TY  - JOUR
A1  - Grüne, Stefanie
T1  - Sartre on mistaken sincerity ('Being and Nothingness')
Y1  - 2013
SN  - 0966-8373
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Grüne, Stefanie
T1  - Is there a Gap in Kant's B Deduction?
Y1  - 2011
SN  - 0967-2559
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Grüne, Stefanie
T1  - Brandom über Kants Konzeption der Intentionalität
Y1  - 2011
SN  - 978-3-89785-705-6
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Grüne, Stefanie
T1  - Is there a Gap in Kant's B Deduction?
JF  - International journal of philosophical studies
N2  - In 'Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content', Robert Hanna argues for a very strong kind of non-conceptualism, and claims that this kind of non-conceptualism originally has been developed by Kant. But according to 'Kant's Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects and the Gap in the B Deduction', Kant's non-conceptualism poses a serious problem for his argument for the objective validity of the categories, namely the problem that there is a gap in the B Deduction. This gap is that the B Deduction goes through only if conceptualism is true, but Kant is a non-conceptualist. In this paper, I will argue, contrary to what Hanna claims, that there is not a gap in the B Deduction.
KW  - Kant
KW  - concepts
KW  - non-conceptualism
KW  - intuition
KW  - synthesis
Y1  - 2011
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2011.595196
SN  - 0967-2559
VL  - 19
IS  - 3
SP  - 465
EP  - 490
PB  - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group
CY  - Abingdon
ER  - 
TY  - GEN
A1  - Grüne, Stefanie
T1  - Allais on Intuitions and the Objective Reality of the Categories
T2  - European journal of philosophy
Y1  - 2016
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12139
SN  - 0966-8373
SN  - 1468-0378
VL  - 24
SP  - 241
EP  - 252
PB  - Wiley-Blackwell
CY  - Hoboken
ER  -