TY - JOUR A1 - Krüger, Hans-Peter T1 - The second nature of human beings : an invitation for John McDowell to discuss Helmuth Plessner's philosophical anthropology ; with a comment on Hans-Peter Krüger's paper by John McDowell, p. 120-125 Y1 - 1998 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Krüger, Hans-Peter A1 - Henrich, D. A1 - Irrlitz, G. T1 - German-language philosophy 1949-1989 and in the future : an interview with Dieter Henrich and Gerd Irrlitz Y1 - 2003 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Krüger, Hans-Peter T1 - Brain in the context of eccentric positioning : philosophical challenges to neurobiological brain research Y1 - 2004 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Krüger, Hans-Peter T1 - The abandonment of living nature as its historical goal Y1 - 2004 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Krüger, Hans-Peter T1 - The public nature of human beings : parallels between classical pragmatism and Helmuth Plessner's philosophical anthropology Y1 - 2004 SN - 0015-1831 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Krüger, Hans-Peter T1 - Life-Philosophical Anthropology as the Missing Third: On Peter Gordon's Continental Divide JF - History of European ideas N2 - Though Peter Gordon mentioned philosophical anthropology in his book Continental Divide, he has not yet realized how it works independently from Cassirer's and Heidegger's prejudices. The whole argument between them before, in and after Davos (1929) raged around the status of philosophical anthropology: How do the spiritualisation of life and the enlivening of the spirit come about? This was not just the central question for philosophical anthropology founded by Max Scheler, but also in Wilhelm Dilthey's life philosophy, which was systematized by Georg Misch. Cassirer and Heidegger shared three shortcomings with respect to the Life-philosophical Anthropology. Neither had a philosophy of nature or a philosophy of sociaty or a philosophy of history. The insight into the unfathomability of humans (Misch) is given a political edge in Helmuth Plessner's book Power and Human Nature (1931). Elevating it to the principle of democratic equality with respect to the worth of all cultures one opens up the potential for a form of civil competition that might supersede ethnocentric wars. KW - philosophical anthropology, anthropological philosophy, unfathomability of humans KW - human life in nature, society, and history Y1 - 2015 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/01916599.2014.981019 SN - 0191-6599 SN - 1873-541X VL - 41 IS - 4 SP - 432 EP - 439 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group CY - Abingdon ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Krüger, Hans-Peter T1 - How is the Human Life-Form of Mind Really Possible in Nature? BT - Parallels Between John Dewey and Helmuth Plessner JF - Human studies N2 - J. Dewey and H. Plessner both and independently of one another treated the central question of what new task philosophy must set itself if the assumption is correct that the life-form of mind, i.e., the mental life-form of humans, arose in nature and must also sustain itself in the future within nature. If nature has to reconceived so as to make the irreducible qualities of life and mind truly possible, then it can no longer be restricted to the role of physical material. Conversely humans cannot no longer take on the role of God outside and independent of nature. Instead these philosophers distinguish between three plateaus (Dewey) or stages (Plessner), between physical (inorganic) nature, psycho-physical (living) nature and the nature that is mental life. This distinction is drawn such that a connection between the plateaus is truly possible. The third level, that of the mental form of life, answers mentally within conduct to the break with the first two levels. Hence it depends in the future as well on the continuously renewed difference (between the precarious and the stable for Dewey, between immediacy and mediation for Plessner) in our experience of nature. Within this difference nature as a whole remains an open unknown, which is why we can credit Dewey with a philosophy of diversified and negative holism, Plessner with a differential philosophy of the negativity of the absolute. KW - Evolution of the human KW - Non-reductive naturalism KW - Open holism KW - Life forms KW - Philosophical anthropology KW - Presuppositions of evolution Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-017-9429-5 SN - 0163-8548 SN - 1572-851X VL - 42 IS - 1 SP - 47 EP - 64 PB - Springer CY - Dordrecht ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Krüger, Hans-Peter T1 - Closed environment and open world BT - On the significance of Uexkull's biology for Helmuth Plessner's natural philosophy T2 - Jakob von Uexküll and philosophy: life, environments, anthropology N2 - According to Plessner, both adaptation and selection can be conceived not just as requested by the environment but also as actively proceeding from the organism. In this respect, Plessner finds in Uexküll’s new biology a powerful counterweight to the constraints of Darwinism. However, despite all the points in common in their respective understanding of the problem, Plessner reproaches to Uexküll to have entirely missed the intermediate layer of the lived body [Leib] between the organism and its environment. Unlike Uexküll, concerning the more developed animals, Plessner took up elements of animal psychology from Wolfgang Köhler and Frederik Jacobus Johannes Buytendijk. Finally, Plessner finds insufficiencies also in Uexküll’s distinction between the notion of world and the notion of environment, which would lead to the parallel positing of different environments. In reaction to Uexküll’s leveling of all environments, Plessner drafted a philosophical-anthropological spectrum between the intelligent way of living observed in the great apes, whose intelligence had been demonstrated, and the co-wordly life of the symbolic mind as seen in the personal sphere of human life. Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-0-429-27909-6 SN - 978-0-367-23273-3 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429279096 SP - 89 EP - 105 PB - Routledge CY - London ER -