TY - JOUR A1 - Ercan, Habibe A1 - Hartmann, Ulrike A1 - Richter, Dirk A1 - Kuschel, Jenny A1 - Gräsel, Cornelia T1 - Effekte von integrativer Führung auf die Datennutzung von Lehrkräften JF - Die deutsche Schule : DDS : Zeitschrift für Erziehungswissenschaft, Bildungspolitik und pädagogische Praxis N2 - The present article reports the effects of school principals' integrative leadership behavior, including transformational and instructional components, on teachers' data use. Results of a structural equation model indicate significant positive direct and indirect effects on teachers' use of various data. Total effects seem to be mainly mediated by teachers' cooperation activities. N2 - Die vorliegende Studie untersucht die Zusammenhänge zwischen integrativem Schulleitungshandeln, das transformationale und instruktionale Komponenten enthält, und der Nutzungshäufigkeit verschiedener Datenquellen durch Lehrkräfte. Die Ergebnisse eines Strukturgleichungsmodells zeigen, dass integrative Führung direkte und indirekte Zusammenhänge mit der Nutzung verschiedener Datenquellen aufweist. Die Effekte scheinen vorwiegend durch die Kooperationsaktivität der Lehrkräfte vermittelt zu sein. T2 - Data-based school improvement - direct and indirect effects of integrative leadership on teachers' data use KW - teachers' data use KW - integrative leadership KW - cooperation KW - Datennutzung von Lehrkräften KW - integrative Führung KW - Kooperation Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.31244/dds.2021.01.08 SN - 0012-0731 SN - 2699-5379 VL - 113 IS - 1 SP - 85 EP - 100 PB - Waxmann CY - Münster ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Güth, Werner A1 - Nithammer, Juri A1 - Orland, Andreas T1 - Inefficient cooperation under stochastic and strategic uncertainty JF - Conflict resolution N2 - Stochastic uncertainty can cause coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can increase efficiency. To test this transfer mechanism, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeated Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not lead to an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two major reasons for this failure: first, stochastic uncertainty forces proposers intending to cooperate to accept high strategic uncertainty, which many proposers avoid; second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperatively, which hinders cooperation in future periods. KW - stochastic uncertainty KW - strategic uncertainty KW - cooperation KW - Ultimatum KW - Game KW - experiment Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027211066614 SN - 0022-0027 SN - 1552-8766 VL - 66 IS - 4-5 SP - 755 EP - 782 PB - Sage Publ. CY - Thousand Oaks ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Tröndle, Tim A1 - Lilliestam, Johan A1 - Marelli, Stefano A1 - Pfenninger, Stefan T1 - Trade-offs between geographic scale, cost, and infrastructure requirements for fully renewable electricity in Europe JF - Joule N2 - The European potential for renewable electricity is sufficient to enable fully renewable supply on different scales, from self-sufficient, subnational regions to an interconnected continent. We not only show that a continental-scale system is the cheapest, but also that systems on the national scale and below are possible at cost penalties of 20% or less. Transmission is key to low cost, but it is not necessary to vastly expand the transmission system. When electricity is transmitted only to balance fluctuations, the transmission grid size is comparable to today's, albeit with expanded cross-border capacities. The largest differences across scales concern land use and thus social acceptance: in the continental system, generation capacity is concentrated on the European periphery, where the best resources are. Regional systems, in contrast, have more dispersed generation. The key trade-off is therefore not between geographic scale and cost, but between scale and the spatial distribution of required generation and transmission infrastructure. KW - energy decarbonization KW - self-sufficiency KW - cooperation KW - trade KW - transmission KW - regional equity KW - land use KW - acceptance KW - flexibility Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joule.2020.07.018 SN - 2542-4351 VL - 4 IS - 9 SP - 1929 EP - 1948 PB - Cell Press CY - Cambridge , Mass. ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Teerling, Annika A1 - Bernholt, Andrea A1 - Asseburg, Regine A1 - Hasl, Andrea A1 - Igler, Jennifer A1 - Schlitter, Theresa A1 - Ohle-Peters, Annika A1 - McElvany, Nele A1 - Köller, Olaf T1 - Affektiv-kognitive Auseinandersetzung mit einer Innovation im Implementationsprozess T1 - Affective-Cognitive Handling of an Innovation in an Implementation Process BT - Eine modellbasierte Erfassung BT - A Model-Based Approach JF - Psychologie in Erziehung und Unterricht : Zeitschrift für Forschung und Praxis N2 - Schulische und vor allem unterrichtliche Implementationsprozesse zielen zumeist auf die Professionalisierung der Lehrkräfte ab. Die intendierte Veränderung des Unterrichts beginnt dabei mit einer gewünschten Veränderung von Einstellungen und Verhaltensweisen der Lehrkräfte, welche erst zu einer veränderten Handlungsroutine in der Arbeitspraxis führen kann. Das Modell der Stages of Concern von Hall und Hord (2006) stellt eine der wenigen Möglichkeiten dar, die individuelle Perspektive der Lehrkräfte im Implementationsprozess modellbasiert und standardisiert zu untersuchen. Der vorliegende Beitrag betrachtet anhand dieses Modells die affektiv-kognitive Auseinandersetzung der Beteiligten im Implementationsprozess sowie deren Zusammenhänge mit verschiedenen Aspekten der Kommunikation und der wahrgenommenen Entwicklung. Auf Basis einer Stichprobe von N = 66 Lehrkräften kann dabei gezeigt werden, dass insbesondere die Aspekte Häufigkeit der Kooperation, Kommunikation im Kollegium und Erfahrungen im Team die affektiv-kognitive Auseinandersetzung vorhersagen. Diese Auseinandersetzung - insbesondere mit den Konsequenzen der Neuerung - bedingt wiederum die wahrgenommene Entwicklung im Implementationsprozess. KW - Implementation KW - Stages of Concern KW - change of behavior KW - cooperation KW - communication KW - Verhaltensänderung KW - Kooperation KW - Kommunikation Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.2378/peu2018.art21d SN - 0342-183X VL - 66 IS - 1 SP - 33 EP - 50 PB - Reinhardt CY - München ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Heuer, Leonie A1 - Orland, Andreas T1 - Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma BT - an experimental comparison between pure and mixed strategies JF - Royal Society Open Science N2 - Cooperation is — despite not being predicted by game theory — a widely documented aspect of human behaviour in Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) situations. This article presents a comparison between subjects restricted to playing pure strategies and subjects allowed to play mixed strategies in a one-shot symmetric PD laboratory experiment. Subjects interact with 10 other subjects and take their decisions all at once. Because subjects in the mixed-strategy treatment group are allowed to condition their level of cooperation more precisely on their beliefs about their counterparts’ level of cooperation, we predicted the cooperation rate in the mixed-strategy treatment group to be higher than in the pure-strategy control group. The results of our experiment reject our prediction: even after controlling for beliefs about the other subjects’ level of cooperation, we find that cooperation in the mixed-strategy group is lower than in the pure-strategy group. We also find, however, that subjects in the mixedstrategy group condition their cooperative behaviour more closely on their beliefs than in the pure-strategy group. In the mixed-strategy group, most subjects choose intermediate levels of cooperation. KW - cooperation KW - experiment KW - human behaviour KW - Prisoner's Dilemma Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.182142 SN - 2054-5703 VL - 6 PB - Royal Soc. Publ. CY - London ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Franzmann, Simon T. T1 - Competition, contest, and cooperation the analytic framework of the issue market JF - Journal of theoretical politics N2 - Although party competition is widely regarded as an important part of a working democracy, it is rarely analysed in political science literature. This article discusses the basic properties of party competition, especially the patterns of interaction in contemporary party systems. Competition as a phenomenon at the macro level has to be carefully distinguished from contest and cooperation as the forms of interaction at the micro level. The article gives special attention to the creation of issue innovations. Contrary to existing approaches, I argue that not only responsiveness but also innovation are necessary to guarantee a workable democratic competition. Competition takes place on an issue market, where parties can discover voters' demands. Combined with the concept of institutional veto points, the article presents hypotheses on how institutions shape the possibility for programmatic innovations. KW - cooperation KW - innovation KW - issue market KW - party competition KW - veto point Y1 - 2011 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629811411747 SN - 0951-6298 SN - 1460-3667 VL - 23 IS - 3 SP - 317 EP - 343 PB - Sage Publ. CY - London ER -