TY  - JOUR
A1  - Kritikos, Alexander
A1  - Tan, Jonathan H. W.
T1  - Influence in the face of impunity
JF  - Economics letters
N2  - We compare dictator and impunity games. In impunity games, responders can reject offers but to no payoff consequence to proposers. Because proposers act under impunity, we should expect the same behavior across games, but experimentally observed behavior varies. Responders indeed exercise the rejection option. This threat psychologically influences proposers. Some proposers avoid rejection by offering nothing. Others raise offers, but only when they receive feedback from responders. Responders lose this influence in the absence of feedback. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
KW  - Dictator
KW  - Impunity
KW  - Experiment
KW  - Psychological influence
KW  - Guilt
Y1  - 2016
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.020
SN  - 0165-1765
SN  - 1873-7374
VL  - 141
SP  - 119
EP  - 121
PB  - Elsevier
CY  - Lausanne
ER  -