TY  - JOUR
A1  - Liese, Andrea
A1  - Herold, Jana
A1  - Feil, Hauke
A1  - Busch, Per-Olof
T1  - The heart of bureaucratic power
BT  - Explaining international bureaucracies’ expert authority
JF  - Review of international studies : RIS
N2  - Expert authority is regarded as the heart of international bureaucracies' power. To measure whether international bureaucracies' expert authority is indeed recognised and deferred to, we draw on novel data from a survey of a key audience: officials in the policy units of national ministries in 121 countries. Respondents were asked to what extent they recognised the expert authority of nine international bureaucracies in various thematic areas of agricultural and financial policy. The results show wide variance. To explain this variation, we test well-established assumptions on the sources of de facto expert authority. Specifically, we look at ministry officials' perceptions of these sources and, thus, focus on a less-studied aspect of the authority relationship. We examine the role of international bureaucracies' perceived impartiality, objectivity, global impact, and the role of knowledge asymmetries. Contrary to common assumptions, we find that de facto expert authority does not rest on impartiality perceptions, and that perceived objectivity plays the smallest role of all factors considered. We find some indications that knowledge asymmetries are associated with more expert authority. Still, and robust to various alternative specifications, the perception that international bureaucracies are effectively addressing global challenges is the most important factor.
KW  - Expert Authority
KW  - International Bureaucracies
KW  - International
KW  - Organisations
KW  - Neutrality
KW  - Performance
KW  - Survey
Y1  - 2021
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1017/S026021052100005X
SN  - 0260-2105
SN  - 1469-9044
VL  - 47
IS  - 3
SP  - 353
EP  - 376
PB  - Cambridge Univ. Press
CY  - Cambridge
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Herold, Jana
A1  - Liese, Andrea
A1  - Busch, Per-Olof
A1  - Feil, Hauke
T1  - Why national ministries consider the policy advice of international bureaucracies
BT  - survey evidence from 106 countries
JF  - International studies quarterly : the journal of the International Studies Association
N2  - Scholars of international relations and public administration widely assume that international bureaucracies, in their role as policy advisors, directly influence countries' domestic policies. Yet, this is not true across the board. Why do some countries closely consider the advice of international bureaucracies while others do not? This article argues that international bureaucracies' standing as sources of expertise is crucial. We tested this argument using data from a unique survey that measured prevalent practices of advice utilization in thematically specialized policy units of national ministries in a representative sample of more than a hundred countries. Our findings show that ministries' perceptions of international bureaucracies' expertise, that is, specialized and reliable knowledge, are the key factor. International bureaucracies influence national ministries directly and without the support of other actors that may also have an interest in the international bureaucracies' policy advice. Our analysis also demonstrates that the effects of alternative means of influence, such as third-party pressure and coercion, are themselves partly dependent on international bureaucracies' reputation as experts. The findings presented in this article reinforce the emphasis on expertise as a source of international bureaucracies' influence, and provide a crucial test of its importance.
Y1  - 2021
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab044
SN  - 0020-8833
SN  - 1468-2478
VL  - 65
IS  - 3
SP  - 669
EP  - 682
PB  - Oxford Univ. Press
CY  - Oxford
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Heinzel, Mirko Noa
A1  - Richter, Jonas
A1  - Busch, Per-Olof
A1  - Feil, Hauke
A1  - Herold, Jana
A1  - Liese, Andrea
T1  - Birds of a feather?
BT  - the determinants of impartiality perceptions of the IMF and the World Bank
JF  - Review of international political economy
N2  - The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank ascribe to impartiality in their mandates. At the same time, scholarship indicates that their decisions are disproportionately influenced by powerful member states. Impartiality is seen as crucial in determining International Organizations' (IOs) effectiveness and legitimacy in the literature. However, we know little about whether key interlocutors in national governments perceive the International Financial Institutions as biased actors who do the bidding for powerful member states or as impartial executors of policy. In order to better understand these perceptions, we surveyed high-level civil servants who are chiefly responsible for four policy areas from more than 100 countries. We found substantial variations in impartiality perceptions. What explains these variations? By developing an argument of selective awareness, we extend rationalist and ideational perspectives on IO impartiality to explain domestic perceptions. Using novel survey data, we test whether staffing underrepresentation, voting underrepresentation, alignment to the major shareholders and overlapping economic policy paradigms are associated with impartiality perceptions. We find substantial evidence that shared economic policy paradigms influence impartiality perceptions. The findings imply that by diversifying their ideational culture, IOs can increase the likelihood that domestic stakeholders view them as impartial.
KW  - Impartiality
KW  - bias
KW  - International Financial Institutions
KW  - International
KW  - Monetary Fund
KW  - World Bank
Y1  - 2020
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2020.1749711
SN  - 0969-2290
SN  - 1466-4526
VL  - 28
IS  - 5
SP  - 1249
EP  - 1273
PB  - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group
CY  - Abingdon
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Busch, Per-Olof
A1  - Liese, Andrea
T1  - The authority of international public administrations
JF  - International Bureaucracy: Challenges and Lessons for Public Administration Research
N2  - This chapter takes stock with the research on the authority of international organizations (IOs) and international public administrations (IPAs) in the fields of International Relations (IR) and Public Administration (PA). It combines arguments from conceptual and theoretical debates with empirical findings to explore under which conditions IPAs are likely to enjoy authority. Based on a review of the literature and on conceptual clarifications, we define authority as a social relationship between holders and granters of authority. We distinguish two types of authority, namely, political and expert authority, and two forms of recognition, namely, in practice (de facto) and by formal delegation (de jure). Given that the de facto expert authority of IPAs has received least attention in the literature, while the PA literature reminds us that knowledge lies at the heart of bureaucratic power, we develop propositions on how de facto expert authority could be measured and how the anticipated variation of expert authority among IPAs could be explained. We illustrate our argument with reference to empirical findings in the IR and PA literature. We conclude by highlighting the implications of our discussion for future research on the authority of national and IPAs.
Y1  - 2016
SN  - 978-1-349-94977-9
SN  - 978-1-349-94976-2
SN  - 978-1-349-95692-0
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-94977-9_5
SP  - 97
EP  - 122
PB  - Palgrave Macmillan, London
CY  - Basingstoke
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Busch, Per-Olof
A1  - Heinzel, Mirko Noa
A1  - Kempken, Mathies
A1  - Liese, Andrea
T1  - Mind the gap?
BT  - comparing de facto and de jure expert authority of international public administrations in financial and agricultural policy
JF  - Journal of comparative policy analysis : research and practice
N2  - Many authors have argued that International Public Administration can influence policy-making through their expert authority. The article compares de jure and de facto expert authority of IPAs to evaluate their conformity. It comparatively assesses the two kinds of authority for five important IPAs (BIS, FAO, IMF, OECD and World Bank) active in agriculture or financial policy. It shows that, on average, de jure and de facto authority seem to conform. At the same time, it demonstrates that gaps between de jure and de facto authority exist at the level of the IPAs, the policy areas and the IPAs’ addressees
KW  - international public administration
KW  - comparative
KW  - expert authority
KW  - de jure authority
KW  - de facto authority
KW  - international organisations
Y1  - 2020
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2020.1820866
SN  - 1387-6988
SN  - 1572-5448
VL  - 24
IS  - 3
SP  - 230
EP  - 253
PB  - Taylor & Francis
CY  - London
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Busch, Per-Olof
A1  - Feil, Hauke
A1  - Heinzel, Mirko Noa
A1  - Herold, Jana
A1  - Kempken, Mathies
A1  - Liese, Andrea
T1  - Policy recommendations of international bureaucracies
BT  - the importance of country-specificity
JF  - International review of administrative sciences : an international journal of comparative public administration
N2  - Many international bureaucracies give policy advice to national administrative units. Why is the advice given by some international bureaucracies more influential than the recommendations of others? We argue that targeting advice to member states through national embeddedness and country-tailored research increases the influence of policy advice. Subsequently, we test how these characteristics shape the relative influence of 15 international bureaucracies' advice in four financial policy areas through a global survey of national administrations from more than 80 countries. Our findings support arguments that global blueprints need to be adapted and translated to become meaningful for country-level work. <br /> Points for practitioners <br /> National administrations are advised by an increasing number of international bureaucracies, and they cannot listen to all of this advice. Whereas some international bureaucracies give 'one-size-fits-all' recommendations to rather diverse countries, others cater their recommendations to the national audience. Investigating financial policy recommendations, we find that national embeddedness and country-tailored advice render international bureaucracies more influential.
KW  - financial policy
KW  - international administration
KW  - international
KW  - organizations
KW  - multi-level government
KW  - regime complexity
Y1  - 2021
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1177/00208523211013385
SN  - 0020-8523
SN  - 1461-7226
VL  - 87
IS  - 4
SP  - 775
EP  - 793
PB  - Sage Publ.
CY  - Los Angeles, Calif.
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Busch, Per-Olof
T1  - The autonomy of international bureaucracies as agents of non-hierarchical policy transfers
JF  - Politische Vierteljahresschrift : Zeitschrift der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft
N2  - International public administrations are increasingly perceived as autonomous actors prompting states to adopt policies without resorting to coercion or legal obligations. Starting from these observations, I determine abilities and characteristics of international public administrations that contribute to their autonomy as agents of non-hierarchical policy transfers. To this end, I draw on theoretical considerations and empirical results from policy transfer research. I find that the various abilities that contribute to this autonomy of international public administrations are essentially rooted in two structural characteristics: in as many states as possible their staff should (a) be present and (b) analyze the state, development and reform need of national policies on a regular basis.
KW  - international organizations
KW  - international bureaucracies
KW  - autonomy
KW  - policy transfer
Y1  - 2014
SN  - 0032-3470
SN  - 1862-2860
SP  - 105
EP  - +
PB  - Nomos
CY  - Hannover
ER  -