TY - JOUR A1 - Thiele, Kathrin T1 - In Quest of Subjectivity JF - Happy Days : Lebenswissen nach Cavell Y1 - 2009 SN - 978-3-7705-4725-8 SP - 72 EP - 77 PB - Fink CY - Paderborn ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Thiele, Kathrin A1 - Trüstedt, Katrin T1 - Lebenswissen nach Cavell BT - eine Einleitung JF - Happy Days : Lebenswissen nach Cavell Y1 - 2009 SN - 978-3-7705-4725-8 SP - 9 EP - 16 PB - Fink CY - Paderborn ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Valdivia Orozco, Pablo Emilio T1 - Wiederholte Wiederholung JF - Happy Days : Lebenswissen nach Cavell Y1 - 2009 SN - 978-3-7705-4725-8 SP - 292 EP - 297 PB - Fink CY - Paderborn ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Petsche, Hans-Joachim T1 - Raum und Zahl - philosophische Kontexte JF - Raum und Zahl im Fokus der Wissenschaften : eine multidisziplinäre Vorlesungsreihe Y1 - 2015 SN - 978-3-86464-082-7 SP - 15 EP - 33 PB - Trafo CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Krüger, Hans-Peter T1 - Critical Anthropology? To the Relationship between Philosophical Anthropology and Critical Theory JF - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung N2 - This article compares Max Horkheimer’s and Theodor W. Adorno’s foundation of the Frankfurt Critical Theory with Helmuth Plessner’s foundation of Philosophical Anthropology. While Horkheimer’s and Plessner’s paradigms are mutually incompatible, Adorno’s „negative dialectics“ and Plessner’s „negative anthropology“ (G. Gamm) can be seen as complementing one another. Jürgen Habermas at one point sketched a complementary relationship between his own publicly communicative theory of modern society and Plessner’s philosophy of nature and human expressivity, and though he then came to doubt this, he later reaffirmed it. Faced with the „life power“ in „high capitalism“ (Plessner), the ambitions for a public democracy in a pluralistic society have to be broadened from an argumentative focus (Habermas) to include the human condition and the expressive modes of our experience as essentially embodied persons. The article discusses some possible aspects of this complementarity under the title of a „critical anthropology“ (H. Schnädelbach). KW - negativity KW - bio-power KW - social critique KW - human condition KW - world and subject KW - human expressivity Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2016-0041 SN - 0012-1045 SN - 2192-1482 VL - 64 SP - 553 EP - 580 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - van Buuren, Jasper T1 - The Difference between Moral Sources and Hypergoods JF - International philosophical quarterly N2 - In Sources of the Self Charles Taylor makes clear that both hypergoods and moral sources are essential to the moral life. Although hypergoods and moral sources are not the same thing, Taylor’s descriptions of these concepts are quite similar, and so their distinction requires interpretation. I propose that we interpret the difference on the basis of another distinction that is central to Taylor’s thinking: that between immanence and transcendence. Whereas a moral source transcends us, a hypergood is the value of our immanent way of relating to that moral source. This interpretation requires that we first differentiate between a narrow and a wide sense of “moral source.” Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5840/ipq201641259 SN - 0019-0365 SN - 2153-8077 VL - 56 SP - 171 EP - 186 PB - Philosophy Documentation Center CY - Charlottesville ER - TY - JOUR A1 - van Buuren, Jasper T1 - critique of neuroscience JF - Continental philosophy review N2 - Bennett and Hacker criticize a number of neuroscientists and philosophers for attributing capacities which belong to the human being as a whole, like perceiving or deciding, to a “part” of the human being, viz. the brain. They call this type of mistake the “mereological fallacy”. Interestingly, the authors say that these capacities cannot be ascribed to the mind either. They reject not only materialistic monism but also Cartesian dualism, arguing that many predicates describing human life do not refer to physical or mental properties, nor to the sum of such properties. I agree with this important principle and with the critique of the mereological fallacy which it underpins, but I have two objections to the authors’ view. Firstly, I think that the brain is not literally a part of the human being, as suggested. Secondly, Bennett and Hacker do not offer an account of body and mind which explains in a systematic way how the domain of phenomena which transcends the mental and the physical relates to the mental and the physical. I first argue that Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical anthropology provides the kind of account we need. Then, drawing on Plessner, I present an alternative view of the mereological relationships between brain and human being. My criticism does not undercut Bennett and Hacker’s diagnosis of the mereological fallacy but rather gives it a more solid philosophical–anthropological foundation. KW - Mereological fallacy KW - Neuroscience KW - Philosophical anthropology KW - Body as subject and object KW - Eccentric positionality KW - Personhood KW - Psychophysical neutrality Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-015-9318-4 SN - 1387-2842 SN - 1573-1103 VL - 49 SP - 223 EP - 241 PB - Springer CY - Dordrecht ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Schneider, Hans Julius T1 - Buddhist Meditation as a Mystical Practice JF - Philosophia : philosophical quarterly of Israel N2 - On the basis of many years of personal experience the paper describes Buddhist meditation (Zazen, Vipassanā) as a mystical practice. After a short discussion of the role of some central concepts (longing, suffering, and love) in Buddhism, William James’ concept of religious experience is used to explain the goal of meditators as the achievement of a special kind of an experience of this kind. Systematically, its main point is to explain the difference between (on the one hand) a craving for pleasant ‘mental events’ in the sense of short-term moods, and (on the other) the long-term project of achieving a deep change in one’s attitude to life as a whole, a change that allows the acceptance of suffering and death. The last part argues that there is no reason to call the discussed practice irrational in a negative sense. Changes of attitude of the discussed kind cannot be brought about by argument alone. Therefore, a considered use of age-old practices like meditation should be seen as an addition, not as an undermining of reason. KW - Experience KW - Mood KW - Meditation KW - Mysticism KW - William James KW - Rationality Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9925-x SN - 0048-3893 SN - 1574-9274 VL - 45 SP - 1621 EP - 1622 PB - Springer CY - Dordrecht ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Haag, Johannes T1 - Analytic Kantianism BT - Sellars and McDowell on Sensory Consciousness JF - Con-textos kantianos : international journal of philosophy N2 - Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell can both be read as proponents of Analytic Kantianism. However, their accounts differ in important detail. In particular, McDowell has criticized Sellars’s account of sensory consciousness in a number of papers (most notably in LFI and SC), both as a reading of Kant and on its systematic merits. The present paper offers a detailed analysis of this criticism and a defense of Sellars’s position against the background of a methodology of transcendental philosophy. KW - Kant KW - Sellars KW - McDowell KW - Transcendental Philosophy KW - perception KW - intuition KW - judgment Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1092766 SN - 2386-7655 SP - 18 EP - 41 PB - Instituto de Filosofía del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas CY - Madrid ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Haag, Johannes T1 - A kantian critique of sellars transcendental realism JF - Wilfrid Sellars, Idealism, and Realism: Understanding Psychological Nominalism Y1 - 2017 SN - 978-1-4742-3895-3 SN - 978-1-4742-3893-9 SN - 978-1-4742-3894-6 SP - 149 EP - 171 PB - Bloomsbury CY - London ER -