TY - JOUR A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena T1 - The Limits of Buyer Power BT - Experimental Evidence JF - Review of Behavioral Economics N2 - This paper studies the behavior of buyers confronting an incumbent monopolist and a potential market entrant in a repeated trade situation. In the experiment, buyers have two possibilities to demand lower prices in future trade periods. First, they can withhold demand. Second, they can voluntarily pay a higher price to the entrant in order to encourage future re-entry. Both these forms of buyer behavior occur in the experiment. They are less frequent when the number of buyers is large as opposed to small. A control treatment tests to what extent such behavior can be attributed to strategic motives. KW - Buyer Power KW - Market Entry KW - Experiment Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1561/105.00000082 SN - 2326-6198 SN - 2326-6201 VL - 5 IS - 2 SP - 149 EP - 167 PB - Now Publishers inc. CY - Hannover ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Gueth, Werner T1 - Asymmetric voluntary cooperation BT - a repeated sequential best-shot experiment JF - International Journal of Game Theory N2 - This paper tests the robustness of voluntary cooperation in a sequential best shot game, a public good game in which the maximal contribution determines the level of public good provision. Thus, efficiency enhancing voluntary cooperation requires asymmetric behavior whose coordination is more difficult. Nevertheless, we find robust cooperation irrespective of treatment-specific institutional obstacles. To explain this finding, we distinguish three behavioral patterns aiming at both, voluntary cooperation and (immediate) payoff equality. KW - Best shot game KW - Coordination KW - Transfer KW - Refund KW - Experiment Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0633-y SN - 0020-7276 SN - 1432-1270 VL - 47 IS - 3 SP - 873 EP - 891 PB - Springer CY - Heidelberg ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena T1 - Is There a Loyalty-Enhancing Effect of Retroactive Price-Reduction Schemes? JF - Review of industrial organization N2 - This paper presents an experiment on the effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes on buyers’ repeated purchase decisions. Such schemes promise buyers a reduced price for all units that are bought in a certain time frame if the total quantity that is purchased passes a given threshold. This study finds a loyalty-enhancing effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes only if the buyers ex-ante expected that entering into the scheme would maximize their monetary gain, but later learn that they should leave the scheme. Furthermore, the effect crucially hinges on the framing of the price reduction. KW - Buyer behavior KW - Experiment KW - Loss aversion KW - Rebate and discount KW - Regulation of dominant firms KW - Risk aversion Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-018-9653-9 SN - 0889-938X SN - 1573-7160 VL - 54 IS - 3 SP - 575 EP - 593 PB - Springer CY - Dordrecht ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Friehe, Tim T1 - A note on making humans randomize JF - Journal of behavioral and experimental economics N2 - This note presents results from an experiment studying a two person 4 4 pure coordination game. We explore different strategy labels in an attempt to implement the mixed strategy equilibrium that selects all four strategies with equal probability. Such strategy labels must be free from salient properties that might be used by participants to coordinate. Testing 23 different sets of strategy labels, we identify two sets that produce a distribution of subjects' choices which approximate the uniform distribution quite well. Our results are relevant for studies intending to compare the behavior of subjects who play against a random mechanism with that of participants who play against human counterparts. KW - Coordination game KW - Experiment KW - Mixed strategy Y1 - 2015 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2015.06.008 SN - 2214-8043 SN - 2214-8051 VL - 58 SP - 40 EP - 45 PB - Elsevier CY - New York ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Friehe, Tim T1 - Can short-term incentives induce long-lasting cooperation? Results from a public-goods experiment JF - Journal of behavioral and experimental economics N2 - This paper investigates whether providing strong cooperation incentives only at the outset of a group interaction spills over to later periods to ensure cooperation in the long run. We study a repeated linear public-good game with punishment opportunities and a parameter change after the first ten (of twenty) rounds. Our data shows that cooperation among subjects who had experienced a higher marginal return on public-good contributions or low punishment costs in rounds 1-10 rapidly deteriorated in rounds 11-20 once these incentives were removed, eventually trending below the level of cooperation in the control group. This suggests the possibility of temporary incentives backfiring in the long run. This paper ties in with the literature highlighting the potentially adverse effects of the use of incentives. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. KW - Public good game KW - Team KW - Punishment KW - Incentives KW - Experiment Y1 - 2014 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2014.09.001 SN - 2214-8043 SN - 2214-8051 VL - 53 SP - 120 EP - 130 PB - Elsevier CY - New York ER -