TY - JOUR A1 - Burauel, Patrick F. A1 - Caliendo, Marco A1 - Grabka, Markus M. A1 - Obst, Cosima A1 - Preuss, Malte A1 - Schröder, Carsten A1 - Shupe, Cortnie T1 - The impact of the German minimum wage on individual wages and monthly warnings JF - Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik = Journal of economics and statistics N2 - This paper evaluates the short-run impact of the introduction of a statutory minimum wage in Germany on the hourly wages and monthly earnings of workers targeted by the reform. We first provide detailed descriptive evidence of changes to the wage structure in particular at the bottom of the distribution and distinguish between trends for regularly employed and marginally employed workers. In the causal analysis, we then employ a differential trend adjusted difference-in-differences (DTADD) strategy to identify the extent to which these changes in wages and earnings can be attributed to the minimum wage introduction. We find that the minimum wage introduction can account for hourly wage growth in the order of roughly 6.5 % or (sic)0.45/hour and an increase in monthly earnings of 6.6 % or (sic)53/month. Despite finding wage growth at the bottom of the distribution, the paper documents widespread non-compliance with the mandated wage floor of (sic)8.50/hour. KW - minimum wage KW - wage and earnings structure KW - inequality Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/jbnst-2018-0077 SN - 0021-4027 SN - 2366-049X VL - 240 IS - 2-3 SP - 201 EP - 231 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Caliendo, Marco A1 - Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. A1 - Obst, Cosima A1 - Seitz, Helke A1 - Uhlendorff, Arne T1 - Locus of control and investment in training JF - Journal of human resources N2 - We extend standard models of work-related training by explicitly incorporating workers’ locus of control into the investment decision through the returns they expect. Our model predicts that higher internal control results in increased take-up of general, but not specific, training. This prediction is empirically validated using data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP). We provide empirical evidence that locus of control influences participation in training through its effect on workers’ expectations about future wage increases rather than actual wage increases. Our results provide an important explanation for underinvestment in training and suggest that those with an external sense of control may require additional training support. Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.57.4.0318-9377R2 SN - 0022-166X SN - 1548-8004 VL - 57 IS - 4 SP - 1311 EP - 1349 PB - University of Wisconsin Press CY - Madison ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Caliendo, Marco A1 - Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. A1 - Obst, Cosima A1 - Uhlendorff, Arne T1 - Risk preferences and training investments JF - Journal of economic behavior & organization N2 - We analyze workers’ risk preferences and training investments. Our conceptual framework differentiates between the investment risk and insurance mechanisms underpinning training decisions. Investment risk leads risk-averse workers to train less; they undertake more training if it insures them against future losses. We use the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to demonstrate that risk affinity is associated with more training, implying that, on average, investment risks dominate the insurance benefits of training. Crucially, this relationship is evident only for general training; there is no relationship between risk attitudes and specific training. Thus, consistent with our conceptual framework, risk preferences matter more when skills are transferable – and workers have a vested interest in training outcomes – than when they are not. Finally, we provide evidence that the insurance benefits of training are concentrated among workers with uncertain employment relationships or limited access to public insurance schemes. Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2022.11.024 SN - 0167-2681 VL - 205 SP - 668 EP - 686 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Caliendo, Marco A1 - Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. A1 - Obst, Cosima A1 - Uhlendorff, Arne T1 - Risk Preferences and Training Investments T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - We analyze workers’ risk preferences and training investments. Our conceptual framework differentiates between the investment risk and insurance mechanisms underpinning training decisions. Investment risk leads risk-averse workers to train less; they undertake more training if it insures them against future losses. We use the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to demonstrate that risk affinity is associated with more training, implying that, on average, investment risks dominate the insurance benefits of training. Crucially, this relationship is evident only for general training; there is no relationship between risk attitudes and specific training. Thus, as expected, risk preferences matter more when skills are transferable – and workers have a vested interest in training outcomes – than when they are not. Finally, we provide evidence that the insurance benefits of training are concentrated among workers with uncertain employment relationships or limited access to public insurance schemes. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 23 KW - Human Capital Investment KW - Work-related Training KW - Risk Preferences Y1 - 2020 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-480927 SN - 2628-653X IS - 23 ER - TY - THES A1 - Obst, Cosima T1 - Essays in labor economics T1 - Aufsätze zur Arbeitsmarktökonomie N2 - This thesis offers insights into the process of workers decisions to invest into work-related training. Specifically, the role of personality traits and attitudes is analysed. The aim is to understand whether such traits contribute to an under-investment into training. Importantly, general and specific training are distinguished, where the worker’s productivity increases in many firms in the former and only in the current firm in the latter case. Additionally, this thesis contributes to the evaluation of the German minimum wage introduction in 2015, identifying causal effects on wages and working hours. Chapters two to four focus on the work-related training decision. First, individuals with an internal locus of control see a direct link between their own actions and their labor market success, while external individuals connect their outcomes to fate, luck, and other people. Consequently, it can be expected that internal individuals expect higher returns to training and are, thus, more willing to participate. The results reflect this hypothesis with internal individuals being more likely to participate in general (but not specific) training. Second, training can be viewed either as a risky investment or as an insurance against negative labor income shocks. In both cases, risk attitudes are expected to play a role in the decision process. The data point towards risk seeking individuals being more likely to participate in general (but not specific) training, and thus, training being viewed on average as a risky investment. Third, job satisfaction influences behavioral decisions in the job context, where dissatisfied workers may react by neglecting their duties, improving the situation or quitting the job. In the first case, dissatisfied workers are expected to invest less in training, while the latter two reactions could lead to higher participation rates amongst dissatisfied workers. The results suggest that on average dissatisfied workers are less likely to invest into training than satisfied workers. However, closer inspections of quit intentions and different sources of dissatisfaction paint less clear pictures, pointing towards the complexity of the job satisfaction construct. Chapters five and six evaluate the introduction of the minimum wage in Germany in 2015. First, in 2015 an increase in the growth of hourly wages can be identified as a causal effect of the minimum wage introduction. However, at the same time, a reduction in the weekly working hours results in an overall unchanged growth in monthly earnings. When considering the effects in 2016, the decrease in weekly working hours disappears, resulting in a significant increase in the growth of monthly earnings due to the minimum wage. Importantly, the analysis suggests that the increase in hourly wages was not sufficient to ensure all workers receiving the minimum wage. This points to non-compliance being an issue in the first years after the minimum wage introduction. N2 - Diese Dissertation bietet Einblicke in den Prozess der Entscheidung von Arbeitnehmer*Innen, in arbeitsbezogene Weiterbildung zu investieren. Insbesondere wird die Rolle von Persönlichkeitsmerkmalen und Einstellungen analysiert. Ziel ist es, zu verstehen, ob solche Eigenschaften zu einer Unterinvestition in Weiterbildung beitragen. Wichtig ist, dass zwischen allgemeiner und spezifischer Weiterbildung unterschieden wird, wobei im ersten Fall die Produktivität des Arbeitnehmers in vielen Unternehmen steigt und im zweiten Fall nur im aktuellen Unternehmen. Darüber hinaus leistet diese Dissertation einen Beitrag zur Evaluation der Einführung des Mindestlohns in Deutschland im Jahr 2015, indem sie kausale Effekte auf Löhne und Arbeitszeiten identifiziert. Die Kapitel zwei bis vier befassen sich mit der Entscheidung für eine berufsbezogene Weiterbildung. Erstens sehen Personen mit einem internale Locus of Control einen direkten Zusammenhang zwischen ihren eigenen Handlungen und ihrem Arbeitsmarkterfolg, während externale Personen ihre Ergebnisse mit dem Schicksal, dem Glück und anderen Personen in Verbindung bringen. Folglich ist zu erwarten, dass interne Personen höhere Erträge aus der Weiterbildung erwarten und daher eher bereit sind, teilzunehmen. Die Ergebnisse spiegeln diese Hypothese wider: Internale Personen nehmen mit größerer Wahrscheinlichkeit an allgemeinen (aber nicht an spezifischen) Weiterbildungsmaßnahmen teil. Zweitens können Weiterbildungen entweder als riskante Investition oder als Versicherung gegen negative Arbeitseinkommensschocks betrachtet werden. In beiden Fällen ist davon auszugehen, dass die Risikobereitschaft eine Rolle im Entscheidungsprozess spielt. Die Daten deuten darauf hin, dass risikofreudige Personen mit größerer Wahrscheinlichkeit an einer allgemeinen (aber nicht an einer spezifischen) Fortbildung teilnehmen und somit eine Fortbildung im Durchschnitt als riskante Investition angesehen wird. Drittens beeinflusst die Arbeitszufriedenheit die Verhaltensentscheidungen im Arbeitskontext, wobei unzufriedene Arbeitnehmer*Innen darauf reagieren können, indem sie ihre Pflichten vernachlässigen, die Situation verbessern oder den Arbeitsplatz kündigen. Im ersten Fall ist davon auszugehen, dass unzufriedene Arbeitnehmer*Innen weniger in die Weiterbildung investieren, während die beiden letztgenannten Reaktionen zu einer höheren Teilnahmequote bei unzufriedenen Arbeitnehmer*Innen führen könnten. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass unzufriedene Arbeitnehmer*Innen im Durchschnitt weniger in Weiterbildungen investieren als zufriedene Arbeitnehmer*Innen. Bei näherer Betrachtung der Kündigungsabsichten und der verschiedenen Ursachen der Unzufriedenheit ergibt sich jedoch ein weniger klares Bild, das auf die Komplexität des Konstrukts der Arbeitszufriedenheit hinweist. In den Kapiteln fünf und sechs wird die Einführung des Mindestlohns in Deutschland im Jahr 2015 evaluiert. Zunächst lässt sich für 2015 ein Anstieg des Wachstums der Stundenlöhne als kausaler Effekt der Mindestlohneinführung identifizieren. Gleichzeitig führt jedoch eine Verringerung der Wochenarbeitszeit zu einem insgesamt unveränderten Wachstum der Monatsverdienste. Betrachtet man die Auswirkungen im Jahr 2016, so verschwindet der Rückgang der Wochenarbeitszeit, was zu einem signifikanten Anstieg des Wachstums der Monatsverdienste aufgrund des Mindestlohns führt. Die Analyse legt nahe, dass der Anstieg der Stundenlöhne nicht ausreichte, um sicherzustellen, dass alle Arbeitnehmer*Innen den Mindestlohn erhalten. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass die Nichteinhaltung in den ersten Jahren nach der Einführung des Mindestlohns ein Problem darstellt. KW - work-related training KW - personality traits KW - locus of control KW - risk attitudes KW - job satisfaction KW - minimum wage KW - hourly wages and monthly earnings KW - weekly working hours KW - Stundenlöhne und Monatseinkommen KW - Arbeitszufriedenheit KW - Kontrollüberzeugung KW - Mindestlohn KW - Persönlichkeitsmerkmale KW - Risikobereitschaft KW - wöchentliche Arbeitszeiten KW - Weiterbildungen Y1 - 2022 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-563794 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Obst, Cosima T1 - Job Satisfaction and Training Investments T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - Job satisfaction has been found to impact behavioral choices at the workplace. Since levels of satisfaction are not guaranteed to remain high, understanding the consequences of job dissatisfaction is essential. Hence, I analyze the relationship between a worker’s job satisfaction and her training investments. Based on my theoretical model, I expect a U-shaped relationship if dissatisfied workers attempt to improve the situation or plan to quit. In contrast, there is an overall positive relationship if dissatisfied workers neglect their duties. Using logit regressions with the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey I find tentative evidence that there is on average an overall positive relationship with a 1 standard deviation increase in job satisfaction being associated with a 1.5% increased likelihood of participating in training. A closer inspection of the reasons for training as well as quit intentions reveals some hints of a U-shaped relationship. My results highlight the importance of considering the source of dissatisfaction as there are heterogeneous effects along different job satisfaction facets. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 47 KW - Human Capital Investment KW - Work-related Training KW - Job Satisfaction Y1 - 2022 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-549124 SN - 2628-653X IS - 47 ER -