TY - JOUR A1 - Ganghof, Steffen T1 - Does public reason require super-majoritarian democracy? Liberty, equality, and history in the justification of political institutions JF - Politics, philosophy & economics N2 - The project of public-reason liberalism faces a basic problem: publicly justified principles are typically too abstract and vague to be directly applied to practical political disputes, whereas applicable specifications of these principles are not uniquely publicly justified. One solution could be a legislative procedure that selects one member from the eligible set of inconclusively justified proposals. Yet if liberal principles are too vague to select sufficiently specific legislative proposals, can they, nevertheless, select specific legislative procedures? Based on the work of Gerald Gaus, this article argues that the only candidate for a conclusively justified decision procedure is a majoritarian or otherwise 'neutral' democracy. If the justification of democracy requires an equality baseline in the design of political regimes and if justifications for departure from this baseline are subject to reasonable disagreement, a majoritarian design is justified by default. Gaus's own preference for super-majoritarian procedures is based on disputable specifications of justified liberal principles. These procedures can only be defended as a sectarian preference if the equality baseline is rejected, but then it is not clear how the set of justifiable political regimes can be restricted to full democracies. KW - public-reason liberalism KW - democracy KW - coercion KW - political equality KW - majority rule KW - Gerald Gaus Y1 - 2013 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X12447786 SN - 1470-594X VL - 12 IS - 2 SP - 179 EP - 196 PB - Sage Publ. CY - Thousand Oaks ER - TY - GEN A1 - Ganghof, Steffen T1 - Does public reason require super-majoritarian democracy? BT - Liberty, equality, and history in the justification of political institutions T2 - Politics, philosophy & economics N2 - The project of public-reason liberalism faces a basic problem: publicly justified principles are typically too abstract and vague to be directly applied to practical political disputes, whereas applicable specifications of these principles are not uniquely publicly justified. One solution could be a legislative procedure that selects one member from the eligible set of inconclusively justified proposals. Yet if liberal principles are too vague to select sufficiently specific legislative proposals, can they, nevertheless, select specific legislative procedures? Based on the work of Gerald Gaus, this article argues that the only candidate for a conclusively justified decision procedure is a majoritarian or otherwise ‘neutral’ democracy. If the justification of democracy requires an equality baseline in the design of political regimes and if justifications for departure from this baseline are subject to reasonable disagreement, a majoritarian design is justified by default. Gaus’s own preference for super-majoritarian procedures is based on disputable specifications of justified liberal principles. These procedures can only be defended as a sectarian preference if the equality baseline is rejected, but then it is not clear how the set of justifiable political regimes can be restricted to full democracies. T3 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe - 86 KW - public-reason liberalism KW - democracy KW - coercion KW - political equality KW - majority rule KW - Gerald Gaus Y1 - 2018 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-477860 VL - 12 IS - 2 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Tomaszewska, Paulina A1 - Schuster, Isabell T1 - Comparing sexuality-related cognitions, sexual behavior, and acceptance of sexual coercion in dating app users and non-users JF - Sexuality research & social policy N2 - Using dating apps has become popular for many young adults worldwide, promising the chance to meet new sexual partners. Because there is evidence that using dating apps may be associated with risky sexual behavior, this study compared users and non-users concerning their sexuality-related cognitions, namely their risky sexual scripts and sexual self-esteem, as well as their risky and sexually assertive behavior. It also explored the link between dating app use and acceptance of sexual coercion. A total of 491 young heterosexual adults (295 female) participated in an online survey advertised in social media and college libraries in Germany. Results indicated that users had more risky sexual scripts and reported more risky sexual behavior than non-users. Furthermore, male dating app users had lower sexual self-esteem and higher acceptance of sexual coercion than male non-users. In both gender groups, dating app use predicted casual sexual activity via a more risky casual sex script. Gender differences, potential underlying mechanisms, and directions for future research are discussed. KW - dating app use KW - sexual scripts KW - sexual behavior KW - acceptance of sexual KW - coercion KW - young adults Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s13178-019-00397-x SN - 1868-9884 SN - 1553-6610 VL - 17 IS - 2 SP - 188 EP - 198 PB - Springer CY - New York ER - TY - THES A1 - Schrenk, Judith Katharina T1 - Aushandlungen unter Kindern : Einsatz verschiedener Taktiken im Verlauf einer Aushandlung und Stellung in der Peergruppe T1 - Negotiations among children : the use of different tactics during negotiation and peer group status N2 - Die folgenden Fragen standen im Mittelpunkt der Dissertation: Wie handeln Grundschulkinder aus, wenn sie von ihren Peers ungerecht behandelt werden? Welche unmittelbaren Wirkungen hat ihr Vorgehen? In welchem Zusammenhang steht das Vorgehen in der Konfliktsituation mit der Stellung unter den Peers? Theoretische Grundlage waren die Entwicklungsmodelle zum Aushandeln von Yeates und Selman (1989) sowie Hawley (1999). Es nahmen 213 Dritt- und Fünftklässler an der Untersuchung teil. Eine Kombination qualitativer und quantitativer Methoden wurde verwendet. In einem individuellen Interview wurde erhoben, welche Taktiken (eine Handlungseinheit) sowie welche Strategien (Abfolge von Taktiken) die Kinder in einer hypothetischen Normbruchsituation einsetzen würden. Die Kinder wurden auch gefragt, welche unmittelbaren Wirkungen sie erwarten, wenn sie die vorgeschlagene Taktik einsetzen. Die Stellung der Kinder wurde sowohl bezüglich ihres Einflusses (Peerrating) als auch bezüglich ihrer Akzeptanz (Soziometrie) unter den Klassenkameraden erhoben. Die von den Kindern genannten Taktiken wurden vier übergeordneten Kategorien zugeordnet: Verhandeln, Erzwingen, Ausweichen und Aufgeben. Nach den Erwartungen der Kinder führen sowohl Verhandlungstaktiken als auch erzwingende Taktiken in um die Hälfte der Fälle zur Durchsetzung. Erzwingende Taktiken gehen jedoch häufig mit unfreundlichen Reaktionen einher. Einfluss und Akzeptanz der Kinder waren davon abhängig, welche Kombination und Sequenz von Taktiken (Strategie) sie wählten. Beispielsweise waren Kinder einflussreich und beliebt, die eine Reihe von Verhandlungstaktiken generierten oder die zunächst Verhandlungstaktiken vorschlugen und danach erzwingende Taktiken. Kinder, die sofort Zwang einsetzen würden, hatten wenig Einfluss und wurden abgelehnt. Außerdem fanden sich Geschlechts- und Altersunterschiede hinsichtlich des Vorgehens in der hypothetischen Normbruchsituation sowie der Zusammenhänge zwischen Taktiken und Stellung unter Peers. N2 - The dissertation dealt with the following questions: How do children react, when a peer infringes upon their rights? What immediate outcomes are connected to their actions? What is the relation between the way children proceed in the conflict situation and their social standing among their peers? As a theoretical background served the modells about negotiations by Yeates and Selman (1989) as well as Hawley (1999). 213 third- and fifthgraders participated in the study. A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods was used. Children were individually interviewed to assess what tactics (unit of action) as well as what strategies (sequence of tactics) they would apply in a hypothetical conflict involving a rights infraction. Children were also asked what immediate outcomes they expected, using the proposed tactic. Children's social standing was assessed concerning their influence (peerrating) as well as their acceptance (sociometrie) among their classmates. The tactics propsed by the children were assigned to four superordinate categories: negotiate, coerce, get out of the way, give in. According to the expectations of the children both negotiation tactics and coercive tactics lead to assertion in about half of the cases. Coercive tactics however often evoque unfriendly responses. Children differed in their influence and acceptance depending on the combination and sequence of tactics (strategy) they chose. For example children, which generated a series of negotiation tactics and children, which proposed negotiation tactics in the beginning and coercion tactics later were both influental and liked. Children, which chose coercion allready in the beginning had little influence and were rejected. Also gender and age differences were found concerning the tactics chosen in the hypothetical conflict situation and the relation between tactics and social standing among peers. KW - Soziale Ungleichheit KW - Einfluss KW - Soziale Anerkennung KW - Konflikt KW - Taktik KW - Strategie KW - Zwang KW - Kind KW - erwartete unmittelbare Wirkung KW - Aushandlung KW - Normbruch KW - Akzeptanz KW - Peerinteraktion KW - social inequality KW - influence KW - social acceptance KW - conflict KW - strategy KW - coercion KW - child KW - outcome expectation KW - negotiation KW - rights infraction Y1 - 2005 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-12580 ER -