TY - JOUR A1 - Herold, Jana A1 - Liese, Andrea A1 - Busch, Per-Olof A1 - Feil, Hauke T1 - Why national ministries consider the policy advice of international bureaucracies BT - survey evidence from 106 countries JF - International studies quarterly : the journal of the International Studies Association N2 - Scholars of international relations and public administration widely assume that international bureaucracies, in their role as policy advisors, directly influence countries' domestic policies. Yet, this is not true across the board. Why do some countries closely consider the advice of international bureaucracies while others do not? This article argues that international bureaucracies' standing as sources of expertise is crucial. We tested this argument using data from a unique survey that measured prevalent practices of advice utilization in thematically specialized policy units of national ministries in a representative sample of more than a hundred countries. Our findings show that ministries' perceptions of international bureaucracies' expertise, that is, specialized and reliable knowledge, are the key factor. International bureaucracies influence national ministries directly and without the support of other actors that may also have an interest in the international bureaucracies' policy advice. Our analysis also demonstrates that the effects of alternative means of influence, such as third-party pressure and coercion, are themselves partly dependent on international bureaucracies' reputation as experts. The findings presented in this article reinforce the emphasis on expertise as a source of international bureaucracies' influence, and provide a crucial test of its importance. Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab044 SN - 0020-8833 SN - 1468-2478 VL - 65 IS - 3 SP - 669 EP - 682 PB - Oxford Univ. Press CY - Oxford ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Liese, Andrea A1 - Herold, Jana A1 - Feil, Hauke A1 - Busch, Per-Olof T1 - The heart of bureaucratic power BT - Explaining international bureaucracies’ expert authority JF - Review of international studies : RIS N2 - Expert authority is regarded as the heart of international bureaucracies' power. To measure whether international bureaucracies' expert authority is indeed recognised and deferred to, we draw on novel data from a survey of a key audience: officials in the policy units of national ministries in 121 countries. Respondents were asked to what extent they recognised the expert authority of nine international bureaucracies in various thematic areas of agricultural and financial policy. The results show wide variance. To explain this variation, we test well-established assumptions on the sources of de facto expert authority. Specifically, we look at ministry officials' perceptions of these sources and, thus, focus on a less-studied aspect of the authority relationship. We examine the role of international bureaucracies' perceived impartiality, objectivity, global impact, and the role of knowledge asymmetries. Contrary to common assumptions, we find that de facto expert authority does not rest on impartiality perceptions, and that perceived objectivity plays the smallest role of all factors considered. We find some indications that knowledge asymmetries are associated with more expert authority. Still, and robust to various alternative specifications, the perception that international bureaucracies are effectively addressing global challenges is the most important factor. KW - Expert Authority KW - International Bureaucracies KW - International KW - Organisations KW - Neutrality KW - Performance KW - Survey Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1017/S026021052100005X SN - 0260-2105 SN - 1469-9044 VL - 47 IS - 3 SP - 353 EP - 376 PB - Cambridge Univ. Press CY - Cambridge ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Feil, Hauke T1 - The cancer of corruption and World Bank project performance BT - Is there a connection? JF - Development policy review / publ. for the Overseas Development Institute N2 - Motivation: Corruption is often cited as a central reason why development projects fail. The article tests this claim by assessing whether World Bank projects perform worse in implementation environments with a higher corruption level. The article focuses specifically on bribery between public officials and firms during the procurement of needed goods and services. Approach and Methods: I use data from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys to avoid the often-criticized corruption perception indices and to allow for an assessment of effects at the subnational level. The analysis builds on an assessment of the performance ratings of 1,228 World Bank projects and covers 87 different countries. Finding: Overall, the article finds a small but statistically significant correlation between the corruption level and project performance. This result indicates that the corruption level of recipient countries should be considered during the design and implementation of projects. Policy Implications: Nonetheless, the relatively small correlation and the low pseudo R-squareds advise not overestimating the relevance of corruption for project performance. At least for the project level, the article finds no indication that corruption is a primary obstacle to aid effectiveness. KW - Aid effectiveness KW - corruption KW - Enterprise Survey KW - project performance KW - World Bank Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12503 SN - 1467-7679 SN - 0950-6764 VL - 39 IS - 3 SP - 381 EP - 397 PB - Blackwell Publ. CY - Oxford ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Busch, Per-Olof A1 - Feil, Hauke A1 - Heinzel, Mirko Noa A1 - Herold, Jana A1 - Kempken, Mathies A1 - Liese, Andrea T1 - Policy recommendations of international bureaucracies BT - the importance of country-specificity JF - International review of administrative sciences : an international journal of comparative public administration N2 - Many international bureaucracies give policy advice to national administrative units. Why is the advice given by some international bureaucracies more influential than the recommendations of others? We argue that targeting advice to member states through national embeddedness and country-tailored research increases the influence of policy advice. Subsequently, we test how these characteristics shape the relative influence of 15 international bureaucracies' advice in four financial policy areas through a global survey of national administrations from more than 80 countries. Our findings support arguments that global blueprints need to be adapted and translated to become meaningful for country-level work.
Points for practitioners
National administrations are advised by an increasing number of international bureaucracies, and they cannot listen to all of this advice. Whereas some international bureaucracies give 'one-size-fits-all' recommendations to rather diverse countries, others cater their recommendations to the national audience. Investigating financial policy recommendations, we find that national embeddedness and country-tailored advice render international bureaucracies more influential. KW - financial policy KW - international administration KW - international KW - organizations KW - multi-level government KW - regime complexity Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/00208523211013385 SN - 0020-8523 SN - 1461-7226 VL - 87 IS - 4 SP - 775 EP - 793 PB - Sage Publ. CY - Los Angeles, Calif. ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Heinzel, Mirko Noa A1 - Richter, Jonas A1 - Busch, Per-Olof A1 - Feil, Hauke A1 - Herold, Jana A1 - Liese, Andrea T1 - Birds of a feather? BT - the determinants of impartiality perceptions of the IMF and the World Bank JF - Review of international political economy N2 - The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank ascribe to impartiality in their mandates. At the same time, scholarship indicates that their decisions are disproportionately influenced by powerful member states. Impartiality is seen as crucial in determining International Organizations' (IOs) effectiveness and legitimacy in the literature. However, we know little about whether key interlocutors in national governments perceive the International Financial Institutions as biased actors who do the bidding for powerful member states or as impartial executors of policy. In order to better understand these perceptions, we surveyed high-level civil servants who are chiefly responsible for four policy areas from more than 100 countries. We found substantial variations in impartiality perceptions. What explains these variations? By developing an argument of selective awareness, we extend rationalist and ideational perspectives on IO impartiality to explain domestic perceptions. Using novel survey data, we test whether staffing underrepresentation, voting underrepresentation, alignment to the major shareholders and overlapping economic policy paradigms are associated with impartiality perceptions. We find substantial evidence that shared economic policy paradigms influence impartiality perceptions. The findings imply that by diversifying their ideational culture, IOs can increase the likelihood that domestic stakeholders view them as impartial. KW - Impartiality KW - bias KW - International Financial Institutions KW - International KW - Monetary Fund KW - World Bank Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2020.1749711 SN - 0969-2290 SN - 1466-4526 VL - 28 IS - 5 SP - 1249 EP - 1273 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group CY - Abingdon ER -