TY  - RPRT
A1  - Sanner, Helge
T1  - Price responses to market entry with and without endogenous product choice
N2  - Textbook wisdom says that competition yields lower prices and higher consumer surplus than monopoly. We show in two versions of a simple location-product differentiation model with and without endogenous choice of products that these two results have to be qualified. In both models, more than half of the reasonable parameter values lead to higher prices with duopoly than with monopoly. If the product characteristics are exogenous to the firms, consumers may even be be better off with monopoly in average.
T3  - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 81 
Y1  - 2005
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-14399
ER  - 
TY  - RPRT
A1  - Sanner, Helge
T1  - Instability in competition
BT  - hotelling re-reconsidered
N2  - In this paper we show that Puu (2002) does not provide a stable solution to the location game, according to his own definition of stability. If the usual two-stage game is considered, where in the first stage a location is chosen once and forever, and in the second stage prices are determined, the equilibrium proves stable for a sizeable interval of parameters, however. Even though this procedure is most common in analyzing Hotelling's location problem, it is not satisfying because it exhibits an inconsistent informational structure. The search for a better concept of stability is imperative.
T3  - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 79 
Y1  - 2005
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-14299
ER  - 
TY  - GEN
A1  - Sanner, Helge
T1  - Imperfect goods and labor markets, and the union wage gap
N2  - Existing theoretical literature fails to explain satisfactorily the differences between the pay of workers that are covered by collective agreements and others who are not. This study aims at providing a model framework which is amenable for an analysis of this issue. Our general-equilibrium approach integrates a dual labor market and a two-sector product market. The results suggest that the so-called 'union wage gap' is largely determined by the degree of centralization of the bargains, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, by the expenditure share of the unionized sector's goods.
KW  - Verhandlungstheorie
KW  - Monopolistische Konkurrenz
KW  - Gewerkschaften
KW  - union wage premium
KW  - comparative analysis
KW  - wage differentials
KW  - dual labor market
KW  - monopolistic competition
Y1  - 2005
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-6511
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Sanner, Helge
T1  - Bertrand Wettbewerb im Raum kann zu höheren Preisen führen als ein Monopol
Y1  - 2005
ER  - 
TY  - RPRT
A1  - Sanner, Helge
T1  - Bertrand Wettbewerb im Raum kann zu höheren Preisen führen als ein Monopol
N2  - In Mikro- und Industrieökonomik ist scheinbar gewiss, dassWettbewerb zu niedrigeren Preisen führt und dass Konsumenten von Wettbewerb profitieren, während die etablierten Unternehmen einen Nachteil erleiden. Dieser Beitrag verwendet ein raumwirtschaftliches Standardmodell, um zu zeigen, dass dies nicht immer so sein muss. Der Grund ist, dass durch den Marktzutritt gerade die Konsumenten, deren Preiselastizität am größten ist, von dem Unternehmen bei der Preisbildung nicht berücksichtigt werden.
T3  - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 75 
Y1  - 2005
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-14251
ER  -