TY  - JOUR
A1  - Bruttel, Lisa Verena
T1  - Is There a Loyalty-Enhancing Effect of Retroactive Price-Reduction Schemes?
JF  - Review of industrial organization
N2  - This paper presents an experiment on the effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes on buyers’ repeated purchase decisions. Such schemes promise buyers a reduced price for all units that are bought in a certain time frame if the total quantity that is purchased passes a given threshold. This study finds a loyalty-enhancing effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes only if the buyers ex-ante expected that entering into the scheme would maximize their monetary gain, but later learn that they should leave the scheme. Furthermore, the effect crucially hinges on the framing of the price reduction.
KW  - Buyer behavior
KW  - Experiment
KW  - Loss aversion
KW  - Rebate and discount
KW  - Regulation of dominant firms
KW  - Risk aversion
Y1  - 2018
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-018-9653-9
SN  - 0889-938X
SN  - 1573-7160
VL  - 54
IS  - 3
SP  - 575
EP  - 593
PB  - Springer
CY  - Dordrecht
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Bruttel, Lisa Verena
T1  - The Limits of Buyer Power
BT  - Experimental Evidence
JF  - Review of Behavioral Economics
N2  - This paper studies the behavior of buyers confronting an incumbent monopolist and a potential market entrant in a repeated trade situation. In the experiment, buyers have two possibilities to demand lower prices in future trade periods. First, they can withhold demand. Second, they can voluntarily pay a higher price to the entrant in order to encourage future re-entry. Both these forms of buyer behavior occur in the experiment. They are less frequent when the number of buyers is large as opposed to small. A control treatment tests to what extent such behavior can be attributed to strategic motives.
KW  - Buyer Power
KW  - Market Entry
KW  - Experiment
Y1  - 2018
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1561/105.00000082
SN  - 2326-6198
SN  - 2326-6201
VL  - 5
IS  - 2
SP  - 149
EP  - 167
PB  - Now Publishers inc.
CY  - Hannover
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Bruttel, Lisa Verena
A1  - Friehe, Tim
T1  - Can short-term incentives induce long-lasting cooperation? Results from a public-goods experiment
JF  - Journal of behavioral and experimental economics
N2  - This paper investigates whether providing strong cooperation incentives only at the outset of a group interaction spills over to later periods to ensure cooperation in the long run. We study a repeated linear public-good game with punishment opportunities and a parameter change after the first ten (of twenty) rounds. Our data shows that cooperation among subjects who had experienced a higher marginal return on public-good contributions or low punishment costs in rounds 1-10 rapidly deteriorated in rounds 11-20 once these incentives were removed, eventually trending below the level of cooperation in the control group. This suggests the possibility of temporary incentives backfiring in the long run. This paper ties in with the literature highlighting the potentially adverse effects of the use of incentives. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
KW  - Public good game
KW  - Team
KW  - Punishment
KW  - Incentives
KW  - Experiment
Y1  - 2014
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2014.09.001
SN  - 2214-8043
SN  - 2214-8051
VL  - 53
SP  - 120
EP  - 130
PB  - Elsevier
CY  - New York
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Bruttel, Lisa Verena
A1  - Friehe, Tim
T1  - A note on making humans randomize
JF  - Journal of behavioral and experimental economics
N2  - This note presents results from an experiment studying a two person 4 4 pure coordination game. We explore different strategy labels in an attempt to implement the mixed strategy equilibrium that selects all four strategies with equal probability. Such strategy labels must be free from salient properties that might be used by participants to coordinate. Testing 23 different sets of strategy labels, we identify two sets that produce a distribution of subjects' choices which approximate the uniform distribution quite well. Our results are relevant for studies intending to compare the behavior of subjects who play against a random mechanism with that of participants who play against human counterparts.
KW  - Coordination game
KW  - Experiment
KW  - Mixed strategy
Y1  - 2015
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2015.06.008
SN  - 2214-8043
SN  - 2214-8051
VL  - 58
SP  - 40
EP  - 45
PB  - Elsevier
CY  - New York
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Bruttel, Lisa Verena
A1  - Gueth, Werner
T1  - Asymmetric voluntary cooperation
BT  - a repeated sequential best-shot experiment
JF  - International Journal of Game Theory
N2  - This paper tests the robustness of voluntary cooperation in a sequential best shot game, a public good game in which the maximal contribution determines the level of public good provision. Thus, efficiency enhancing voluntary cooperation requires asymmetric behavior whose coordination is more difficult. Nevertheless, we find robust cooperation irrespective of treatment-specific institutional obstacles. To explain this finding, we distinguish three behavioral patterns aiming at both, voluntary cooperation and (immediate) payoff equality.
KW  - Best shot game
KW  - Coordination
KW  - Transfer
KW  - Refund
KW  - Experiment
Y1  - 2018
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0633-y
SN  - 0020-7276
SN  - 1432-1270
VL  - 47
IS  - 3
SP  - 873
EP  - 891
PB  - Springer
CY  - Heidelberg
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Halbrügge, Lena
A1  - Banerji, Amitabh
A1  - Meerholz, Klaus
T1  - Hallo Zukunft!
BT  - gedruckte Elektronik als Hands-on-Experiment für die Lehre in den Naturwissenschaften an (Hoch-)Schulen
JF  - Chemie konkret : CHEMKON ; Forum für Unterricht und Didaktik
N2  - Gedruckte Elektronik ist nicht nur ein aufstrebendes Forschungsfeld, sie wird in naher Zukunft auch eine wesentliche Rolle in unserem Alltag spielen. Gedruckte, elektronische Bauteile können sehr dünn und flexibel sein und somit vielfältig eingesetzt werden. Für die Implementation in der (Hoch-)Schule haben die Autoren eine flexible, lichtemittierende Folie entwickelt, die mit einfachen Materialien und Methoden manuell gedruckt werden kann.
N2  - Printed electronics is an emerging research field and is going to play a vital role in our everyday-life in the near future. Printed electronic devices can be very thin and flexible, which makes them feasible for various applications. For the implementation in High Schools and Universities the authors developed a flexible, light emitting foil, which can be printed manually using simple materials and methods.
T2  - Hello future! Printed electronics as a hands-on-experiment for teaching science in high schools and universities
KW  - curriculum innovation
KW  - experiment
KW  - electroluminescence
KW  - semiconductor
KW  - curriculare Innovation
KW  - Experiment
KW  - Elektrolumineszenz
KW  - Halbleiter
Y1  - 2022
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1002/ckon.202200030
SN  - 0944-5846
SN  - 1521-3730
VL  - 29
IS  - 51
SP  - 355
EP  - 361
PB  - Wiley-VCH
CY  - Weinheim
ER  - 
TY  - THES
A1  - Hebisch, Benjamin
T1  - Power in supply chain negotiations: a two-stage approach
T2  - Schriftenreihe zum Verhandlungsmanagement ; Band 15
N2  - Negotiations between buyers and suppliers directly influence a company’s costs, revenue, and consequently its profits. The outcome of these negotiations relies heavily on the companies’ as well as the negotiators’ power position. Across three empirical articles the author demonstrates how the own power position can first be identified as well as improved and subsequently used to maximize profits in negotiations between sellers and buyers. In the first paper the sources underlying buyer and supplier power are identified and weighted. The results of the first paper show the impact of each single sources on the buyer and supplier power. The number of suppliers available for one product is by far the most important source of power for both sides. The results indicate that a higher number of suppliers leads to a better power position of the buyer and simultaneously to an inferior power position of a single supplier. The second paper aims to examine the impact of the number of suppliers on the outcome of buyer-seller-negotiations thereby considering the innovation level of the products purchased. The results of the second study which are based on real negotiation data from a German car manufacturer indicate that the number of available suppliers has a stronger impact on the negotiation outcome for innovative than for functional, less innovative products. The third paper analyzes how the ability to take the counterpart’s perspective (perspective taking ability) influences the negotiation outcome. This relationship is examined for different power positions. The results indicate that a negotiator’s high perspective taking ability leads to a more unfavorable negotiation outcome compared to low perspective taking ability. Simultaneously, high perspective taking ability causes a more positive perception of the conducted negotiation than low perspective taking ability. This contradictory effect of perspective taking ability bears the risk for buyers and suppliers to assess an unfavorable outcome as positive. Finally, the results of the papers are summarized and discussed. The dissertation concludes with implications for practice, limitations of the work, and approaches for future research.
N2  - Verhandlungen zwischen Einkäufern und Zulieferern haben einen unmittelbaren Einfluss auf die Kosten und den Umsatz eines Unternehmens und sind dementsprechend ein wichtiger Faktor für deren Gewinn. Das Ergebnis dieser Verhandlungen hängt maßgeblich von der Machtposition der Unternehmen und damit auch der Verhandler ab. In dieser Studie wird in den drei empirischen Artikeln gezeigt, wie die Machtposition zunächst identifiziert sowie verbessert und anschließend gewinnmaximierend in Verhandlungen zwischen Verkäufern und Einkäufern eingesetzt werden kann. Im ersten Paper werden die der Macht von Einkäufern und Lieferanten zu Grunde liegenden Ursachen identifiziert und gewichtet. Die Ergebnisse des ersten Papers zeigen, wie stark die einzelnen identifizierten Faktoren die Macht des Einkäufers und des Vertriebs beeinflussen. Die Anzahl der für ein Produkt zur Verfügung stehenden Lieferanten ist für beide Seiten die mit Abstand wichtigste Ursache für Macht. Es wird herausgestellt, dass eine höhere Anzahl an Lieferanten zu einer besseren Machtposition des Einkäufers und gleichzeitig zu einer schlechteren Machtposition des Verkäufers führt. Das Ziel des zweiten Papers ist es, den Einfluss der Anzahl der Lieferanten auf das Ergebnis von Verhandlungen zwischen Einkäufern und Verkäufern zu untersuchen. Dabei werden die verschiedenen Innovationsgrade der zu beschaffenden Produkte berücksichtigt. Auf Basis realer Verhandlungsdaten eines deutschen Automobilerstellers wird gezeigt, dass die Anzahl der für ein Produkt zur Verfügung stehenden Lieferanten bei innovativen Produkten einen stärkeren Einfluss auf das Verhandlungsergebnis hat als bei funktionalen, weniger innovativen Produkten. Das dritte Paper ermittelt, wie die Fähigkeit, die Perspektive der Gegenseite einzunehmen (Perspective Taking Ability) das Verhandlungsergebnis beeinflusst. Dieser Zusammenhang wird für verschiedene Machtpositionen untersucht. Die Ergebnisse lassen darauf schließen, dass hohe Perspective Taking Ability eines Verhandlungsführerenden in der besseren Machtposition zu einem schlechteren Ergebnis führt als niedrige Perspective Taking Ability. Gleichzeitig führt eine hohe Ausprägung der Fähigkeit zu einer positiveren Wahrnehmung der geführten Verhandlung als eine niedrige Ausprägung. Dieser gegensätzliche Effekt von Perspective Taking Ability birgt für Einkäufer und Verkäufer in einer überlegenen Machtposition das Risiko, ein schlechteres Verhandlungsergebnis positiv zu bewerten. Die Ergebnisse der Studien werden am Ende der Dissertation zusammengefasst und diskutiert. Es werden Implikationen für die Praxis abgeleitet sowie Limitationen und Ansätze zukünftiger Forschung aufgezeigt.
KW  - Automotive
KW  - Business-to-Business
KW  - Experiment
KW  - Expertenbefragung
KW  - Negotiation
KW  - Supply Chain Management
KW  - Verhandlungsmanagement
Y1  - 2021
SN  - 978-3-339-12400-5
SN  - 978-3-339-12401-2
PB  - Kovac
CY  - Hamburg
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Kritikos, Alexander
A1  - Tan, Jonathan H. W.
T1  - Influence in the face of impunity
JF  - Economics letters
N2  - We compare dictator and impunity games. In impunity games, responders can reject offers but to no payoff consequence to proposers. Because proposers act under impunity, we should expect the same behavior across games, but experimentally observed behavior varies. Responders indeed exercise the rejection option. This threat psychologically influences proposers. Some proposers avoid rejection by offering nothing. Others raise offers, but only when they receive feedback from responders. Responders lose this influence in the absence of feedback. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
KW  - Dictator
KW  - Impunity
KW  - Experiment
KW  - Psychological influence
KW  - Guilt
Y1  - 2016
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.020
SN  - 0165-1765
SN  - 1873-7374
VL  - 141
SP  - 119
EP  - 121
PB  - Elsevier
CY  - Lausanne
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Orland, Andreas
A1  - Rostam-Afschar, Davud
T1  - Flexible work arrangements and precautionary behavior
BT  - Theory and experimental evidence
JF  - Journal of economic behavior & organization
N2  - In the past years, work-time in many industries has become more flexible, opening up a new channel for intertemporal substitution: workers might, instead of saving, adjust their work-time to smooth consumption. To study this channel, we set up a two-period consumption/saving model with wage uncertainty. This extends the standard saving model by also allowing a worker to allocate a fixed time budget between two work-shifts. To test the comparative statics implied by these two different channels, we conduct a laboratory experiment. A novel feature of our experiments is that we tie income to a real-effort style task. In four treatments, we turn on and off the two channels for consumption smoothing: saving and time allocation. Our main finding is that savings are strictly positive for at least 85 percent of subjects. We find that a majority of subjects also uses time allocation to smooth consumption and use saving and time shifting as substitutes, though not perfect substitutes. Part of the observed heterogeneity of precautionary behavior can be explained by risk preferences and motivations different from expected utility maximization. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
KW  - Precautionary saving
KW  - Labor supply
KW  - Intertemporal substitution
KW  - Experiment
Y1  - 2021
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.09.015
SN  - 0167-2681
SN  - 1879-1751
VL  - 191
SP  - 442
EP  - 481
PB  - Elsevier
CY  - Amsterdam
ER  -