TY - RPRT A1 - Aharon, Itzik A1 - Brill, Antonia A1 - Fonseca, Philip A1 - Vandchali, Azin Alizadeh A1 - Wendel, Nina T1 - The Protection of Women Human Rights Defenders and their Collective Actions T2 - Staat, Recht und Politik – Forschungs- und Diskussionspapiere T2 - State, Law, and Politics - Research and Discussion Papers N2 - This paper evaluates the construction of the rights of human rights defenders within international law and its shortcomings in protecting women. Human rights defenders have historically been defined on the basis of their actions as defenders. However, as Marxist-feminist scholar Silvia Federici contends, women are inherently politicised and, moreover, face obstacles to political action which are invisible to and untouchable by the law. Labour rights set an example of handling such a disadvantaged political position by placing vital importance on workers’ right to association and collective action. The paper closes with the suggestion that transposing this construction of rights to women would better protect women as human rights defenders while emphasising their capacity for self-determination in their political actions. N2 - Dieses Papier bewertet die Konstruktion der Rechte von Menschenrechtsverteidigern innerhalb des Völkerrechts und ihre Mängel beim Schutz von Frauen. Menschenrechtsverteidiger wurden in der Vergangenheit auf der Grundlage ihrer Tätigkeit als Verteidiger definiert. Wie die marxistisch-feministische Wissenschaftlerin Silvia Federici behauptet, sind Frauen jedoch von Natur aus politisiert und sehen sich darüber hinaus Hindernissen für politisches Handeln gegenüber, die für das Gesetz unsichtbar und unantastbar sind. Die Arbeitsrechte sind ein Beispiel für den Umgang mit einer derart benachteiligten politischen Position, indem sie dem Recht der Arbeitnehmer auf Vereinigungsfreiheit und kollektive Aktionen entscheidende Bedeutung beimessen. Das Papier schließt mit dem Vorschlag, dass die Übertragung dieser Rechtskonstruktion auf Frauen Frauen als Menschenrechtsverteidigerinnen besser schützen und gleichzeitig ihre Fähigkeit zur Selbstbestimmung in ihrem politischen Handeln betonen würde. T3 - Staat, Recht und Politik – Forschungs- und Diskussionspapiere = State, Law, and Politics - Research and Discussion Papers - 10 KW - Human Rights Defender KW - Women's Rights Y1 - 2020 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-444278 IS - 10 PB - Universitätsverlag Potsdam CY - Potsdam ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Amann, Erwin A1 - Rzepka, Sylvi T1 - The Effect of Goal-Setting Prompts in a Blended Learning Environment BT - Evidence from a Field Experiment T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - We investigate how inviting students to set task-based goals affects usage of an online learning platform and course performance. We design and implement a randomized field experiment in a large mandatory economics course with blended learning elements. The low-cost treatment induces students to use the online learning system more often, more intensively, and to begin earlier with exam preparation. Treated students perform better in the course than the control group: they are 18.8% (0.20 SD) more likely to pass the exam and earn 6.7% (0.19 SD) more points on the exam. There is no evidence that treated students spend significantly more time, rather they tend to shift to more productive learning methods. The heterogeneity analysis suggests that higher treatment effects are associated with higher levels of behavioral bias but also with poor early course behavior. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 25 KW - natural field experiment KW - blended learning KW - behavioral economics KW - goal-setting Y1 - 2021 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-493476 SN - 2628-653X N1 - The trial is registered in the AEA RCT registry, RCT ID AEARCTR-28790 (https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2928-1.0). IS - 25 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Amoroso, Sara A1 - Herrmann, Benedikt A1 - Kritikos, Alexander T1 - The Role of Regulation and Regional Government Quality for High Growth Firms BT - The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - High growth firms (HGFs) are important for job creation and considered to be precursors of economic growth. We investigate how formal institutions, like product- and labor-market regulations, as well as the quality of regional governments that implement these regulations, affect HGF development across European regions. Using data from Eurostat, OECD, WEF, and Gothenburg University, we show that both regulatory stringency and the quality of the regional government influence the regional shares of HGFs. More importantly, we find that the effect of labor- and product-market regulations ultimately depends on the quality of regional governments: in regions with high quality of government, the share of HGFs is neither affected by the level of product market regulation, nor by more or less flexibility in hiring and firing practices. Our findings contribute to the debate on the effects of regulations by showing that regulations are not, per se, “good, bad, and ugly”, rather their impact depends on the efficiency of regional governments. Our paper offers important building blocks to develop tailored policy measures that may influence the development of HGFs in a region. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 71 KW - High growth firms KW - Regulation KW - Quality of regional governments KW - Regions Y1 - 2023 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-612771 SN - 2628-653X IS - 71 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Andree, Kai T1 - Spatial discrimination, nations' size and transportation costs N2 - In this paper we develop a spatial Cournot trade model with two unequally sized countries, using the geographical interpretation of the Hotelling line. We analyze the trade and welfare effects of international trade between these two countries. The welfare analysis indicates that in this framework the large country benefits from free trade and the small country may be hurt by opening to trade. This finding is contrary to the results of Shachmurove and Spiegel (1995) as well as Tharakan and Thisse (2002), who use related models to analyze size effects in international trade, where the small country usually gains from trade and the large country may lose. T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 101 KW - Landesgröße KW - Außenwirtschaftstheorie KW - Zwei-Länder-Modell KW - Räumlicher Wettbewerb KW - Transportkosten KW - Neue ökonomische Geographie Y1 - 2010 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-48117 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Andree, Kai T1 - Collusion in spatially separated markets with quantity competition N2 - This paper develops the incentives to collude in a model with spatially separated markets and quantity setting firms. We find that increases in transportation costs stabilize the collusive agreement. We also show that, the higher the demand in both markets the less likely will collusion be sustained. Gross and Holahan (2003) use a similar model with price setting firms, we compare their results with ours to analyze the impact of the mode of competition on sustainability of collusion. Further we analyze the impact of collusion on social welfare and find that collusion may be welfare enhancing. T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 104 Y1 - 2011 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-55927 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Andree, Kai A1 - Schwan, Mike T1 - Collusive market sharing with spatial competition N2 - This paper develops a spatial model to analyze the stability of a market sharing agreement between two firms. We find that the stability of the cartel depends on the relative market size of each firm. Collusion is not attractive for firms with a small home market, but the incentive for collusion increases when the firm’s home market is getting larger relative to the home market of the competitor. The highest stability of a cartel and additionally the highest social welfare is found when regions are symmetric. Further we can show that a monetary transfer can stabilize the market sharing agreement. T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 105 Y1 - 2012 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-62146 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Andres, Maximilian T1 - Equilibrium selection in infinitely repeated games with communication T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - The present paper proposes a novel approach for equilibrium selection in the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma where players can communicate before choosing their strategies. This approach yields a critical discount factor that makes different predictions for cooperation than the usually considered sub-game perfect or risk dominance critical discount factors. In laboratory experiments, we find that our factor is useful for predicting cooperation. For payoff changes where the usually considered factors and our factor make different predictions, the observed cooperation is consistent with the predictions based on our factor. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 75 KW - cooperation KW - communication KW - infinitely repeated game KW - machine learning Y1 - 2024 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-631800 SN - 2628-653X IS - 75 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Andres, Maximilian A1 - Bruttel, Lisa T1 - Communicating Cartel Intentions T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - While the economic harm of cartels is caused by their price-increasing effect, sanctioning by courts rather targets at the underlying process of firms reaching a price-fixing agreement. This paper provides experimental evidence on the question whether such sanctioning meets the economic target, i.e., whether evidence of a collusive meeting of the firms and of the content of their communication reliably predicts subsequent prices. We find that already the mere mutual agreement to meet predicts a strong increase in prices. Conversely, express distancing from communication completely nullifies its otherwise price-increasing effect. Using machine learning, we show that communication only increases prices if it is very explicit about how the cartel plans to behave. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 77 KW - cartel KW - collusion KW - communication KW - machine learning KW - experiment Y1 - 2024 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-638469 SN - 2628-653X IS - 77 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Andres, Maximilian A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Friedrichsen, Jana T1 - The Leniency Rule Revisited: Experiments on Cartel Formation with Open Communication T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - The experimental literature on antitrust enforcement provides robust evidence that communication plays an important role for the formation and stability of cartels. We extend these studies through a design that distinguishes between innocuous communication and communication about a cartel, sanctioning only the latter. To this aim, we introduce a participant in the role of the competition authority, who is properly incentivized to judge communication content and price setting behavior of the firms. Using this novel design, we revisit the question whether a leniency rule successfully destabilizes cartels. In contrast to existing experimental studies, we find that a leniency rule does not affect cartelization. We discuss potential explanations for this contrasting result. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 24 KW - cartel KW - judgment of communication KW - corporate leniency program KW - price competition KW - experiment Y1 - 2021 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-491696 SN - 2628-653X N1 - This project, including the design and hypotheses, was preregistered at OSF before data collection had started (osf.io/ubhz8). IS - 24 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Andres, Maximilian A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Friedrichsen, Jana T1 - Choosing between explicit cartel formation and tacit collusion – An experiment T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - Numerous studies investigate which sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation but little is known as to how these sanctions work. We contribute to understanding the inner workings of cartels by studying experimentally the effect of sanctioning institutions on firms’ communication. Using machine learning to organize the chat communication into topics, we find that firms are significantly less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing when sanctioning institutions are present. At the same time, average prices are lower when communication is less explicit. A mediation analysis suggests that sanctions are effective in hindering cartel formation not only because they introduce a risk of being fined but also by reducing the prevalence of explicit price communication. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 19 KW - cartel KW - collusion KW - communication KW - machine learning KW - experiment Y1 - 2020 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-473885 SN - 2628-653X IS - 19 ER -