TY  - RPRT
A1  - Kalkuhl, Matthias
A1  - Franks, Max
A1  - Gruner, Friedemann
A1  - Lessmann, Kai
A1  - Edenhofer, Ottmar
T1  - Pigou’s Advice and Sisyphus’ Warning
BT  - Carbon Pricing with Non-Permanent Carbon-Dioxide Removal
T2  - CEPA Discussion Papers
N2  - Carbon dioxide removal from the atmosphere is becoming an important option to achieve net zero climate targets. This paper develops a welfare and public economics perspective on optimal policies for carbon removal and storage in non-permanent sinks like forests, soil, oceans, wood products or chemical products. We derive a new metric for the valuation of non-permanent carbon storage, the social cost of carbon removal (SCC-R), which embeds also the conventional social cost of carbon emissions. We show that the contribution of CDR is to create new carbon sinks that should be used to reduce transition costs, even if the stored carbon is released to the atmosphere eventually. Importantly, CDR does not raise the ambition of optimal temperature levels unless initial atmospheric carbon stocks are excessively high. For high initial atmospheric carbon stocks, CDR allows to reduce the optimal temperature below initial levels. Finally, we characterize three different policy regimes that ensure an optimal deployment of carbon removal: downstream carbon pricing, upstream carbon pricing, and carbon storage pricing. The policy regimes differ in their informational and institutional requirements regarding monitoring, liability and financing.
T3  - CEPA Discussion Papers - 62 
KW  - Carbon Dioxide Removal
KW  - Carbon Capture
KW  - Social Cost of Carbon
KW  - Climate Policy
KW  - Impermanence
Y1  - 2023
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-575882
SN  - 2628-653X
IS  - 62
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Streck, Charlotte
T1  - How voluntary carbon markets can drive climate ambition
JF  - Journal of energy & natural resources law : the journal of the Section on Energy and Natural Resources Law of the International Bar Association
N2  - Over the last three years, corporate interest in voluntary carbon markets has almost tripled, and this trend has seemed to resist the COVID-19 economic fallout. If managed well, this market has the potential to become a very significant driver of mitigation action, in particular in developing countries, which supply the majority of voluntary carbon offsets. Robust standards and rules can overcome concerns that voluntary carbon markets could lead to company greenwashing and undermine the goals of the Paris Agreement. On the contrary, voluntary corporate investments can encourage more ambitious government climate action, and encourage governments to make more ambitious pledges under the Paris Agreement. Multisectoral mitigation partnerships can ensure the complementarity of public and private action and support policy alignment and investments in priority sectors and regions.
KW  - Climate Policy
KW  - Paris Agreement
KW  - Corporate Climate Action
KW  - Carbon
KW  - Markets
KW  - public-private partnerships
Y1  - 2021
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1080/02646811.2021.1881275
SN  - 0264-6811
SN  - 2376-4538
VL  - 39
IS  - 3
SP  - 367
EP  - 374
PB  - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group
CY  - Abingdon
ER  -