TY  - JOUR
A1  - Tomaszewska, Paulina
A1  - Schuster, Isabell
T1  - Comparing sexuality-related cognitions, sexual behavior, and acceptance of sexual coercion in dating app users and non-users
JF  - Sexuality research & social policy
N2  - Using dating apps has become popular for many young adults worldwide, promising the chance to meet new sexual partners. Because there is evidence that using dating apps may be associated with risky sexual behavior, this study compared users and non-users concerning their sexuality-related cognitions, namely their risky sexual scripts and sexual self-esteem, as well as their risky and sexually assertive behavior. It also explored the link between dating app use and acceptance of sexual coercion. A total of 491 young heterosexual adults (295 female) participated in an online survey advertised in social media and college libraries in Germany. Results indicated that users had more risky sexual scripts and reported more risky sexual behavior than non-users. Furthermore, male dating app users had lower sexual self-esteem and higher acceptance of sexual coercion than male non-users. In both gender groups, dating app use predicted casual sexual activity via a more risky casual sex script. Gender differences, potential underlying mechanisms, and directions for future research are discussed.
KW  - dating app use
KW  - sexual scripts
KW  - sexual behavior
KW  - acceptance of sexual
KW  - coercion
KW  - young adults
Y1  - 2019
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1007/s13178-019-00397-x
SN  - 1868-9884
SN  - 1553-6610
VL  - 17
IS  - 2
SP  - 188
EP  - 198
PB  - Springer
CY  - New York
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Ganghof, Steffen
T1  - Does public reason require super-majoritarian democracy? Liberty, equality, and history in the justification of political institutions
JF  - Politics, philosophy & economics
N2  - The project of public-reason liberalism faces a basic problem: publicly justified principles are typically too abstract and vague to be directly applied to practical political disputes, whereas applicable specifications of these principles are not uniquely publicly justified. One solution could be a legislative procedure that selects one member from the eligible set of inconclusively justified proposals. Yet if liberal principles are too vague to select sufficiently specific legislative proposals, can they, nevertheless, select specific legislative procedures? Based on the work of Gerald Gaus, this article argues that the only candidate for a conclusively justified decision procedure is a majoritarian or otherwise 'neutral' democracy. If the justification of democracy requires an equality baseline in the design of political regimes and if justifications for departure from this baseline are subject to reasonable disagreement, a majoritarian design is justified by default. Gaus's own preference for super-majoritarian procedures is based on disputable specifications of justified liberal principles. These procedures can only be defended as a sectarian preference if the equality baseline is rejected, but then it is not clear how the set of justifiable political regimes can be restricted to full democracies.
KW  - public-reason liberalism
KW  - democracy
KW  - coercion
KW  - political equality
KW  - majority rule
KW  - Gerald Gaus
Y1  - 2013
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X12447786
SN  - 1470-594X
VL  - 12
IS  - 2
SP  - 179
EP  - 196
PB  - Sage Publ.
CY  - Thousand Oaks
ER  -