TY  - JOUR
A1  - Weikard, Hans-Peter
T1  - Instrumente zur Durchsetzung von Umweltauflagen
Y1  - 1995
ER  - 
TY  - BOOK
A1  - Weikard, Hans-Peter
T1  - Sustainable freedom of choice : a new concept
N2  - The value concept of traditional resource economics is welfare. Therefore, sustainability of welfare is often taken to characterise our obligations to future generations. This paper argues that this view is inappropriate because it leaves no room for future generations autonomy. Future generations should be free to make their own decisions. Consequently freedom of choice is the appropriate value concept on which resource economics should be based. The concept of sustainability receives a new interpretation. Sustainability is a principle of intertemporal distributive justice which requires equitable opportunities across generations.
T3  - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - Bd. 11 
Y1  - 1996
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-8484
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Weikard, Hans-Peter
T1  - Rationalität, Rückwärtsinduktion und die Grundlagen der Spieltheorie
Y1  - 1996
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Weikard, Hans-Peter
T1  - Soziale Diskontrate, intergenerationelle Gerechtigkeit und Wahlmöglichkeiten für zukünftige Generationen
Y1  - 1996
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Weikard, Hans-Peter
T1  - Beschäftigungseffekte genossenschaftlicher Unternehmensorganisation
Y1  - 1996
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Weikard, Hans-Peter
T1  - Privatisierung volkseigenen Bodens in den neuen Bundesländern : eine rechtsphilosophische Perspektive
Y1  - 1996
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Weikard, Hans-Peter
A1  - Balmann, Alfons
A1  - Odening, Martin
A1  - Brandes, Wilhelm
T1  - Path-dependence without increasing returns to scale and network externalities
Y1  - 1996
ER  - 
TY  - BOOK
A1  - Weikard, Hans-Peter
T1  - The Rawlsian principles of justice reconsidered : paper prepared for the 3rd international meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare, Maastricht, 22 - 25 June 1996
N2  - Of Rawls's two principles of justice only the second has received attention from economists. The second principle is concerned with the social and economic conditions in a just society. The first principle, however, has largely been neglected. It claims, that all people in society should have equal basic liberties. In this paper Rawls's first principle is characterised in a freedom of choice framework. The analysis reveals conceptual problems of the Rawlsian approach to justice.
T3  - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - Bd. 09 
Y1  - 1996
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-16128
ER  - 
TY  - BOOK
A1  - Weikard, Hans-Peter
T1  - Contractarian approaches to intergenerational justice
N2  - In modern political philosophy social contract theory is the most prominent approach to individual rights and fair institutions. According to social contract theory the system of rights in a society ought to be justified by reconstructing its basic features as a contract between the mutually unconcerned members of society. This paper explores whether social contract theory can successfully be applied to justify rights of future generations. Three competing views are analysed: Rawls's theory of justice, Hobbes's radical liberalism and Gauthier's bargaining framework based on the Lockean proviso.
T3  - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - Bd. 15 
Y1  - 1997
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-8529
ER  - 
TY  - BOOK
A1  - Weikard, Hans-Peter
T1  - Property rights and resource allocation in an overlapping generations model
N2  - The paper is an enquiry into dynamic social contract theory. The social contract defines the rules of resource use. An intergenerational social contract in an economy with a single exhaustible resource is examined within a framework of an overlapping generations model. It is assumed that new generations do not accept the old social contract, and access to resources will be renegotiated between any incumbent generation and their successors. It turns out that later generations will be in an unfortunate position regardless of their bargaining power.
T3  - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - Bd. 17 
Y1  - 1997
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-8543
ER  -