TY  - JOUR
A1  - Abeler, Johannes
A1  - Calaki, Juljana
A1  - Andree, Kai
A1  - Basek, Christoph
T1  - The power of apology
N2  - How should firms react to customer complaints after an unsatisfactory purchase? In a field experiment, we test the effect of different reactions and find that a cheap-talk apology yields significantly better outcomes for the firm than offering a monetary compensation.
Y1  - 2010
UR  - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01651765
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.01.033
SN  - 0165-1765
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Andree, Kai
A1  - Heywood, John S.
A1  - Schwan, Mike
A1  - Wang, Zheng
T1  - A spatial model of cartel stability
BT  - the influence of production cost convexity
JF  - Bulletin of economic research
N2  - We uniquely introduce convex production costs into a cartel model involving spatial price discrimination. We demonstrate that greater convexity improves cartel stability and that for sufficient convexity first best locations will be adopted. We show that allowing locations to vary over the game reduces cartel stability but that greater convexity continues to improve that stability. Moreover, when the degree of convexity does not support the first best collusive locations, other collusive locations exist that require less stability and these may either increase or decrease social welfare relative to competition. Critically, these locations that require less stability are more dispersed in sharp contrast to the known result assuming linear production costs.
KW  - cartel stability
KW  - convex costs
KW  - delivered pricing
Y1  - 2018
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12149
SN  - 0307-3378
SN  - 1467-8586
VL  - 70
IS  - 3
SP  - 298
EP  - 311
PB  - Wiley
CY  - Hoboken
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Andree, Kai
T1  - A note on merger in mixed duopoly - Bertrand versus Cournot
JF  - Journal of economics
N2  - In this note we analyze the incentives to merge in a mixed duopoly if firms compete in prices or quantities. Our model framework mainly follows Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (J Econ 80:27-42, 2003) who set up the model with quantity competition. We extend their analysis by analyzing the case of competition in prices. Further we compare the incentives to merge with Bertrand and Cournot competition. Comparing quantity with price competition we can show that a merger is more likely with Cournot competition than with Bertrand competition.
KW  - Merger
KW  - Price competition
KW  - Mixed duopoly
Y1  - 2013
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-012-0280-x
SN  - 0931-8658
VL  - 108
IS  - 3
SP  - 291
EP  - 298
PB  - Springer
CY  - Wien
ER  -