TY - JOUR A1 - Carlà-Uhink, Filippo T1 - ‘He had thoughtlessly accepted certain gifts’ BT - corrnuption and ormative behaviour for roman magistrates JF - Cultural History N2 - It has been highlighted many times how difficult it is to draw a boundary between gift and bribe, and how the same transfer can be interpreted in different ways according to the position of the observer and the narrative frame into which it is inserted. This also applied of course to Ancient Rome; in both the Republic and Principate lawgivers tried to define the limits of acceptable transfers and thus also to identify what we might call ‘corruption’. Yet, such definitions remained to a large extent blurred, and what was constructed was mostly a ‘code of conduct’, allowing Roman politicians to perform their own ‘honesty’ in public duty – while being aware at all times that their involvement in different kinds of transfer might be used by their opponents against them and presented as a case of ‘corrupt’ behaviour. KW - corruption KW - gift-giving KW - Ancient Rome KW - bribery KW - transfers KW - code of conduct KW - embezzlement KW - Cicero Y1 - 2024 UR - https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/abs/10.3366/cult.2024.0296 SN - 2045-290X SN - 2045-2918 VL - 13 IS - 1 SP - 52 EP - 70 PB - Edinburgh University Press CY - Edinburgh ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Fruhstorfer, Anna A1 - Hudson, Alexander T1 - Costs and benefits of accepting presidential term limits BT - should I stay or should I go? JF - Democratization N2 - As presidents approach the end of their constitutionally defined term in office, they face a number of difficulties, most importantly the deprivation of sources of power, personal enrichment, and protection from prosecution. This leads many of them to attempt to circumvent their term limits. Recent studies explain both the reasons for the extension or full abolition of term limits, and failed attempts to do so. Key explanations include electoral competition and the post-term fate of previous post holders. What we do not know yet is how compliance with term limits may be tied to the current president's expectations for their post-term fate. In particular, we do not know whether leaders who attempt to remove term limits and fail to do so jeopardize their post-term career as a result, and conversely, whether leaders who comply will have better outcomes in terms of security, prestige, and economic gain. Hence, we ask how the decision of a leader to comply or not comply with term limits is conditioned by the expectation of their post-term fate. To address this question, this article introduces new data on the career trajectories of term-limited presidents and its systematic effect on term limit compliance. KW - Presidents KW - head of state KW - term limits KW - executives KW - corruption KW - prestige KW - institutional change KW - constitutions Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.1960314 SN - 1351-0347 SN - 1743-890X VL - 29 IS - 1 SP - 93 EP - 112 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group CY - Abingdon ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Feil, Hauke T1 - The cancer of corruption and World Bank project performance BT - Is there a connection? JF - Development policy review / publ. for the Overseas Development Institute N2 - Motivation: Corruption is often cited as a central reason why development projects fail. The article tests this claim by assessing whether World Bank projects perform worse in implementation environments with a higher corruption level. The article focuses specifically on bribery between public officials and firms during the procurement of needed goods and services. Approach and Methods: I use data from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys to avoid the often-criticized corruption perception indices and to allow for an assessment of effects at the subnational level. The analysis builds on an assessment of the performance ratings of 1,228 World Bank projects and covers 87 different countries. Finding: Overall, the article finds a small but statistically significant correlation between the corruption level and project performance. This result indicates that the corruption level of recipient countries should be considered during the design and implementation of projects. Policy Implications: Nonetheless, the relatively small correlation and the low pseudo R-squareds advise not overestimating the relevance of corruption for project performance. At least for the project level, the article finds no indication that corruption is a primary obstacle to aid effectiveness. KW - Aid effectiveness KW - corruption KW - Enterprise Survey KW - project performance KW - World Bank Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12503 SN - 1467-7679 SN - 0950-6764 VL - 39 IS - 3 SP - 381 EP - 397 PB - Blackwell Publ. CY - Oxford ER -