TY - JOUR A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Gueth, Werner T1 - Asymmetric voluntary cooperation BT - a repeated sequential best-shot experiment JF - International Journal of Game Theory N2 - This paper tests the robustness of voluntary cooperation in a sequential best shot game, a public good game in which the maximal contribution determines the level of public good provision. Thus, efficiency enhancing voluntary cooperation requires asymmetric behavior whose coordination is more difficult. Nevertheless, we find robust cooperation irrespective of treatment-specific institutional obstacles. To explain this finding, we distinguish three behavioral patterns aiming at both, voluntary cooperation and (immediate) payoff equality. KW - Best shot game KW - Coordination KW - Transfer KW - Refund KW - Experiment Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0633-y SN - 0020-7276 SN - 1432-1270 VL - 47 IS - 3 SP - 873 EP - 891 PB - Springer CY - Heidelberg ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Orland, Andreas A1 - Rostam-Afschar, Davud T1 - Flexible work arrangements and precautionary behavior BT - Theory and experimental evidence JF - Journal of economic behavior & organization N2 - In the past years, work-time in many industries has become more flexible, opening up a new channel for intertemporal substitution: workers might, instead of saving, adjust their work-time to smooth consumption. To study this channel, we set up a two-period consumption/saving model with wage uncertainty. This extends the standard saving model by also allowing a worker to allocate a fixed time budget between two work-shifts. To test the comparative statics implied by these two different channels, we conduct a laboratory experiment. A novel feature of our experiments is that we tie income to a real-effort style task. In four treatments, we turn on and off the two channels for consumption smoothing: saving and time allocation. Our main finding is that savings are strictly positive for at least 85 percent of subjects. We find that a majority of subjects also uses time allocation to smooth consumption and use saving and time shifting as substitutes, though not perfect substitutes. Part of the observed heterogeneity of precautionary behavior can be explained by risk preferences and motivations different from expected utility maximization. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. KW - Precautionary saving KW - Labor supply KW - Intertemporal substitution KW - Experiment Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.09.015 SN - 0167-2681 SN - 1879-1751 VL - 191 SP - 442 EP - 481 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena T1 - Is There a Loyalty-Enhancing Effect of Retroactive Price-Reduction Schemes? JF - Review of industrial organization N2 - This paper presents an experiment on the effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes on buyers’ repeated purchase decisions. Such schemes promise buyers a reduced price for all units that are bought in a certain time frame if the total quantity that is purchased passes a given threshold. This study finds a loyalty-enhancing effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes only if the buyers ex-ante expected that entering into the scheme would maximize their monetary gain, but later learn that they should leave the scheme. Furthermore, the effect crucially hinges on the framing of the price reduction. KW - Buyer behavior KW - Experiment KW - Loss aversion KW - Rebate and discount KW - Regulation of dominant firms KW - Risk aversion Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-018-9653-9 SN - 0889-938X SN - 1573-7160 VL - 54 IS - 3 SP - 575 EP - 593 PB - Springer CY - Dordrecht ER -