TY  - THES
A1  - Radtke, Ina
T1  - Organizing immigration
BT  - German ministerial bureaucracies in a dynamic policy field
N2  - Immigration constitutes a dynamic policy field with – often quite unpredictable – dynamics. This is based on immigration constituting a ‘wicked problem’ meaning that it is characterized by uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity. Due to the dynamics in the policy field, expectations towards public administrations often change. Following neo-institutionalist theory, public administrations depend on meeting the expectations in the organizational field in order to maintain legitimacy as the basis for, e.g., resources and compliance of stakeholders. With the dynamics in the policy field, expectations might change and public administrations consequently need to adapt in order to maintain or repair the then threatened legitimacy. If their organizational legitimacy is threatened by a perception of structures and processes being inadequate for changed expectations, an ‘institutional crisis’ unfolds. However, we know little about ministerial bureaucracies’ structural reactions to such crucial momentums and how this effects the quest for coordination within policy-making. Overall, the dissertation thus links to both policy analysis and public administration research and consists of five publications. It asks: How do structures in ministerial bureaucracies change in the context of institutional crises? And what effect do these changes have on ministerial coordination? The dissertation hereby focusses on the above described dynamic policy field of immigration in Germany in the period from 2005 to 2017 and pursues three objectives: 1) to identify the context and impulse for changes in the structures of ministerial bureaucracies, 2) to describe respective changes with regard to their organizational structures, and 3) to identify their effect on coordination. It hereby compares and contrasts institutional crises by incremental change and shock as well as changes and effects at federal and Länder level which allows a comprehensive answer to both of the research questions. Theoretically, the dissertation follows neo-institutionalist theory with a particular focus on changes in organizational structures, coordination and crisis management. Methodologically, it follows a comparative design. Each article (except for the literature review), focusses on ministerial bureaucracies at one governmental level (federal or Länder) and on an institutional crisis induced by either an incremental process or a shock. Thus, responses and effects can be compared and contrasted across impulses for institutional crises and governmental levels. Overall, the dissertation follows a mixed methods approach with a majority of qualitative single and small-n case studies based on document analysis and semi-structured interviews. Additionally, two articles use quantitative methods as they best suited the respective research question. The rather explorative nature of these two articles however fits to the overall interpretivist approach of the dissertation. Overall, the dissertation’s core argument is: Within the investigation period, varying dynamics and thus impulses for institutional crises took place in the German policy field of immigration. Respectively, expectations by stakeholders on how the politico-administrative system should address the policy problem changed. Ministerial administrations at both the federal and Länder level adapted to these expectations in order to maintain, or regain respectively, organizational legitimacy. The administration hereby referred to well-known recipes of structural changes. Institutional crises do not constitute fields of experimentation. The new structures had an immediate effect on ministerial coordination, with respect to both the horizontal and vertical dimension. Yet, they did not mean a comprehensive change of the system in place. The dissertation thus challenges the idea of the toppling effect of crises and rather shows that adaptability and persistence of public administrations constitute two sides of the same coin.
KW  - Ministerial bureaucracy
KW  - coordination
KW  - institutional crisis
KW  - immigration
KW  - migration
KW  - refugee crisis
KW  - Ministerialbürokratie
KW  - Koordination
KW  - institutionelle Krise
KW  - Immigration
KW  - Migration
KW  - Flüchtlingskrise
Y1  - 2020
ER  - 
TY  - THES
A1  - Fleischer, Julia
T1  - Policy advice and institutional politics : a comparative analysis of Germany and Britain
T1  - Politikberatung und Institutionenpolitik : eine vergleichende Analyse für Deutschland und Großbritannien
N2  - Die Studie schließt an die Debatte in der vergleichenden politikwissenschaftlichen Verwaltungsforschung an, die sich mit der Rolle interner Beratungsakteure in Regierungsorganisationen beschäftigt. Ziel dieser Studie ist es, die Mechanismen zu erklären, durch die interne Beratungsakteure die ihnen zugeschriebene Bedeutung im exekutiven Entscheidungsprozess erlangen. Dabei werden jene Organisationseinheiten untersucht, die proaktiv an exekutiven Entscheidungsprozessen mitwirken und mit ihrer Beratung politischer Akteure in Konkurrenz zur Ministerialverwaltung stehen können. Die Einflussmechanismen dieser Akteure in der exekutiven Entscheidungsfindung werden als Formen einer "Institutionenpolitik" aufgefasst, bei der Akteure die institutionellen Bedingungen von Politikformulierungsprozessen bzw. die "Spielregeln exekutiver Entscheidungsfindung" verändern, um ihre eigene Position bzw. die ihres "Klienten" zu stärken. Das theoretische Argument dieser Arbeit folgt der neo-institutionalistischen Wende in der Organisationstheorie und definiert Institutionenpolitik als graduelle Institutionalisierungsprozesse zwischen Institutionen und organisationalen Akteuren, wobei einem weiten Institutionenbegriff folgend die Objekte solcher Veränderungsprozesse durch regulative, normative und kognitive Säulen gekennzeichnet sind. In Anwendung des "power-distributional approach" lassen sich graduelle Institutionalisierungsprozesse durch institutionenbezogene Charakteristika erklären, d.h. die Beschaffenheit der Objekte von Institutionenpolitik, insbesondere die Interpretationsfreiheit ihrer Anwendung, sowie die Restriktionen des institutionellen Kontexts. Zudem lässt sich Institutionenpolitik durch akteursbezogene Charakteristika erklären, d.h. den Ambitionen der Akteure sich als "potentielle institutionelle Agenten" zu engagieren. Diese beiden Erklärungsdimensionen drücken sich in vier idealtypischen Mechanismen von Institutionenpolitik aus: Sedimentation, Ersetzung, Drift, und Konversion, die mit vier Agententypen korrespondieren. Die Studie untersucht die institutionenpolitischen Ambitionen der Akteure explorativ, die Relevanz des institutionellen Kontexts wird mithilfe von Erwartungshypothesen zu den Effekten von vier Merkmalen analysiert, die in der bestehenden Debatte als relevant gelten: (1) die Parteienzusammensetzung der Regierung, (2) die Strukturprinzipien von Kabinettsentscheidungen, (3) die Verwaltungstradition sowie (4) die formale Politisierung der Ministerialverwaltung. Die Studie folgt einem "most similar systems design" und führt qualitative Fallstudien zur Rolle interner Beratungseinheiten im Zentrum deutscher und britischer Regierungsorganisationen, d.h. der Regierungszentrale und dem Finanzministerium, über einen längeren Zeitraum durch (1969/1970-2005). Es werden jeweils drei Zeitperioden pro Untersuchungsland betrachtet, die britischen Fallstudien analysieren die Beratungsakteure im Cabinet Office, Prime Minister's Office und dem Finanzministerium unter den Premierministern Heath (1970-74), Thatcher (1979-87) und Blair (1997-2005). Die deutschen Fallstudien untersuchen die Beratungsakteure im Bundeskanzleramt und dem Bundesfinanzministerium unter den Bundeskanzlern Brandt (1969-74), Kohl (1982-1987) und Schröder (1998-2005). Für die empirische Untersuchung wurden die Ergebnisse einer Dokumentenanalyse mit den Erkenntnissen aus 75 semi-strukturierten Experteninterviews trianguliert. Die vergleichende Analyse zeigt unterschiedliche Muster von Institutionenpolitik. Die deutschen Beratungsakteure agieren anfänglich in Ersetzung, später vornehmlich in Sedimentation sowie Drift, d.h. ihre institutionenpolitischen Aktivitäten widmen sich nach anfänglicher Ersetzung bestehender institutioneller Grundlagen zunehmend der Addition neuer Elemente sowie der deliberativen Nicht-Entscheidung zur Anpassung existierender institutioneller Grundlagen an Umweltveränderungen. Die britischen Beratungsakteure sind zumeist in Ersetzung sowie Konversion engagiert, trotz gelegentlicher Sedimentation, d.h. einer direkten Ersetzung bestehender institutioneller Grundlagen durch neue Spielregeln exekutiver Entscheidungsfindung sowie einer bewussten Umwandlung und Neuausrichtung existierender institutionellen Grundlagen, gelegentlich auch eine Addition neuer Elemente zu bestehenden Regeln. Die institutionen- und akteursspezifischen Charakteristika sind für diese Muster von Institutionenpolitik erklärungsrelevant. Erstens weist die Studie nach, dass der institutionelle Kontext die institutionenpolitischen Aktivitäten in Deutschland beschränkt und in Großbritannien begünstigt. Zweitens ist die Interpretationsfreiheit der Anwendung institutionenpolitischer Objekte bedeutsam, wie sich anhand der institutionenpolitischen Ambitionen der Akteure im Zeitverlauf und im Ländervergleich zeigt und somit drittens bestätigt, dass diese Interessen der Akteure an Institutionenwandel die Mechanismen von Institutionenpolitik beeinflussen. Die Arbeit schließt mit der Erkenntnis, dass die Rolle interner Beratungseinheiten in der exekutiven Politikformulierung nicht nur aus ihren inhaltlichen, parteistrategischen oder medial-beratenden Funktionen für politische Akteure in Regierungsämtern folgt, sondern insbesondere aus ihren institutionenpolitischen Aktivitäten, deren Resultate die institutionellen Restriktionen aller Akteure in exekutiven Entscheidungsprozessen beeinflussen – und somit auch ihre eigene Rolle in diesen Prozessen.
N2  - This study follows the debate in comparative public administration research on the role of advisory arrangements in central governments. The aim of this study is to explain the mechanisms by which these actors gain their alleged role in government decision-making. Hence, it analyses advisory arrangements that are proactively involved in executive decision-making and may compete with the permanent bureaucracy by offering policy advice to political executives. The study argues that these advisory arrangements influence government policy-making by "institutional politics", i.e. by shaping the institutional underpinnings to govern or rather the "rules of the executive game" in order to strengthen their own position or that of their clients. The theoretical argument of this study follows the neo-institutionalist turn in organization theory and defines institutional politics as gradual institutionalization processes between institutions and organizational actors. It applies a broader definition of institutions as sets of regulative, normative and cognitive pillars. Following the "power-distributional approach" such gradual institutionalization processes are influenced by structure-oriented characteristics, i.e. the nature of the objects of institutional politics, in particular the freedom of interpretation in their application, as well as the distinct constraints of the institutional context. In addition, institutional politics are influenced by agency-oriented characteristics, i.e. the ambitions of actors to act as "would-be change agents". These two explanatory dimensions result in four ideal-typical mechanisms of institutional politics: layering, displacement, drift, and conversion, which correspond to four ideal-types of would-be change agents. The study examines the ambitions of advisory arrangements in institutional politics in an exploratory manner, the relevance of the institutional context is analyzed via expectation hypotheses on the effects of four institutional context features that are regarded as relevant in the scholarly debate: (1) the party composition of governments, (2) the structuring principles in cabinet, (3) the administrative tradition, and (4) the formal politicization of the ministerial bureaucracy. The study follows a "most similar systems design" and conducts qualitative case studies on the role of advisory arrangements at the center of German and British governments, i.e. the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Finance, for a longer period (1969/1970-2005). Three time periods are scrutinized per country; the British case studies examine the role of advisory arrangements at the Cabinet Office, the Prime Minister's Office, and the Ministry of Finance under Prime Ministers Heath (1970-74), Thatcher (1979-87) and Blair (1997-2005). The German case studies study the role of advisory arrangements at the Federal Chancellery and the Federal Ministry of Finance during the Brandt government (1969-74), the Kohl government (1982-1987) and the Schröder government (1998-2005). For the empirical analysis, the results of a document analysis and the findings of 75 semi-structured expert interviews have been triangulated. The comparative analysis reveals different patterns of institutional politics. The German advisory arrangements engaged initially in displacement but turned soon towards layering and drift, i.e. after an initial displacement of the pre-existing institutional underpinnings to govern they laid increasingly new elements onto existing ones and took the non-deliberative decision to neglect the adaption of existing rules of the executive game towards changing environmental demands. The British advisory arrangements were mostly involved in displacement and conversion, despite occasional layering, i.e. they displaced the pre-existing institutional underpinnings to govern with new rules of the executive game and transformed and realigned them, sometimes also layering new elements onto pre-existing ones. The structure- and agency-oriented characteristics explain these patterns of institutional politics. First, the study shows that the institutional context limits the institutional politics in Germany and facilitates the institutional politics in the UK. Second, the freedom of interpreting the application of institutional targets is relevant and could be observed via the different ambitions of advisory arrangements across countries and over time, confirming, third, that the interests of such would-be change agents are likewise important to understand the patterns of institutional politics. The study concludes that the role of advisory arrangements in government policy-making rests not only upon their policy-related, party-political or media-advisory role for political executives, but especially upon their activities in institutional politics, resulting in distinct institutional constraints on all actors in government policy-making – including their own role in these processes.
KW  - Politikberatung
KW  - Ministerialverwaltung
KW  - Regierungszentrale
KW  - Organisationstheorie
KW  - Fallstudie
KW  - Policy advice
KW  - Ministerial bureaucracy
KW  - Prime Minister's Office
KW  - Organization theory
KW  - Case study
Y1  - 2012
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-61873
ER  -