TY - JOUR A1 - Döbbeling-Hildebrandt, Niklas A1 - Miersch, Klaas A1 - Khanna, Tarun M. A1 - Bachelet, Marion A1 - Bruns, Stephan B. A1 - Callaghan, Max A1 - Edenhofer, Ottmar A1 - Flachsland, Christian A1 - Forster, Piers M. A1 - Kalkuhl, Matthias A1 - Koch, Nicolas A1 - Lamb, William F. A1 - Ohlendorf, Nils A1 - Steckel, Jan Christoph A1 - Minx, Jan C. T1 - Systematic review and meta-analysis of ex-post evaluations on the effectiveness of carbon pricing JF - Nature communications N2 - Today, more than 70 carbon pricing schemes have been implemented around the globe, but their contributions to emissions reductions remains a subject of heated debate in science and policy. Here we assess the effectiveness of carbon pricing in reducing emissions using a rigorous, machine-learning assisted systematic review and meta-analysis. Based on 483 effect sizes extracted from 80 causal ex-post evaluations across 21 carbon pricing schemes, we find that introducing a carbon price has yielded immediate and substantial emission reductions for at least 17 of these policies, despite the low level of prices in most instances. Statistically significant emissions reductions range between –5% to –21% across the schemes (–4% to –15% after correcting for publication bias). Our study highlights critical evidence gaps with regard to dozens of unevaluated carbon pricing schemes and the price elasticity of emissions reductions. More rigorous synthesis of carbon pricing and other climate policies is required across a range of outcomes to advance our understanding of “what works” and accelerate learning on climate solutions in science and policy. KW - carbon and energy KW - climate-change mitigation KW - climate-change policy KW - economics Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-48512-w SN - 2041-1723 VL - 15 IS - 1 PB - Springer Nature CY - London ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Kalkuhl, Matthias A1 - Steckel, Jan Christoph A1 - Edenhofer, Ottmar T1 - All or nothing BT - climate policy when assets can become stranded JF - Journal of environmental economics and management N2 - This paper develops a new perspective on stranded assets in climate policy using a partial equilibrium model of the energy sector. Political-economy related aspects are considered in the government's objective function. Lobbying power of firms or fiscal considerations by the government lead to time inconsistency: The government will deviate from a previously announced carbon tax which creates stranded assets. Under rational expectations, we show that a time-consistent policy outcome exists with either a zero carbon tax or a prohibitive carbon tax that leads to zero fossil investments - an "all-or-nothing" policy. Although stranded assets are crucial to such a bipolar outcome, they disappear again under time-consistent policy. Which of the two outcomes (all or nothing) prevails depends on the lobbying power of owners of fixed factors (land and fossil resources) but not on fiscal revenue considerations or on the lobbying power of renewable or fossil energy firms. KW - Climate policy KW - Optimal control KW - Political economy KW - Public finance KW - Credible policy KW - Time inconsistency Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.012 SN - 0095-0696 SN - 1096-0449 VL - 100 PB - Elsevier CY - San Diego ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Edenhofer, Ottmar A1 - Kalkuhl, Matthias A1 - Roolfs, Christina T1 - Carbon pricing and revenue recycling BT - an overview of vertical and horizontal equity effects for Germany JF - CESifo forum Y1 - 2021 UR - https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/CESifo-Forum-2021-5-edenhofer-kalkuhl-roolfs-carbon-pricing-september.pdf SN - 2190-717X SN - 1615-245X VL - 22 IS - 5 SP - 10 EP - 14 PB - Ifo CY - Munich ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Edenhofer, Ottmar A1 - Kalkuhl, Matthias A1 - Requate, Tilman A1 - Steckel, Jan Christoph T1 - How assets get stranded BT - the impact of climate policy on capital and fossil fuel owners : introduction to the JEEM special section on climate policy and political economy JF - Journal of environmental economics and management N2 - Internalizing external costs of carbon is a fundamental goal of climate policy. Since the seminal work of Arthur Pigou in 1920, economic theory has analyzed the efficiency gains arising from various instruments that internalize externalities and lead to Pareto-improvements. It is widely recognized in environmental economics that a carbon price would effectively reflect the scarcity of the atmospheric disposal space for carbon depending on the temperature target that is to be achieved. The question of how to organize the transition process, i.e. moving from inefficient to efficient allocations, and implementing the necessary policies, has gained increasing attention in recent years. Arguably, the transition process is tightly interwoven with political processes that include complex interactions between societal stakeholders, such as households and firms, on the one hand, and political decision makers, on the other. Accordingly, understanding political-economy aspects of the transition process, including distributional outcomes, is becoming increasingly relevant. While a growing literature discusses the distributional implications of climate policy on households, it is less well understood how asset owners might be affected by climate policy and how these potential impacts would interact with the transition process. This Special Section focuses on public policy challenges related to this transition problem, with special emphasis on asset owners. A core theme is the special role of stranded assets, i.e. a devaluation of capital stocks or financial assets either by introducing a stringent carbon price or by omitting a pre-announced policy of this kind. Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2020.102300 SN - 0095-0696 SN - 1096-0449 VL - 100 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Edenhofer, Ottmar A1 - Kalkuhl, Matthias A1 - Ockenfels, Axel T1 - Das Klimaschutzprogramm der Bundesregierung BT - eine Wende der deutschen Klimapolitik? JF - Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik N2 - Das Klimaschutzgesetz hat einen Paradigmenwechsel eingeleitet: den Einstieg in eine CO2-Bepreisung als künftiges Leitinstrument der Klimapolitik. Auf den ersten Blick ist der CO2-Preis unter einer Fülle von Fördermaßnahmen und ordnungsrechtlichen Regelungen verschüttet, deren Wirksamkeit und Kosten höchst unsicher sind. Der CO2-Preis ist aber so angelegt, dass er langfristig das dominante Instrument einer europäisch harmonisierten Klimapolitik werden kann. Der angedeutete Paradigmenwechsel der deutschen Klimapolitik öffnet damit die Tür, die europäische und internationale Kooperation zu stärken. Dazu ist es aber notwendig, neben der europäischen auch die globale Klimapolitik neu auszurichten. Auch dort sollten sich die Verhandlungen statt auf nationale Mengenziele auf CO2-Preise konzentrieren. Die erforderliche Kooperation wird möglich, wenn die Regierungen Transferzahlungen strategisch und reziprok nutzen. So könnte die Effektivität der Klimapolitik erhöht werden und es ließen sich die entstehenden Verteilungskonflikte entschärfen. KW - Klimaschutzgesetz KW - CO2-Preis KW - Emissionshandel KW - internationale Kooperation KW - Klimawandel KW - Klimapolitik KW - Deutschland KW - EU Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/pwp-2020-0001 SN - 1465-6493 SN - 1468-2516 VL - 21 IS - 1 SP - 4 EP - 18 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Sureth, Michael A1 - Kalkuhl, Matthias A1 - Edenhofer, Ottmar A1 - Rockström, Johan T1 - A welfare economic approach to planetary boundaries JF - Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik N2 - The crises of both the climate and the biosphere are manifestations of the imbalance between human extractive, and polluting activities and the Earth’s regenerative capacity. Planetary boundaries define limits for biophysical systems and processes that regulate the stability and life support capacity of the Earth system, and thereby also define a safe operating space for humanity on Earth. Budgets associated to planetary boundaries can be understood as global commons: common pool resources that can be utilized within finite limits. Despite the analytical interpretation of planetary boundaries as global commons, the planetary boundaries framework is missing a thorough integration into economic theory. We aim to bridge the gap between welfare economic theory and planetary boundaries as derived in the natural sciences by presenting a unified theory of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis. Our pragmatic approach aims to overcome shortcomings of the practical applications of CEA and CBA to environmental problems of a planetary scale. To do so, we develop a model framework and explore decision paradigms that give guidance to setting limits on human activities. This conceptual framework is then applied to planetary boundaries. We conclude by using the realized insights to derive a research agenda that builds on the understanding of planetary boundaries as global commons. KW - cost-benefit analysis KW - cost-effectiveness analysis KW - global commons KW - planetary boundaries KW - precautionary principle KW - shadow price KW - uncertainty KW - welfare economics Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/jbnst-2022-0022 SN - 0021-4027 SN - 2366-049X VL - 243 IS - 5 SP - 477 EP - 542 PB - De Gruyter Oldenbourg CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Edenhofer, Ottmar A1 - Franks, Max A1 - Kalkuhl, Matthias T1 - Pigou in the 21st century BT - a tribute on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the publication of The Economics of Welfare JF - International tax and public finance N2 - The year 2020 marks the centennial of the publication of Arthur Cecil Pigou's magnum opus The Economics of Welfare. Pigou's pricing principles have had an enduring influence on the academic debate, with a widespread consensus having emerged among economists that Pigouvian taxes or subsidies are theoretically desirable, but politically infeasible. In this article, we revisit Pigou's contribution and argue that this consensus is somewhat spurious, particularly in two ways: (1) Economists are too quick to ignore the theoretical problems and subtleties that Pigouvian pricing still faces; (2) The wholesale skepticism concerning the political viability of Pigouvian pricing is at odds with its recent practical achievements. These two points are made by, first, outlining the theoretical and political challenges that include uncertainty about the social cost of carbon, the unclear relationship between the cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness approaches, distributional concerns, fragmented ministerial responsibilities, an unstable tax base, commitment problems, lack of acceptance and trust between government and citizens as well as incomplete international cooperation. Secondly, we discuss the recent political success of Pigouvian pricing, as evidenced by the German government's 2019 climate policy reform and the EU's Green Deal. We conclude by presenting a research agenda for addressing the remaining barriers that need to be overcome to make Pigouvian pricing a common political practice. KW - Environmental economics KW - Climate change economics KW - Carbon pricing KW - Pigouvian taxation KW - Economic policy Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-020-09653-y SN - 0927-5940 SN - 1573-6970 VL - 28 IS - 5 SP - 1090 EP - 1121 PB - Springer CY - Dordrecht ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Strefler, Jessica A1 - Kriegler, Elmar A1 - Bauer, Nico A1 - Luderer, Gunnar A1 - Pietzcker, Robert C. A1 - Giannousakis, Anastasis A1 - Edenhofer, Ottmar T1 - Alternative carbon price trajectories can avoid excessive carbon removal JF - Nature communications N2 - The large majority of climate change mitigation scenarios that hold warming below 2 °C show high deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR), resulting in a peak-and-decline behavior in global temperature. This is driven by the assumption of an exponentially increasing carbon price trajectory which is perceived to be economically optimal for meeting a carbon budget. However, this optimality relies on the assumption that a finite carbon budget associated with a temperature target is filled up steadily over time. The availability of net carbon removals invalidates this assumption and therefore a different carbon price trajectory should be chosen. We show how the optimal carbon price path for remaining well below 2 °C limits CDR demand and analyze requirements for constructing alternatives, which may be easier to implement in reality. We show that warming can be held at well below 2 °C at much lower long-term economic effort and lower CDR deployment and therefore lower risks if carbon prices are high enough in the beginning to ensure target compliance, but increase at a lower rate after carbon neutrality has been reached. KW - climate-change mitigation KW - climate sciences KW - environmental sciences Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-22211-2 SN - 2041-1723 VL - 12 IS - 1 PB - Nature Publishing Group CY - London ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Schultes, Anselm A1 - Piontek, Franziska A1 - Soergel, Bjoern A1 - Rogelj, Joeri A1 - Baumstark, Lavinia A1 - Kriegler, Elmar A1 - Edenhofer, Ottmar A1 - Luderer, Gunnar T1 - Economic damages from on-going climate change imply deeper near-term emission cuts JF - Environmental research letters N2 - Pathways toward limiting global warming to well below 2 ∘C, as used by the IPCC in the Fifth Assessment Report, do not consider the climate impacts already occurring below 2 ∘C. Here we show that accounting for such damages significantly increases the near-term ambition of transformation pathways. We use econometric estimates of climate damages on GDP growth and explicitly model the uncertainty in the persistence time of damages. The Integrated Assessment Model we use includes the climate system and mitigation technology detail required to derive near-term policies. We find an optimal carbon price of $115 per tonne of CO2 in 2030. The long-term persistence of damages, while highly uncertain, is a main driver of the near-term carbon price. Accounting for damages on economic growth increases the gap between the currently pledged nationally determined contributions and the welfare-optimal 2030 emissions by two thirds, compared to pathways considering the 2 ∘C limit only. KW - climate change KW - climate mitigation KW - climate impacts KW - integrated assessment Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ac27ce SN - 1748-9326 VL - 16 IS - 10 PB - IOP Publishing CY - Bristol ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Amberg, Maximilian A1 - aus dem Moore, Nils A1 - Bekk, Anke A1 - Bergmann, Tobias A1 - Edenhofer, Ottmar A1 - Flachsland, Christian A1 - George, Jan A1 - Haywood, Luke A1 - Heinemann, Maik A1 - Held, Anne A1 - Kalkuhl, Matthias A1 - Kellner, Maximilian A1 - Koch, Nicolas A1 - Luderer, Gunnar A1 - Meyer, Henrika A1 - Nikodinoska, Dragana A1 - Pahle, Michael A1 - Roolfs, Christina A1 - Schill, Wolf-Peter T1 - Reformoptionen für ein nachhaltiges Steuer- und Abgabensystem BT - wie Lenkungssteuern effektiv und gerecht für den Klima- und Umweltschutz ausgestaltet werden können JF - Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik N2 - Steuern und Abgaben auf Produkte oder Verbrauch mit gesellschaftlichen Folgekosten (externe Kosten) – sogenannte Pigou- oder Lenkungssteuern – sind ein gesellschaftliches „Win-Win-Instrument“. Sie verbessern die Wohlfahrt und schützen gleichzeitig die Umwelt und das Klima. Dies wird erreicht, indem umweltschädigende Aktivitäten einen Preis bekommen, der möglichst exakt der Höhe des Schadens entspricht. Eine konsequente Bepreisung der externen Kosten nach diesem Prinzip könnte in Deutschland erhebliche zusätzliche Einnahmen erbringen: Basierend auf bisherigen Studien zu externen Kosten wären zusätzliche Einnahmen in der Größenordnung von 348 bis 564 Milliarden Euro pro Jahr (44 bis 71 Prozent der gesamten Steuereinnahmen) möglich. Die Autoren warnen allerdings, dass die Bezifferung der externen Kosten mit erheblichen Unsicherheiten verbunden ist. Damit Lenkungssteuern und -abgaben ihre positiven Lenkungs- und Wohlstandseffekte voll entfalten können, seien zudem institutionelle Reformen notwendig. KW - Externalitäten KW - Pigou-Steuern KW - Nachhaltige Steuerreform KW - Energiewende Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/pwp-2021-0051 SN - 1465-6493 SN - 1468-2516 VL - 23 IS - 3 SP - 165 EP - 199 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER -