TY - RPRT A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Nithammer, Juri A1 - Stolley, Florian T1 - ”Thanks in Advance” BT - The Negative Effect of a Polite Phrase on Compliance with a Request T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - This paper studies the effect of the commonly used phrase “thanks in advance” on compliance with a small request. In a controlled laboratory experiment we ask participants to give a detailed answer to an open question. The treatment variable is whether or not they see the phrase “thanks in advance.” Our participants react to the treatment by exerting less effort in answering the request even though they perceive the phrase as polite. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 7 KW - compliance behavior KW - gratitude KW - reciprocity KW - experiment Y1 - 2019 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-427706 SN - 2628-653X IS - 7 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Andres, Maximilian A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Friedrichsen, Jana T1 - The Leniency Rule Revisited: Experiments on Cartel Formation with Open Communication T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - The experimental literature on antitrust enforcement provides robust evidence that communication plays an important role for the formation and stability of cartels. We extend these studies through a design that distinguishes between innocuous communication and communication about a cartel, sanctioning only the latter. To this aim, we introduce a participant in the role of the competition authority, who is properly incentivized to judge communication content and price setting behavior of the firms. Using this novel design, we revisit the question whether a leniency rule successfully destabilizes cartels. In contrast to existing experimental studies, we find that a leniency rule does not affect cartelization. We discuss potential explanations for this contrasting result. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 24 KW - cartel KW - judgment of communication KW - corporate leniency program KW - price competition KW - experiment Y1 - 2021 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-491696 SN - 2628-653X N1 - This project, including the design and hypotheses, was preregistered at OSF before data collection had started (osf.io/ubhz8). IS - 24 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Felgendreher, Simon A1 - Güth, Werner A1 - Hertwig, Ralph T1 - Strategic ignorance in repeated prisoners’ dilemma experiments and its effects on the dynamics of voluntary cooperation T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - Being ignorant of key aspects of a strategic interaction can represent an advantage rather than a handicap. We study one particular context in which ignorance can be beneficial: iterated strategic interactions in which voluntary cooperation may be sustained into the final round if players voluntarily forego knowledge about the time horizon. We experimentally examine this option to remain ignorant about the time horizon in a finitely repeated two-person prisoners’ dilemma game. We confirm that pairs without horizon knowledge avoid the drop in cooperation that otherwise occurs toward the end of the game. However, this effect is superposed by cooperation declining more rapidly in pairs without horizon knowledge during the middle phase of the game, especially if players do not know that the other player also wanted to remain ignorant of the time horizon. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 10 KW - strategic ignorance KW - cooperation KW - prisoners' dilemma KW - experiment Y1 - 2019 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-431881 SN - 2628-653X IS - 10 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Eisenkopf, Gerald A1 - Nithammer, Juri T1 - Pre-election communication in public good games with endogenous leaders T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - Leadership plays an important role for the efficient and fair solution of social dilemmas but the effectiveness of a leader can vary substantially. Two main factors of leadership impact are the ability to induce high contributions by all group members and the (expected) fair use of power. Participants in our experiment decide about contributions to a public good. After all contributions are made, the leader can choose how much of the joint earnings to assign to herself; the remainder is distributed equally among the followers. Using machine learning techniques, we study whether the content of initial open statements by the group members predicts their behavior as a leader and whether groups are able to identify such clues and endogenously appoint a “good” leader to solve the dilemma. We find that leaders who promise fairness are more likely to behave fairly, and that followers appoint as leaders those who write more explicitly about fairness and efficiency. However, in their contribution decision, followers focus on the leader’s first-move contribution and place less importance on the content of the leader’s statements. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 73 KW - leadership KW - public good KW - voting KW - experiment KW - promises Y1 - 2024 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-623952 SN - 2628-653X IS - 73 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena T1 - Is There a Loyalty-Enhancing Effect of Retroactive Price-Reduction Schemes? T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - This paper presents an experiment on the effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes on buyers’ repeated purchase decisions. Such schemes promise buyers a reduced price for all units that are bought in a certain time frame if the total quantity that is purchased passes a given threshold. This study finds a loyalty-enhancing effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes only if the buyers ex-ante expected that entering into the scheme would maximize their monetary gain, but later learn that they should leave the scheme. Furthermore, the effect crucially hinges on the framing of the price reduction. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 5 KW - rebate and discount KW - buyer behavior KW - risk aversion KW - loss aversion KW - regulation of dominant firms KW - experiment Y1 - 2019 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-427688 SN - 2628-653X IS - 5 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Güth, Werner A1 - Nithammer, Juri A1 - Orland, Andreas T1 - Inefficient Cooperation under Stochastic and Strategic Uncertainty T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - Stochastic uncertainty can cause difficult coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can do so. To test this, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeatedly played Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not entail an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two main reasons for this finding: First, the stochastic uncertainty forces proposers to accept high strategic uncertainty if they intend to cooperate by claiming a low amount (which many proposers do not). Second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperative by transferring too little (which hinders cooperation in future periods). T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 20 KW - stochastic uncertainty KW - strategic uncertainty KW - cooperation KW - Ultimatum Game KW - experiment Y1 - 2020 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-475500 SN - 2628-653X IS - 20 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Güth, Werner A1 - Nithammer, Juri A1 - Orland, Andreas T1 - Inefficient cooperation under stochastic and strategic uncertainty JF - Conflict resolution N2 - Stochastic uncertainty can cause coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can increase efficiency. To test this transfer mechanism, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeated Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not lead to an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two major reasons for this failure: first, stochastic uncertainty forces proposers intending to cooperate to accept high strategic uncertainty, which many proposers avoid; second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperatively, which hinders cooperation in future periods. KW - stochastic uncertainty KW - strategic uncertainty KW - cooperation KW - Ultimatum KW - Game KW - experiment Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027211066614 SN - 0022-0027 SN - 1552-8766 VL - 66 IS - 4-5 SP - 755 EP - 782 PB - Sage Publ. CY - Thousand Oaks ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Ziemann, Niklas T1 - How do people discount over spatial distance? JF - German economic review N2 - This paper studies how individuals discount the utility they derive from their provision of goods over spatial distance. In a controlled laboratory experiment in Germany, we elicit preferences for the provision of the same good at different locations. To isolate spatial preferences from any other direct value of the goods being close to the individual, we focus on goods with “existence value.” We find that individuals put special weight on the provision of these goods in their immediate vicinity. This “vicinity bias” represents a spatial analogy to the “present bias” in the time dimension. KW - spatial discounting KW - existence value KW - charitable giving KW - experiment Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/ger-2021-0106 SN - 1465-6485 SN - 1468-0475 VL - 24 IS - 1 SP - 33 EP - 67 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Andres, Maximilian A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Friedrichsen, Jana T1 - How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion BT - a machine learning approach T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 53 KW - cartel KW - collusion KW - communication KW - machine learning KW - experiment Y1 - 2022 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-562234 SN - 2628-653X ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Stolley, Florian T1 - Getting a yes BT - an experiment on the power of asking JF - Journal of behavioral and experimental economics N2 - This paper studies how the request for a favor has to be devised in order to maximize its chance of success. We present results from a mini-dictator game, in which the recipient can send a free-form text message to the dictator before the latter decides. We find that putting effort into the message, writing in a humorous way and mentioning reasons why the money is needed pays off. Additionally, we find differences in the behavior of male and female dictators. Only men react positively to efficiency arguments, while only women react to messages that emphasize the dictators power and responsibility. KW - dictator game KW - communication KW - inequality KW - text analysis KW - experiment Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2020.101550 SN - 2214-8043 VL - 86 PB - Elsevier CY - New York ER -