TY  - JOUR
A1  - Khurana, Thomas
T1  - This other life that knows itself as life
BT  - comments on Karen Ng's Hegel's concept of life
JF  - European journal of philosophy
N2  - In this paper, I discuss Karen Ng's reconstruction of Hegel's concept of life. On Ng's account, Hegel's conception of life has a remarkable double role to play: Life is both the proper object of judgment as well as a fundamental characterization of the activity of the judging subject. In a first step, I highlight the insight that Ng's account sheds on the internal connection of life and self-consciousness and the peculiar normativity of life. In a second step, I raise three concerns about Ng's strong focus on the logical notion of life which she characterizes as non-empirical and a priori. I argue that in order to uncover the full significance of the notion of life for Hegel we have to turn to his Philosophy of Nature and Spirit.
Y1  - 2022
SN  - 978-0-19-094761-3
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12745
SN  - 0966-8373
SN  - 1468-0378
N1  - Rezension zu: Ng, Karen: Hegel's concept of life : self-consciousness, freedon, logic. - New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020. - xiii, 319 p. - ISBN 978-0-19-094761-3
VL  - 29
IS  - 4
SP  - 1136
EP  - 1144
PB  - Wiley-Blackwell
CY  - Oxford
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Khurana, Thomas
T1  - The struggle for recognition and the authority of the second person
JF  - European journal of philosophy
N2  - In this introductory paper, I discuss the second-personal approach to ethics and the theory of recognition as two accounts of the fundamental sociality of the human form of life. The first section delineates the deep affinities between the two approaches. They both put a reciprocal social constellation front and center from which they derive the fundamental norms of moral and social life and a social conception of freedom. The second section discusses three points of contrast between the two approaches: The accounts differ in that the second-personal approach opts for a narrower conception of recognition focusing on mutual moral accountability, whereas recognition theory suggests a broader conception including relations of love, respect, and esteem. Secondly, the accounts differ as to how they conceive of the interrelation of the I-thou and the I-We relationship. Finally, they differ with regard to the way they think of struggles for recognition. Whereas the second-personal approach suggests that we can understand struggles on the basis of a transcendental infrastructure of second-personal address, the theory of recognition considers norms of recognition as themselves constituted by dialectical social struggles. The paper closes with a reflection on the ways in which both approaches can help us understand the social vulnerability of the human form of life.
Y1  - 2021
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12675
SN  - 0966-8373
SN  - 1468-0378
VL  - 29
IS  - 3
SP  - 552
EP  - 561
PB  - Wiley-Blackwell
CY  - Oxford
ER  -