TY - JOUR A1 - Kurz, Verena A1 - Orland, Andreas A1 - Posadzy, Kinga T1 - Fairness versus efficiency BT - how procedural fairness concerns affect coordination JF - Experimental Economics N2 - We investigate in a laboratory experiment whether procedural fairness concerns affect how well individuals are able to solve a coordination problem in a two-player Volunteer’s Dilemma. Subjects receive external action recommendations, either to volunteer or to abstain from it, in order to facilitate coordination and improve efficiency. We manipulate the fairness of the recommendation procedure by varying the probabilities of receiving the disadvantageous recommendation to volunteer between players. We find evidence that while recommendations improve overall efficiency regardless of their implications for expected payoffs, there are behavioural asymmetries depending on the recommendation: advantageous recommendations are followed less frequently than disadvantageous ones and beliefs about others’ actions are more pessimistic in the treatment with recommendations inducing unequal expected payoffs. KW - Coordination KW - Correlated equilibrium KW - Recommendations KW - Procedural Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-017-9540-5 SN - 1386-4157 SN - 1573-6938 VL - 21 IS - 3 SP - 601 EP - 626 PB - Springer CY - Dordrecht ER - TY - GEN A1 - Kurz, Verena A1 - Orland, Andreas A1 - Posadzy, Kinga T1 - Fairness versus efficiency BT - how procedural fairness concerns affect coordination T2 - Postprints der Universität Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe N2 - We investigate in a laboratory experiment whether procedural fairness concerns affect how well individuals are able to solve a coordination problem in a two-player Volunteer's Dilemma. Subjects receive external action recommendations, either to volunteer or to abstain from it, in order to facilitate coordination and improve efficiency. We manipulate the fairness of the recommendation procedure by varying the probabilities of receiving the disadvantageous recommendation to volunteer between players. We find evidence that while recommendations improve overall efficiency regardless of their implications for expected payoffs, there are behavioural asymmetries depending on the recommendation: advantageous recommendations are followed less frequently than disadvantageous ones and beliefs about others' actions are more pessimistic in the treatment with recommendations inducing unequal expected payoffs. T3 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe - 117 KW - coordination KW - correlated equilibrium KW - recommendations KW - procedural fairness KW - volunteer’s dilemma KW - experiment Y1 - 2019 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-432611 SN - 1867-5808 IS - 117 SP - 601 EP - 626 ER -