TY - BOOK A1 - Haag, Johannes A1 - Wild, Markus T1 - Philosophie der Neuzeit BT - von Descartes bis Kant T3 - Beck Wissen ; 2822 N2 - Mit der Neuzeit rückt die Urteilskraft des Menschen ins Zentrum des Denkens. Ab dem 17. Jahrhundert entwickeln sich auf europäischem Boden vielfältige aufklärerische Bewegungen, die das Bewusstsein menschlicher Freiheit nicht nur zum Maßstab der Erkenntnis, sondern auch zum Fundament der Politik machen. Diese Einführung in Rationalismus, Empirismus und politische Philosophie stellt die Untrennbarkeit von Wissen und Handeln als Leitidee des intellektuellen Aufbruchs vor. Im Zentrum der Darstellung stehen Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, Hume und Rousseau. Y1 - SN - 978-3-406-73210-2 PB - Beck CY - München ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Haag, Johannes A1 - Sturm, Holger T1 - Sprechen über die Welt : zu Robert Brandoms Making It Explicit Y1 - 2002 SN - 0031-8183 ER - TY - BOOK A1 - Haag, Johannes A1 - Perler, Dominik ED - Haag, Johannes ED - Perler, Dominik T1 - Ideen : Repräsentationalismus in der frühen Neuzeit ; 2 Bände Y1 - 2010 SN - 978-3-11-019542-2 PB - de Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - GEN A1 - Haag, Johannes A1 - Hoeppner, Till T1 - Errata zu: Denken und Welt – Wege kritischer Metaphysik. dzph. Band 67, 2019, Heft 1, S. 76–97 T2 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung N2 - We begin by considering two common ways of conceiving critical metaphysics. According to the first (and polemical) conception, critical metaphysics analyzes nothing more than the form of thought and thereby misses the proper point of metaphysics, namely to investigate the form of reality. According to the second (and affirmative) conception, critical metaphysics starts from the supposed insight that the form of reality can’t be other than the form of thought and is thus not required to analyze anything but that form. We argue that the first conception is too weak while the second is too strong. Then we sketch an alternative conception of critical metaphysics, a conception we find expressed both in Kant’s B-Deduction and in the way Barry Stroud has recently investigated the possibility of metaphysics. According to such a conception, a properly critical metaphysics needs to proceed in two steps: first, it needs to analyze the most general and necessary form of any thought that is about an objective reality at all; second, it needs to investigate how that form of thought relates to the reality it purports to represent. But unlike Kant, Stroud remains sceptical regarding the possibility of a satisfying transition from thought to reality in metaphysics. We argue that this dissatisfaction can be traced back to a notion of objectivity and reality in terms of complete mind-independence. Then we sketch an alternative notion of objectivity and reality in terms of distinctness from subjects and acts of thinking, and argue that it is that notion that allows Kant, with his Transcendental Idealism, to make the transition required for any satisfying metaphysics, namely that from the form of thought to reality. T2 - Thought and the World - Paths of critical Metaphysics (vol 67, 2019, H. 1, pg 76-97) Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2019-0888 SN - 0012-1045 SN - 2192-1482 VL - 67 IS - 2 SP - 326 EP - 327 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Haag, Johannes A1 - Hoeppner, Till T1 - Denken und Welt – Wege kritischer Metaphysik T1 - Thinking and World - Ways of more critical Metaphysics JF - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung N2 - Wird Metaphysik realistisch verstanden, so ist sie mit dem Anspruch verbunden, in objektiver Weise von der grundlegenden Beschaffenheit und Ordnung der Welt (oder Realität, Wirklichkeit etc.) zu handeln. Damit beansprucht sie die Möglichkeit von Objektivität, d. h. die Möglichkeit der Repräsentation der grundlegenden Beschaffenheit und Ordnung einer Welt, die von uns und unserer Repräsentation verschieden ist. Realistisch verstandene Metaphysik verfährt dogmatisch, wenn sie ihre eigene Möglichkeit einfach voraussetzt. Eine dogmatische Metaphysik ist unkritisch, weil sie ohne eine Untersuchung der Frage betrieben wird, wie eine objektive und adäquate Repräsentation der grundlegenden Beschaffenheit und Ordnung der Welt überhaupt möglich ist. Im Unterschied dazu nennen wir eine realistische Metaphysik in einem vorläufigen Sinne kritisch, sofern sie ihren Ausgang von einer Untersuchung dieser Möglichkeit nimmt und erst auf der Grundlage positiver Ergebnisse dieser Untersuchung einen – vor diesem Hintergrund nunmehr gerechtfertigten – Objektivitätsanspruch erhebt. N2 - We begin by considering two common ways of conceiving critical metaphysics. According to the first (and polemical) conception, critical metaphysics analyses nothing more than the form of thought and thereby misses the proper point of metaphysics, namely to investigate the form of reality. According to the second (and affirmative) conception, critical metaphysics starts from the supposed insight that the form of reality can’t be other than the form of thought and it is thus not necessary to analyse anything but that form. We argue that the first conception is too weak while the second is too strong. Then we sketch an alternative conception of critical metaphysics, a conception we find expressed both in Kant’s B-Deduction and in the way Barry Stroud has recently investigated the possibilities of metaphysics. According to such a conception, a properly critical metaphysics needs to proceed in two steps: first, it needs to analyze the most general and necessary form of any thought that is about an objective reality at all; second, it needs to investigate how that form of thought relates to the reality it purports to represent. But unlike Kant, Stroud remains sceptical regarding the possibility of a satisfying transition from thought to reality in metaphysics. We argue that this dissatisfaction can be traced back to a notion of objectivity and reality in terms of complete mind-independence. Then we sketch an alternative notion of objectivity and reality in terms of distinctness from subjects and acts of thinking, and argue that it is that notion that allows Kant, with his Transcendental Idealism, to make the transition required for any satisfying metaphysics, namely that from the form of thought to reality. KW - critical metaphysics KW - Stroud KW - Kant KW - objectivity KW - transcendental idealism Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2019-0006 SN - 0012-1045 SN - 2192-1482 VL - 67 IS - 1 SP - 76 EP - 97 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Haag, Johannes T1 - Analytic Kantianism BT - Sellars and McDowell on Sensory Consciousness JF - Con-textos kantianos : international journal of philosophy N2 - Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell can both be read as proponents of Analytic Kantianism. However, their accounts differ in important detail. In particular, McDowell has criticized Sellars’s account of sensory consciousness in a number of papers (most notably in LFI and SC), both as a reading of Kant and on its systematic merits. The present paper offers a detailed analysis of this criticism and a defense of Sellars’s position against the background of a methodology of transcendental philosophy. KW - Kant KW - Sellars KW - McDowell KW - Transcendental Philosophy KW - perception KW - intuition KW - judgment Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1092766 SN - 2386-7655 SP - 18 EP - 41 PB - Instituto de Filosofía del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas CY - Madrid ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Haag, Johannes T1 - A kantian critique of sellars transcendental realism JF - Wilfrid Sellars, Idealism, and Realism: Understanding Psychological Nominalism Y1 - 2017 SN - 978-1-4742-3895-3 SN - 978-1-4742-3893-9 SN - 978-1-4742-3894-6 SP - 149 EP - 171 PB - Bloomsbury CY - London ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Haag, Johannes T1 - Rezension zu: Willascheck, Marcus: Kant on the sources of metaphysics: the dialectic of pure reason. - New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018, 298pp. - ISBN: 978-1-108-47263-0 JF - European journal of philosophy Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12555 SN - 0966-8373 SN - 1468-0378 VL - 28 IS - 2 SP - 524 EP - 528 PB - Wiley CY - Hoboken ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Haag, Johannes T1 - Intuiting the Original Unity? BT - Modality and Intellectual Intuition in Hölderlin’s Urteil und Sein JF - Kantian legacies in German idealism Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-032-00160-9 SP - 161 EP - 185 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group CY - New York ; London ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Haag, Johannes T1 - Transcendental Principles and Perceptual Warrant BT - a case study in analytic kantianism JF - Wilfrid Sellars and twentieth-century philosophy Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-1-351-20275-6 SN - 978-1-351-20274-9 SN - 978-0-815-38499-1 SP - 130 EP - 150 PB - Routledge CY - Abingdon ER -