TY  - JOUR
A1  - Seyfried, Markus
T1  - Setting a fox to guard the henhouse? Determinants in elections for presidents of supreme audit institutions Evidence from the German federal states (1991-2011)
JF  - Managerial auditing journal
N2  - Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to provide evidence regarding the selection procedures for and characteristics of senior officials in supreme audit institutions (SIAs). Design/methodology/approach - This study follows a quantitative approach using original data collected for presidential elections of SIAs in the 16 federal states in Germany. A fractional logit model is calculated to test different theoretical assumptions in relation to structural, political and individual factors. Findings - The descriptive results confirm the findings of prior research that presidential candidates are elected with very high approval rates. The main determinants are the vote share of the ruling coalition and the executive experience of the presidential candidate. Research limitations/implications - This study focuses on 16 federal states in Germany, but an international comparative perspective covering subnational levels would further augment analysis through the variance of selection procedures and electoral outcomes. Social implications - Independence of auditors is a fundamental issue for the control of the executive, but it seems that there are inevitable trade-offs therein, such as between knowledge of the auditing objects or the politicization of the election process and the independence of the auditor. Originality/value - This study provides novel empirical insights into the election and selection procedures for senior SIA officials at the subnational level, and shows that the executive exerts strong, but functionally reasonable, influence on candidate selection.
KW  - Independence
KW  - President
KW  - Sub-national
KW  - Supreme audit institutions
Y1  - 2016
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1108/MAJ-03-2015-1168
SN  - 0268-6902
SN  - 1758-7735
VL  - 31
SP  - 492
EP  - 511
PB  - Emerald Group Publishing Limited
CY  - Bingley
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Hustedt, Thurid
A1  - Seyfried, Markus
T1  - Co-ordination across internal organizational boundaries: how the EU Commission co-ordinates climate policies
JF  - Journal of European public policy
N2  - Through an analysis of climate policy-making in the European Commission (EU), this article argues that co-ordination in the Commission displays the same characteristics as the co-ordination across ministries in central governments, i.e., the properties of negative co-ordination. The article is based on a survey among Commission officials. Overall, the article reveals that a public administration perspective on the Commission proves invaluable to gain insights on how decisions are made at the European Union level. The article contributes to the emerging literature viewing the Commission as an ordinary bureaucracy - as opposed to a unique supranational organization.
KW  - Bureaucratic organization
KW  - climate change policy
KW  - co-ordination
KW  - Directorate General
KW  - EU policy-making
KW  - European Commission
Y1  - 2016
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2015.1074605
SN  - 1350-1763
SN  - 1466-4429
VL  - 23
SP  - 888
EP  - 905
PB  - Springer Publishing Company
CY  - Abingdon
ER  -