TY - RPRT A1 - Wagner, Wolfgang T1 - A simulation of segregation in cities and its application for the analysis of rent control N2 - Social segregation in cities takes place where different household groups exist and when, according to Schelling, their location choice either minimizes the number of differing households in their neighborhood or maximizes their own group. In this contribution an evolutionary simulation based on a monocentric city model with externalities among households is used to discuss the spatial segregation patterns of four groups. The resulting complex spatial patterns can be shown as graphic animations. They can be applied as initial situation for the analysis of the effects a rent control has on segregation. T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 71 Y1 - 2004 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-14177 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Sanner, Helge T1 - Bargaining structure and regional unemployment insurance N2 - This study examines how the size of trade unions relative to the la- bor force impacts on the desirability of different organizational forms of self-financing unemployment insurance (UI) for workers, firms, and with reference to an efficiency criterion. For this purpose, we respectively nu- merically compare the outcome of a model with a uniform payroll tax to a model where workers pay taxes according to their systematic risk of unemployment. Our results highlight the importance of the bargaining structure for the assessment of a particular UI scheme. Most importantly, it depends on the size of the unions whether efficiency favors a uniform or a differentiated UI scheme. T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 44 Y1 - 2001 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-13747 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Caliendo, Marco A1 - Künn, Steffen A1 - Weißenberger, Martin T1 - Catching up or Lagging Behind? BT - The Long-Term Business and Innovation Potential of Subsidized Start-Ups out of Unemployment T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - From an active labor market policy perspective, start-up subsidies for unemployed individuals are very effective in improving long-term labor market outcomes for participants. From a business perspective, however, the assessment of these public programs is less clear since they might attract individuals with low entrepreneurial abilities and produce businesses with low survival rates and little contribution to job creation, economic growth, and innovation. In this paper, we use a rich data set to compare participants of a German start-up subsidy program for unemployed individuals to a group of regular founders who started from nonunemployment and did not receive the subsidy. The data allows us to analyze their business performance up until 40 months after business formation. We find that formerly subsidized founders lag behind not only in survival and job creation, but especially also in innovation activities. The gaps in these business outcomes are relatively constant or even widening over time. Hence, we do not see any indication of catching up in the longer run. While the gap in survival can be entirely explained by initial differences in observable start-up characteristics, the gap in business development remains and seems to be the result of restricted access to capital as well as differential business strategies and dynamics. Considering these conflicting results for the assessment of the subsidy program from an ALMP and business perspective, policy makers need to carefully weigh the costs and benefits of such a strategy to find the right policy mix. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 12 KW - Entrepreneurship KW - Start-up Subsidies KW - Business Grow KW - Innovation KW - Job Creation Y1 - 2019 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-437012 SN - 2628-653X IS - 12 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Andree, Kai T1 - Collusion in spatially separated markets with quantity competition N2 - This paper develops the incentives to collude in a model with spatially separated markets and quantity setting firms. We find that increases in transportation costs stabilize the collusive agreement. We also show that, the higher the demand in both markets the less likely will collusion be sustained. Gross and Holahan (2003) use a similar model with price setting firms, we compare their results with ours to analyze the impact of the mode of competition on sustainability of collusion. Further we analyze the impact of collusion on social welfare and find that collusion may be welfare enhancing. T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 104 Y1 - 2011 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-55927 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Andree, Kai A1 - Schwan, Mike T1 - Collusive market sharing with spatial competition N2 - This paper develops a spatial model to analyze the stability of a market sharing agreement between two firms. We find that the stability of the cartel depends on the relative market size of each firm. Collusion is not attractive for firms with a small home market, but the incentive for collusion increases when the firm’s home market is getting larger relative to the home market of the competitor. The highest stability of a cartel and additionally the highest social welfare is found when regions are symmetric. Further we can show that a monetary transfer can stabilize the market sharing agreement. T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 105 Y1 - 2012 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-62146 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Gruševaja, Marina T1 - Do institutions matter? BT - An analysis of the russian competition policy in the period of transformation N2 - Contens 1 Introduction 2 Institutions and the Institutional Change 2.1 Institutions and Theoretical Concepts in Economics 2.2 Path Dependence 2.3 Inconsistence of Institutional Development 2.4 Determinants of Effectiveness 2.5 Efficiency of New Institutions 3 What is “Competition Policy”? 4 The Competition Policy in Russia as an Institution 4.1 Establishment of the Competition Policy as an Institution 4.2 Market Structure and Competition Policy 4.3 Measures of Competition Policy 4.3.1 Prohibition of Competition Restrictive Agreements or Concerted Actions 4.3.2 Abuse of Dominance 4.3.3 Merger Control 4.3.4 Restrictive Action to Competition of Administrative Bodies 4.4 Violations of the Competition Law 4.5 Problems of the Russian Competition Policy 5 Which Mistakes Russia has made with the Implementation of theCompetition Policy? 6 Is a Lacking Effectiveness of Transplanted Institutions Inevitable? 7 Concluding Remarks T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 88 Y1 - 2006 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-14485 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Margaryan, Shushanik A1 - Saniter, Nils A1 - Schumann, Mathias A1 - Siedler, Thomas T1 - Do internships pay off? BT - the effects of student internships on earnings T2 - Journal of human resources N2 - We study the causal effect of student internship experience in firms on earnings later in life. We use mandatory firm internships at German universities as an instrument for doing a firm internship while attending university. Employing longitudinal data from graduate surveys, we find positive and significant earnings returns of about 6 percent in both ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV) regressions. The positive returns are particularly pronounced for individuals and areas of study that are characterized by a weak labor market orientation. The empirical findings show that graduates who completed a firm internship face a lower risk of unemployment during the first year of their careers, suggesting a smoother transition to the labor market. Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.57.4.0418-9460R2 SN - 0022-166X SN - 1548-8004 VL - 57 IS - 4 SP - 1242 EP - 1275 PB - University of Wisconsin Press CY - Madison ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Güth, Werner A1 - Hertwig, Ralph A1 - Orland, Andreas T1 - Do people harness deliberate ignorance to avoid envy and its detrimental effects? T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - Envy is an unpleasant emotion. If individuals anticipate that comparing their payoff with the (potentially higher) payoff of others will make them envious, they may want to actively avoid information about other people’s payoffs. Given the opportunity to reduce another person’s payoff, an individual’s envy may trigger behavior that is detrimental to welfare. In this case, if individuals anticipate that they will react in a welfare-reducing way, they may also avoid information about other people’s payoffs from the outset. We investigated these two hypotheses using three experiments. We found that 13% of our potentially envious subjects avoided information when they did not have the opportunity to reduce another participant’s payoff. Psychological scales do not explain this behavior. We also found that voluntarily uninformed subjects did neither deduct less of the payoff nor less frequently than subjects who could not avoid the information. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 17 KW - envy KW - emotion regulation KW - deliberate ignorance KW - punishment KW - experiment Y1 - 2020 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-444463 SN - 2628-653X IS - 17 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Holzer, Verena Leïla T1 - Does the german renewable energies act fulfil sustainable development objectives? BT - Paper presented at the Research Workshop & Short Course: Investment in Sustainable Energy, Helsinki, Finland, 28.6. - 1.7.2004 N2 - Table of contens 1 Introduction 2 The concept of sustainability 2.1 Ecological sustainability 2.2 Social sustainability 2.3 Economic sustainability 2.4 The sustainability strategy of the german government 3 Effects of energy use on the enviromment 4 Requirements of the SSGG for energy policy 4.1 Ecological implications of thr SSGG 4.2 Social and economic requirements of the SSGG 5 The German Renewable Energies Act 5.1 Objectives 5.2 Design and mechanisms 5.3 Fees-in tariffs 6 Does the EEG meet the sustainability requirements of the SSGG? 6.1 Management rules 6.2 Social sustainability 6.3 Economic sustainability 6.4 Development tendencis 7 Possible amendments for more sustainability 7.1 Changing the promotional system 7.2 A European regulation T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 73 Y1 - 2004 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-14189 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Holzer, Verena Leïla T1 - Ecological objectives and the energy sector BT - the German renewable energies act and the European emissions trading system N2 - Table of contents 1 Introduction 2 Ecological regulation and cost effectiveness 2.1 Climate policy 2.2 Promotion of renewable energies 3 Ecological regulation and security of supply 3.1 Climate policy 3.2 Promotion of renewable energies 4 The German Renewable Energies Act (EEG) 4.1 Objectives 4.2 Design and mechanisms 5 The European emissions trading system (EETS) 5.1 Objectives 5.2 Framework 6 The EEG and the EETS: trade off between ecological objectivesand cost effectiveness, innovation and security of supply? 6.1 EEG 6.2 EETS 6.3 Comparison between the approaches of the EEG and the EETS 7 Conclusions and outlook T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 63 Y1 - 2004 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-14054 ER -