TY - JOUR A1 - Andres, Maximilian T1 - Four essays on communication, cooperation, and text mining in experimental economics Y1 - 2023 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Andres, Maximilian T1 - Equilibrium selection in infinitely repeated games with communication T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - The present paper proposes a novel approach for equilibrium selection in the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma where players can communicate before choosing their strategies. This approach yields a critical discount factor that makes different predictions for cooperation than the usually considered sub-game perfect or risk dominance critical discount factors. In laboratory experiments, we find that our factor is useful for predicting cooperation. For payoff changes where the usually considered factors and our factor make different predictions, the observed cooperation is consistent with the predictions based on our factor. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 75 KW - cooperation KW - communication KW - infinitely repeated game KW - machine learning Y1 - 2024 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-631800 SN - 2628-653X IS - 75 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Andres, Maximilian A1 - Bruttel, Lisa A1 - Friedrichsen, Jana T1 - The leniency rule revisited BT - experiments on cartel formation with open communication JF - International journal of industrial organization N2 - The experimental literature on antitrust enforcement provides robust evidence that communication plays an important role for the formation and stability of cartels. We extend these studies through a design that distinguishes between innocuous communication and communication about a cartel, sanctioning only the latter. To this aim, we introduce a participant in the role of the competition authority, who is properly incentivized to judge the communication content and price setting behavior of the firms. Using this novel design, we revisit the question whether a leniency rule successfully destabilizes cartels. In contrast to existing experimental studies, we find that a leniency rule does not affect cartelization. We discuss potential explanations for this contrasting result. KW - cartel KW - judgment of communication KW - corporate leniency program KW - price competition KW - experiment Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102728 SN - 0167-7187 VL - 76 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Andres, Maximilian A1 - Bruttel, Lisa A1 - Friedrichsen, Jana T1 - How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion BT - a machine learning approach JF - European economic review N2 - This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices. KW - cartel KW - collusion KW - communication KW - machine learning KW - experiment Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104331 SN - 0014-2921 SN - 1873-572X VL - 152 SP - 1 EP - 18 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Andres, Maximilian A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Friedrichsen, Jana T1 - The Leniency Rule Revisited: Experiments on Cartel Formation with Open Communication T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - The experimental literature on antitrust enforcement provides robust evidence that communication plays an important role for the formation and stability of cartels. We extend these studies through a design that distinguishes between innocuous communication and communication about a cartel, sanctioning only the latter. To this aim, we introduce a participant in the role of the competition authority, who is properly incentivized to judge communication content and price setting behavior of the firms. Using this novel design, we revisit the question whether a leniency rule successfully destabilizes cartels. In contrast to existing experimental studies, we find that a leniency rule does not affect cartelization. We discuss potential explanations for this contrasting result. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 24 KW - cartel KW - judgment of communication KW - corporate leniency program KW - price competition KW - experiment Y1 - 2021 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-491696 SN - 2628-653X N1 - This project, including the design and hypotheses, was preregistered at OSF before data collection had started (osf.io/ubhz8). IS - 24 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Andres, Maximilian A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Friedrichsen, Jana T1 - Choosing between explicit cartel formation and tacit collusion – An experiment T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - Numerous studies investigate which sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation but little is known as to how these sanctions work. We contribute to understanding the inner workings of cartels by studying experimentally the effect of sanctioning institutions on firms’ communication. Using machine learning to organize the chat communication into topics, we find that firms are significantly less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing when sanctioning institutions are present. At the same time, average prices are lower when communication is less explicit. A mediation analysis suggests that sanctions are effective in hindering cartel formation not only because they introduce a risk of being fined but also by reducing the prevalence of explicit price communication. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 19 KW - cartel KW - collusion KW - communication KW - machine learning KW - experiment Y1 - 2020 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-473885 SN - 2628-653X IS - 19 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Andres, Maximilian A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Friedrichsen, Jana T1 - How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion BT - a machine learning approach T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 53 KW - cartel KW - collusion KW - communication KW - machine learning KW - experiment Y1 - 2022 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-562234 SN - 2628-653X ER -