TY - JOUR A1 - Ewelt-Knauer, Corinna A1 - Schwering, Anja A1 - Winkelmann, Sandra T1 - Wirksamkeit der Kontrollen im Corporate-Governance-System der Sparkassen JF - Zeitschrift für Gemeinwirtschaft und Gemeinwohl N2 - Da Sparkassen einen öffentlichen Auftrag erfüllen müssen, der ihr Bestehen gesetzlich legitimiert, zeichnet sich ihr Corporate-Governance-System durch Besonderheiten aus. Diese Besonderheiten wirken sich nicht nur auf die Vorstandstätigkeit, sondern auch auf die Tätigkeit der Kontrollorgane aus, welche eine nachhaltige Erfüllung des öffentlichen Auftrags prüfen und gewährleisten sollen. Nach einer Vorstellung des Corporate-Governance-Systems beschäftigt sich der Beitrag daher mit der Frage, ob und wie allgemeine Herausforderungen, die durch das System bedingt sind, sowie besondere Herausforderungen, die sich aus der langanhaltenden Niedrigzinspolitik ergeben, die Effektivität der Kontrollen beeinflussen. N2 - Since savings banks must fulfill a public contract that legitimizes their existence by law, a number of special features characterizes their corporate governance system. These features affect not only the activities of the management board, but also the activities of the surveillance institutions, which have to review and ensure the sustainable fulfillment of the public contract. After a presentation of the corporate governance system, the article therefore deals with the question of whether and how general challenges resulting from the corporate governance system as well as special challenges resulting from the long-term low interest rate policy influence the effectiveness of the controls Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5771/2701-4193-2021-2-280 SN - 2701-4193 VL - 44 IS - 2 SP - 280 EP - 300 PB - Nomos CY - Baden-Baden ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Schwering, Anja A1 - Sommer, Friedrich A1 - Uepping, Florian A1 - Winkelmann, Sandra T1 - The social-psychological perspective on executive compensation BT - evidence from a two-tier board system JF - Journal of Business Economics N2 - This paper investigates whether and how social-psychological mechanisms, namely reciprocity, demographic similarity, and similar experiences, affect CEO compensation packages with respect to the levels of total, fixed, and short- and mid-term compensation and the variable proportion of the compensation package. We use evidence from Germany as it is considered a prototype of a two-tier board system. Given the primary roles of both the CEO and the chair of the supervisory board, we especially highlight social-psychological mechanisms in the process leading to the final compensation package. Using a hand-collected sample of non-financial constituents of the German HDAX, we find that reciprocity can lead to a compensation package that is more favorable for the CEO. Results on similarity are ambivalent such that the effects of similarity on CEO compensation—both positive and negative—may depend on the dimension of similarity. Finally, the chair’s CEO experience, both inside and outside the focal company, also plays an essential role in shaping CEO compensation. More specifically, CEO experience in general is associated with more favorable compensation. However, having a chair that has been CEO at the focal company correlates with less favorable compensation packages except for when the CEO has also been recruited internally. Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-021-01066-5 VL - 92 IS - 2 SP - 309 EP - 345 PB - Springer CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Knauer, Thorsten A1 - Hermanns, Martin A1 - Schwering, Anja A1 - Winkelmann, Sandra T1 - Stand und Entwicklung nichtfinanzieller Kennzahlen im Rahmen der Unternehmenssteuerung und ihre Rolle im Steuerungssystem der Vorstandsvergütung JF - Controlling - Zeitschrift für erfolgsorientierte Unternehmensführung N2 - Durch den Deutschen Rechnungslegungs Standard 20 und die sog. CorporateSocial Responsibility-Richtlinie sind nichtfinanzielle Kennzahlen im Rahmen der Unternehmenssteuerung zunehmend in den Fokus gerückt. Trotz dieser regulatorischen Signale etabliert sich deren Nutzung in der Praxis nur langsam. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird daher ein Überblick über die Bedeutung, die Hintergründeund den Stand der Implementierung nicht finanzieller Kennzahlen in der Unternehmenssteuerung im Allgemeinen und insbesondere im Hinblick auf das Steuerungssystem der Vorstandsvergütung gegeben. Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.15358/0935-0381-2020-3-59 SN - 0935-0381 VL - 32 IS - 3 SP - 59 EP - 65 PB - Beck CY - München ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ewelt-Knauer, Corinna A1 - Schwering, Anja A1 - Winkelmann, Sandra T1 - Probabilistic audits and misreporting BT - the influence of audit process design on employee behavior JF - European accounting review N2 - We investigate how the design of audit processes influences employees’ reporting decisions. We focus specifically on detective employee audits for which several employees are randomly selected after a defined period to audit their ex-post behavior. We investigate two design features of the audit process, namely, employee anonymity and process transparency, and analyze their impact on misreporting. Overall, we find that both components influence the extent of individuals’ misreporting. A nonanonymous audit decreases performance misreporting more than an audit in which the employee remains anonymous. Furthermore, the high incidence of performance misreporting in the case of anonymous audits can be decreased when the process transparency is low. Thus, our study informs accountants about how the two design features of employee anonymity and transparency of the audit process can be used to constrain performance misreporting to increase the efficiency of audits KW - Performance misreporting KW - Employee audits KW - Employee anonymity KW - Process KW - transparency Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2021.1899014 SN - 1468-4497 SN - 0963-8180 VL - 30 IS - 5 SP - 989 EP - 1012 PB - Routledge CY - London ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ewelt-Knauer, Corinna A1 - Schwering, Anja A1 - Winkelmann, Sandra T1 - Doing good by doing bad BT - How tone at the top and tone at the bottom impact performance-improving noncompliant behavior JF - Journal of business ethics N2 - This study investigates how tone at the top, implemented by top management, and tone at the bottom, in an employee’s immediate work environment, determine noncompliance. We focus on the disallowed actions of employees that improve their own and, in turn, the company’s performance, referred to as performance-improving noncompliant behavior (PINC behavior). We conduct a survey of German sales employees to investigate specifically how, on the one hand, (1) corporate rules and (2) performance pressure, both implemented by top management, and, on the other hand, (3) others’ PINC expectations and (4) others’ PINC behavior, both arising from the employee’s immediate work environment, influence PINC behavior. When considered in isolation, we find that corporate rules, as top management’s main instrument to guide employee behavior, decrease employee PINC behavior. However, this effect is negatively influenced by the employees’ immediate work environment when employees are expected to engage in PINC or when others engage in PINC. In contrast, even though top management places great performance pressure on employees, that by itself does not increase PINC behavior. Overall, our study informs practitioners and researchers about whether and how the four determinants increase or decrease employees’ PINC behavior, which is important to comprehend triggers and to counteract such misconduct. KW - noncompliance KW - tone at the top KW - tone at the bottom KW - corporate rules KW - performance pressure KW - others’ expectations KW - 0thers’ behavior Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-020-04647-6 SN - 0167-4544 SN - 1573-0697 VL - 175 IS - 3 SP - 609 EP - 624 PB - Springer CY - Dordrecht ER - TY - GEN A1 - Ewelt-Knauer, Corinna A1 - Schwering, Anja A1 - Winkelmann, Sandra T1 - Doing good by doing bad BT - How tone at the top and tone at the bottom impact performance-improving noncompliant behavior T2 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe N2 - This study investigates how tone at the top, implemented by top management, and tone at the bottom, in an employee's immediate work environment, determine noncompliance. We focus on the disallowed actions of employees that improve their own and, in turn, the company's performance, referred to as performance-improving noncompliant behavior (PINC behavior). We conduct a survey of German sales employees to investigate specifically how, on the one hand, (1) corporate rules and (2) performance pressure, both implemented by top management, and, on the other hand, (3) others' PINC expectations and (4) others' PINC behavior, both arising from the employee's immediate work environment, influence PINC behavior. When considered in isolation, we find that corporate rules, as top management's main instrument to guide employee behavior, decrease employee PINC behavior. However, this effect is negatively influenced by the employees' immediate work environment when employees are expected to engage in PINC or when others engage in PINC. In contrast, even though top management places great performance pressure on employees, that by itself does not increase PINC behavior. Overall, our study informs practitioners and researchers about whether and how the four determinants increase or decrease employees' PINC behavior, which is important to comprehend triggers and to counteract such misconduct. T3 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe - 170 KW - noncompliance KW - tone at the top KW - tone at the bottom KW - corporate rules KW - performance pressure KW - others’ expectations KW - 0thers’ behavior Y1 - 2020 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-577912 SN - 1867-5808 IS - 3 ER -