TY  - RPRT
A1  - Sanner, Helge
T1  - Imperfect goods and labor markets, and the union wage gap
N2  - Existing theoretical literature fails to explain the differences between the pay of workers that are covered by union agreements and others who are not. This study aims at closing this gap by a single general- equilibrium approach that integrates a dual labor market and a two- sector product market. Our results suggest that the so­ called 'union wage gap' is largely determined by the degree of centralization of the bargains, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, by the expenditure share of the unionized sector's goods.
T3  - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 55 
Y1  - 2003
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-13949
ER  - 
TY  - RPRT
A1  - Sanner, Helge
T1  - Imperfect goods and labor markets, regulation, and spillover effects
N2  - (De)regulatory interventions frequently have unintended cross- market effects, which may or may not be desirable. We assess the effects of three policies on aggregate variables, in particular real income, from a theoretical perspective. Our results suggest that instruments acting upon wages have only a weak impact on real income, whereas the distribution of income is affected strongly. In contrast, a policy that enhances product market competition is fostering real income, but also impacts strongly on union wages and the distribution of income.
T3  - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 56 
Y1  - 2003
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-13951
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Sanner, Helge
T1  - Optimal unemployment insurance in a federation
Y1  - 2003
SN  - 3-540-44004-6
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Sanner, Helge
T1  - Self-financing unemployment insurance and bargaining structure
N2  - This study examines how the size of trade unions relative to the labor force impacts on the desirability of different organizational forms of self- financing unemployment insurance (UI) for workers, firms, and with reference to an efficiency criterion. For this purpose, we respectively numerically compare the outcome of a model with a uniform payroll tax to a model where workers pay taxes according to their systematic risk of unemployment. Our results highlight the importance of the bargaining structure for the assessment of a particular UI scheme. Most importantly, it depends on the size of the unions whether effciency favors a uniform or a differentiated UI scheme.
Y1  - 2003
ER  -