TY  - RPRT
A1  - Andres, Maximilian
A1  - Bruttel, Lisa Verena
A1  - Friedrichsen, Jana
T1  - How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion
BT  - a machine learning approach
T2  - CEPA Discussion Papers
N2  - This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices.
T3  - CEPA Discussion Papers - 53 
KW  - cartel
KW  - collusion
KW  - communication
KW  - machine learning
KW  - experiment
Y1  - 2022
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-562234
SN  - 2628-653X
ER  - 
TY  - RPRT
A1  - Bruttel, Lisa Verena
A1  - Eisenkopf, Gerald
A1  - Nithammer, Juri
T1  - Pre-election communication in public good games with endogenous leaders
T2  - CEPA Discussion Papers
N2  - Leadership plays an important role for the efficient and fair solution of social dilemmas but the effectiveness of a leader can vary substantially. Two main factors of leadership impact are the ability to induce high contributions by all group members and the (expected) fair use of power. Participants in our experiment decide about contributions to a public good. After all contributions are made, the leader can choose how much of the joint earnings to assign to herself; the remainder is distributed equally among the followers. Using machine learning techniques, we study whether the content of initial open statements by the group members predicts their behavior as a leader and whether groups are able to identify such clues and endogenously appoint a “good” leader to solve the dilemma. We find that leaders who promise fairness are more likely to behave fairly, and that followers appoint as leaders those who write more explicitly about fairness and efficiency. However, in their contribution decision, followers focus on the leader’s first-move contribution and place less importance on the content of the leader’s statements.
T3  - CEPA Discussion Papers - 73 
KW  - leadership
KW  - public good
KW  - voting
KW  - experiment
KW  - promises
Y1  - 2024
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-623952
SN  - 2628-653X
IS  - 73
ER  -