance, duress and compulsion, can be shown to have direct bearing on the permissibility of actions. The appeal to distinctly identifiable excusing considerations thus does not stand up to closer scrutiny, undermining the classical view and giving us reason to seek alternative ways of drawing the justification/excuse distinction. Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12425 SN - 0279-0750 SN - 1468-0114 VL - 104 IS - 2 SP - 324 EP - 347 PB - Wiley-Blackwell CY - Hoboken, NJ ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Schneider, Hans Julius T1 - Buddhist Meditation as a Mystical Practice JF - Philosophia N2 - On the basis of many years of personal experience the paper describes Buddhist meditation (Zazen, Vipassanā) as a mystical practice. After a short discussion of the role of some central concepts (longing, suffering, and love) in Buddhism, William James’ concept of religious experience is used to explain the goal of meditators as the achievement of a special kind of an experience of this kind. Systematically, its main point is to explain the difference between (on the one hand) a craving for pleasant ‘mental events’ in the sense of short-term moods, and (on the other) the long-term project of achieving a deep change in one’s attitude to life as a whole, a change that allows the acceptance of suffering and death. The last part argues that there is no reason to call the discussed practice irrational in a negative sense. Changes of attitude of the discussed kind cannot be brought about by argument alone. Therefore, a considered use of age-old practices like meditation should be seen as an addition, not as an undermining of reason. KW - Experience KW - Mood KW - Meditation KW - Mysticism KW - William James KW - Rationality Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9783-y SN - 0048-3893 SN - 1574-9274 VL - 45 SP - 773 EP - 787 PB - Springer CY - Dordrecht ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Schneider, Hans Julius T1 - Buddhist Meditation as a Mystical Practice JF - Philosophia : philosophical quarterly of Israel N2 - On the basis of many years of personal experience the paper describes Buddhist meditation (Zazen, Vipassanā) as a mystical practice. After a short discussion of the role of some central concepts (longing, suffering, and love) in Buddhism, William James’ concept of religious experience is used to explain the goal of meditators as the achievement of a special kind of an experience of this kind. Systematically, its main point is to explain the difference between (on the one hand) a craving for pleasant ‘mental events’ in the sense of short-term moods, and (on the other) the long-term project of achieving a deep change in one’s attitude to life as a whole, a change that allows the acceptance of suffering and death. The last part argues that there is no reason to call the discussed practice irrational in a negative sense. Changes of attitude of the discussed kind cannot be brought about by argument alone. Therefore, a considered use of age-old practices like meditation should be seen as an addition, not as an undermining of reason. KW - Experience KW - Mood KW - Meditation KW - Mysticism KW - William James KW - Rationality Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9925-x SN - 0048-3893 SN - 1574-9274 VL - 45 SP - 1621 EP - 1622 PB - Springer CY - Dordrecht ER - TY - JOUR A1 - van Buuren, Jasper T1 - critique of neuroscience JF - Continental philosophy review N2 - Bennett and Hacker criticize a number of neuroscientists and philosophers for attributing capacities which belong to the human being as a whole, like perceiving or deciding, to a “part” of the human being, viz. the brain. They call this type of mistake the “mereological fallacy”. Interestingly, the authors say that these capacities cannot be ascribed to the mind either. They reject not only materialistic monism but also Cartesian dualism, arguing that many predicates describing human life do not refer to physical or mental properties, nor to the sum of such properties. I agree with this important principle and with the critique of the mereological fallacy which it underpins, but I have two objections to the authors’ view. Firstly, I think that the brain is not literally a part of the human being, as suggested. Secondly, Bennett and Hacker do not offer an account of body and mind which explains in a systematic way how the domain of phenomena which transcends the mental and the physical relates to the mental and the physical. I first argue that Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical anthropology provides the kind of account we need. Then, drawing on Plessner, I present an alternative view of the mereological relationships between brain and human being. My criticism does not undercut Bennett and Hacker’s diagnosis of the mereological fallacy but rather gives it a more solid philosophical–anthropological foundation. KW - Mereological fallacy KW - Neuroscience KW - Philosophical anthropology KW - Body as subject and object KW - Eccentric positionality KW - Personhood KW - Psychophysical neutrality Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-015-9318-4 SN - 1387-2842 SN - 1573-1103 VL - 49 SP - 223 EP - 241 PB - Springer CY - Dordrecht ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Wallage, Martijn T1 - Dotting the “I think” BT - Self-consciousness and punctuation JF - Reading Rödl : On Self-Consciousness and Objectivity N2 - This chapter discusses a central problem in Sebastian Rödl’s Self-Consciousness and Objectivity and in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. In a statement of the form “I think p”, the words “I think” do not contribute to the content, and yet they are not redundant. In other words, a thinking subject is not something and yet not nothing. But then in what sense is a thinking subject a part of the world? The problem is intractable on a merely negative understanding of “I think”, like Anscombe’s merely negative thesis, endorsed by Rödl, that “I” is not a referring expression. In search of a positive understanding, this chapter proposes to understand “I think” by comparison to “hello”. A speaking subject is the expression of mutual presence in conversation – in that sense a limit of the world. Such expression may be compared to facial expression, with the crucial difference that a verbal expression can be taken up – i.e., repeated – in the third person. A speaking subject, then, is potentially absent from conversation, and in that sense a part of the world. Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-1-03-234951-0 SN - 978-1-00-095669-6 U6 - https://doi.org//10.4324/9781003324638 SP - 316 EP - 333 PB - Taylor & Francis Group CY - Milton ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Wiemann, Dirk A1 - Bartels, Anke T1 - Editorial - The Return of Politics Y1 - 2018 SN - 0171-1695 SN - 2627-4264 VL - 101 IS - 1 SP - i EP - x ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Krüger, Hans-Peter T1 - How is the Human Life-Form of Mind Really Possible in Nature? BT - Parallels Between John Dewey and Helmuth Plessner JF - Human studies N2 - J. Dewey and H. Plessner both and independently of one another treated the central question of what new task philosophy must set itself if the assumption is correct that the life-form of mind, i.e., the mental life-form of humans, arose in nature and must also sustain itself in the future within nature. If nature has to reconceived so as to make the irreducible qualities of life and mind truly possible, then it can no longer be restricted to the role of physical material. Conversely humans cannot no longer take on the role of God outside and independent of nature. Instead these philosophers distinguish between three plateaus (Dewey) or stages (Plessner), between physical (inorganic) nature, psycho-physical (living) nature and the nature that is mental life. This distinction is drawn such that a connection between the plateaus is truly possible. The third level, that of the mental form of life, answers mentally within conduct to the break with the first two levels. Hence it depends in the future as well on the continuously renewed difference (between the precarious and the stable for Dewey, between immediacy and mediation for Plessner) in our experience of nature. Within this difference nature as a whole remains an open unknown, which is why we can credit Dewey with a philosophy of diversified and negative holism, Plessner with a differential philosophy of the negativity of the absolute. KW - Evolution of the human KW - Non-reductive naturalism KW - Open holism KW - Life forms KW - Philosophical anthropology KW - Presuppositions of evolution Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-017-9429-5 SN - 0163-8548 SN - 1572-851X VL - 42 IS - 1 SP - 47 EP - 64 PB - Springer CY - Dordrecht ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hustedt, Thurid A1 - Danken, Thomas T1 - Institutional logics in inter-departmental coordination: Why actors agree on a joint policy output JF - Public administration N2 - By investigating two German inter-departmental committees, this article shows that the policy output of these coordination bodies depends on the specific institutional logic evoked throughout the coordination process. While in one of the groups a policy logic prevailed and a joint coordination output was achieved, the other was dominated by a political logic and proved unable to achieve agreement. The article contributes to research on government coordination by showing that actor orientations are crucial for explaining inter-organizational coordination. The results direct attention to the behavioural implications of coordination structures. Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12331 SN - 0033-3298 SN - 1467-9299 VL - 95 SP - 730 EP - 743 PB - Wiley CY - Hoboken ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Haag, Johannes T1 - Intuiting the Original Unity? BT - Modality and Intellectual Intuition in Hölderlin’s Urteil und Sein JF - Kantian legacies in German idealism Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-032-00160-9 SP - 161 EP - 185 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group CY - New York ; London ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Spiegel, Thomas Jussuf T1 - Is religion natural? BT - religion, naturalism and near-naturalism JF - International journal of philosophy and theology N2 - In this article I argue that the kind of scientific naturalism that tends to underwrite projects of naturalizing religion operates with a tacit conception of nature which, upon closer inspection, turns out to be untenable. I first distinguish an uninteresting modest naturalism from the more ambitious and relevant scientific naturalism. Secondly I survey three different kinds of attempting to naturalize religion: naturalizing the social aspect of religion, naturalizing religious experience, and naturalizing reference to the transcendent. Thirdly I argue that these projects operate with a conception of nature which is insufficiently clear. I suggest three ways of charitably explicating that tacit conception of what is natural before arguing that neither of these three positions works. Lastly I offer an irenic proposal: we would do good in giving up the scientific naturalism that underlies projects of naturalizing religion in order to embrace Lynne Rudder Baker's recently proposed notion of near-naturalism which allows the naturalist to retain a 'science first' attitude while avoiding problematic, overly restrictive notions of what is natural. KW - naturalism KW - religion KW - near-naturalism KW - liberal naturalism KW - naturalization Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2020.1749717 SN - 2169-2327 SN - 2169-2335 VL - 81 IS - 4 SP - 351 EP - 368 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group CY - Abingdon ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Kabeshkin, Anton T1 - Logical and natural life in Hegel JF - European journal of philosophy N2 - In this article, I discuss the specific ways in which Hegel's account of life and organisms advances upon Kant's account of natural purposes in the third Critique. First of all, I argue that it is essential for Hegel's account that it contains two levels. The first level is that of logical life, the discussion of which does not depend on any empirical knowledge of natural organisms. I provide my reconstruction of this logical account of life that answers to the objection made by a number of Hegel scholars to the effect that Hegel does in fact rely on empirical knowledge at this place in the logic. The second level is that of natural organisms themselves. I argue that it is with the help of this separation of the logical and natural levels, as well as his doctrine of the impotence of nature, that Hegel, unlike Kant, (a) is able to claim that not everything in natural organisms is purposive, and (b) provide a philosophical, and not merely empirical, account of the distinction between plants and animals. In both of these respects, Hegel's position can be seen as a welcome advance over Kant. Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12647 SN - 0966-8373 SN - 1468-0378 VL - 30 IS - 1 SP - 129 EP - 147 PB - Wiley-Blackwell CY - Oxford ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Montemayor, Carlos T1 - On the human uniqueness of the temporal reasoning system JF - Behavioral and brain sciences : an international journal of current research and theory with open peer commentary N2 - A central claim by Hoerl & McCormack is that the temporal reasoning system is uniquely human. But why exactly? This commentary evaluates two possible options to justify the thesis that temporal reasoning is uniquely human, one based on considerations regarding agency and the other based on language. The commentary raises problems for both of these options. Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19000335 SN - 0140-525X SN - 1469-1825 VL - 42 PB - Cambridge Univ. Press CY - New York ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Schöllner, Karsten T1 - Practical Philosophy JF - Philosophical investigations Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12134 SN - 0190-0536 SN - 1467-9205 VL - 40 SP - 121 EP - 138 PB - Wiley CY - Hoboken ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Pirwitz, Anne T1 - Romanian Migrants in Western Europe BT - Expectations, Challenges and the Importance of their Networks JF - Philologica Jassyensia N2 - This article aims to sum up the main results of a research project made in 2016 and 2017 about the situation of 1190 Romanian migrants in Western Europe and to give an overview about the push and pull factors, transnational family structures, as well as the challenges and difficulties of the Romanian survey respondents living in Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy. It also considers the role of personal networks which represent an important motor of migration and constitute the main motive for the choice of a certain destination region. These migration networks lead to the construction of transnational social spaces between Romania and the destination country and have high influence in the search for housing or jobs but can also influence the integration process abroad. KW - Romanian migration KW - migration networks KW - transnational families KW - labor migration Y1 - 2019 SN - 1841-5377 SN - 2247-8353 VL - 15 IS - 1 SP - 221 EP - 230 PB - Editura Tracus Arte CY - Bucharest ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - The art of second nature BT - Modern culture after Kant JF - Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5840/gfpj20224312 SN - 0093-4240 SN - 2153-9197 VL - 43 IS - 1 SP - 33 EP - 69 PB - Philosophy Documentation Center CY - New York ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Brenner, Leon S. T1 - The autistic mirror in the real BT - Autism in Lacan’s mirror stage JF - Theory & psychology N2 - The mirror stage is one of Jacques Lacan's most well-received metapsychological models in the English-speaking world. In its many renditions Lacan elucidates the different forms of identification that lead to the construction of the Freudian ego. This article utilizes Lacan's mirror stage to provide a novel perspective on autistic embodiment. It develops an integrative model that accounts for the progression of four distinct forms of autistic identification in the mirror stage; these forms provide the basis for the development of four different clinical trajectories in the treatment of autism. This model is posed as an alternative to the clinical and diagnostic framework associated with the autistic spectrum disorder. KW - autism KW - Lacan KW - mirror stage KW - psychoanalysis KW - theory Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543211034569 SN - 0959-3543 SN - 1461-7447 VL - 31 IS - 6 SP - 950 EP - 972 PB - Sage Publ. CY - London ER -