TY - JOUR A1 - Kalkuhl, Matthias A1 - Steckel, Jan Christoph A1 - Edenhofer, Ottmar T1 - All or nothing BT - climate policy when assets can become stranded JF - Journal of environmental economics and management N2 - This paper develops a new perspective on stranded assets in climate policy using a partial equilibrium model of the energy sector. Political-economy related aspects are considered in the government's objective function. Lobbying power of firms or fiscal considerations by the government lead to time inconsistency: The government will deviate from a previously announced carbon tax which creates stranded assets. Under rational expectations, we show that a time-consistent policy outcome exists with either a zero carbon tax or a prohibitive carbon tax that leads to zero fossil investments - an "all-or-nothing" policy. Although stranded assets are crucial to such a bipolar outcome, they disappear again under time-consistent policy. Which of the two outcomes (all or nothing) prevails depends on the lobbying power of owners of fixed factors (land and fossil resources) but not on fiscal revenue considerations or on the lobbying power of renewable or fossil energy firms. KW - Climate policy KW - Optimal control KW - Political economy KW - Public finance KW - Credible policy KW - Time inconsistency Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.012 SN - 0095-0696 SN - 1096-0449 VL - 100 PB - Elsevier CY - San Diego ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Edenhofer, Ottmar A1 - Kalkuhl, Matthias A1 - Requate, Tilman A1 - Steckel, Jan Christoph T1 - How assets get stranded BT - the impact of climate policy on capital and fossil fuel owners : introduction to the JEEM special section on climate policy and political economy JF - Journal of environmental economics and management N2 - Internalizing external costs of carbon is a fundamental goal of climate policy. Since the seminal work of Arthur Pigou in 1920, economic theory has analyzed the efficiency gains arising from various instruments that internalize externalities and lead to Pareto-improvements. It is widely recognized in environmental economics that a carbon price would effectively reflect the scarcity of the atmospheric disposal space for carbon depending on the temperature target that is to be achieved. The question of how to organize the transition process, i.e. moving from inefficient to efficient allocations, and implementing the necessary policies, has gained increasing attention in recent years. Arguably, the transition process is tightly interwoven with political processes that include complex interactions between societal stakeholders, such as households and firms, on the one hand, and political decision makers, on the other. Accordingly, understanding political-economy aspects of the transition process, including distributional outcomes, is becoming increasingly relevant. While a growing literature discusses the distributional implications of climate policy on households, it is less well understood how asset owners might be affected by climate policy and how these potential impacts would interact with the transition process. This Special Section focuses on public policy challenges related to this transition problem, with special emphasis on asset owners. A core theme is the special role of stranded assets, i.e. a devaluation of capital stocks or financial assets either by introducing a stringent carbon price or by omitting a pre-announced policy of this kind. Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2020.102300 SN - 0095-0696 SN - 1096-0449 VL - 100 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Edenhofer, Ottmar A1 - Kalkuhl, Matthias A1 - Ockenfels, Axel T1 - Das Klimaschutzprogramm der Bundesregierung BT - eine Wende der deutschen Klimapolitik? JF - Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik N2 - Das Klimaschutzgesetz hat einen Paradigmenwechsel eingeleitet: den Einstieg in eine CO2-Bepreisung als künftiges Leitinstrument der Klimapolitik. Auf den ersten Blick ist der CO2-Preis unter einer Fülle von Fördermaßnahmen und ordnungsrechtlichen Regelungen verschüttet, deren Wirksamkeit und Kosten höchst unsicher sind. Der CO2-Preis ist aber so angelegt, dass er langfristig das dominante Instrument einer europäisch harmonisierten Klimapolitik werden kann. Der angedeutete Paradigmenwechsel der deutschen Klimapolitik öffnet damit die Tür, die europäische und internationale Kooperation zu stärken. Dazu ist es aber notwendig, neben der europäischen auch die globale Klimapolitik neu auszurichten. Auch dort sollten sich die Verhandlungen statt auf nationale Mengenziele auf CO2-Preise konzentrieren. Die erforderliche Kooperation wird möglich, wenn die Regierungen Transferzahlungen strategisch und reziprok nutzen. So könnte die Effektivität der Klimapolitik erhöht werden und es ließen sich die entstehenden Verteilungskonflikte entschärfen. KW - Klimaschutzgesetz KW - CO2-Preis KW - Emissionshandel KW - internationale Kooperation KW - Klimawandel KW - Klimapolitik KW - Deutschland KW - EU Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/pwp-2020-0001 SN - 1465-6493 SN - 1468-2516 VL - 21 IS - 1 SP - 4 EP - 18 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER -