TY - JOUR A1 - Göthe, Katrin A1 - Oberauer, Klaus A1 - Kliegl, Reinhold T1 - Age differences in dual-task performance after practice N2 - This study investigated whether older adults could acquire the ability to perform 2 cognitive operations in parallel in a paradigm in which young adults had been shown to be able to do so (K. Oberauer & R. Kliegl, 2004). Twelve young and 12 older adults practiced a numerical and a visuospatial continuous memory updating task in single-task and dual-task conditions for 16 to 24 sessions. After practice, 9 young adults were able to process the 2 tasks without dual- task costs, but none of the older adults had reached the criterion of parallel processing. The results suggest a qualitative difference between young and older adults in how they approach dual-task situations. Y1 - 2008 UR - http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=browsePA.volumes&jcode=pag U6 - https://doi.org/10.1037/0882-7974.22.3.596 SN - 0882-7974 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Göthe, Katrin A1 - Oberauer, Klaus A1 - Kliegl, Reinhold T1 - Eliminating dual-task costs by minimizing crosstalk between tasks: The role of modality and feature pairings JF - Cognition : international journal of cognitive science N2 - We tested the independent influences of two content-based factors on dual-task costs, and on the parallel processing ability: The pairing of S-R modalities and the pairing of relevant features between stimuli and responses of two tasks. The two pairing factors were realized across four dual-task groups. Within each group the two tasks comprised two different stimulus modalities (visual and auditory), two different relevant stimulus features (spatial and verbal) and two response modalities (manual and vocal). Pairings of S-R modalities (standard: visual-manual and auditory-vocal, non-standard: visual-vocal and auditory manual) and feature pairings (standard: spatial-manual and verbal-vocal, non-standard: spatial-vocal and verbal-manual) varied across groups. All participants practiced their respective dual-task combination in a paradigm with simultaneous stimulus onset before being transferred to a psychological refractory period paradigm varying stimulus-onset asynchrony. A comparison at the end of practice revealed similar dual-task costs and similar pairing effects in both paradigms. Dual-task costs depended on modality and feature pairings. Groups training with non-standard feature pairings (i.e., verbal stimulus features mapped to spatially separated response keys, or spatial stimulus features mapped to verbal responses) and non-standard modality pairings (i.e., auditory stimulus mapped to manual response, or visual stimulus mapped to vocal responses) had higher dual-task costs than respective standard pairings. In contrast, irrespective of modality pairing dual-task costs virtually disappeared with standard feature pairings after practice in both paradigms. The results can be explained by crosstalk between feature-binding processes for the two tasks. Crosstalk was present for non-standard but absent for standard feature pairings. Therefore, standard feature pairings enabled parallel processing at the end of practice. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. KW - Parallel processing KW - Modality pairings KW - Representational overlap KW - Bottleneck Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.02.003 SN - 0010-0277 SN - 1873-7838 VL - 150 SP - 92 EP - 108 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hoernig, Robin A1 - Oberauer, Klaus A1 - Weidenfeld, Andrea T1 - Between reasoning JF - The quarterly journal of experimental psychology N2 - In two experiments we investigated three-term reasoning with spatial relational assertions using the preposition between as compared to projective prepositions (such as to the left of). For each kind of assertion we distinguish the referent expression (i.e., the grammatical subject) from the relatum expression (i.e., the internal argument of the preposition; e.g., [The hedgehog](referent)_(expression) is to the left of [the frog](relatum)_(expression); [the snake](referent)_(expression) is between [the donkey and the deer](relatum)_(expression)). Previous research has shown that integrating premises with projective prepositions is easier (a) when the relatum expression of the second premise denotes an element already given by the first premise (relatum = given), and (b) when the term denoting a given element precedes the term denoting a new element (given - new). Experiment 1 extended this finding to second premises with the preposition between. In Experiment 2, between figured in the first premise. In this case, participants built an initial preferred model already from the first premise, although such a premise is indeterminate with respect to the array that it describes. Since there is no need left for integrating the second premise, this premise is instead used to verify the initial model and to modify it when necessary. A further investigation of conclusion evaluation times showed that conclusions were evaluated faster when they first mentioned the element that was included most recently into the mental model of the premises. The use of premises with between permitted the separation of recency of model inclusion from recency of appearance of an element in a premise. Y1 - 2006 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/17470210500416151 SN - 1747-0218 VL - 59 IS - 10 SP - 1805 EP - 1825 PB - SAGE Publishing CY - Thousand Oaks, CA ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hornig, R. A1 - Oberauer, Klaus A1 - Weidenfeld, Andrea T1 - Two principles of premise integration in spatial reasoning N2 - We propose two principles that facilitate integration of two relational premises in spatial reasoning. Integration is easier if the anaphor in the second premise, P2, bears the role of the relatum (relatum = given). Moreover, integration is easier if, in P2, the anaphor is mentioned before the new element (given-new). In premises with canonical word order (grammatical subjects mentioned first), these principles always conflict with one another. In topicalized statements mentioning the prepositional phrase first, the two principles work in tandem. By varying word order, we tested the two principles by measuring P2 comprehension times. Comprehension times indicated that integration was easiest when P2 obeyed both principles and most difficult when both principles were violated. Canonical premises were of intermediate difficulty. This pattern emerged regardless of whether the anaphor was a definite description or a pronoun Y1 - 2005 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Jünger, Elisabeth A1 - Kliegl, Reinhold A1 - Oberauer, Klaus T1 - No evidence for feature overwriting in visual working memory JF - Memory Y1 - 2014 SN - 0965-8211 SN - 1464-0686 VL - 22 IS - 4 SP - 374 EP - 389 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group CY - Abingdon ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Kliegl, Reinhold A1 - Mayr, Ulrich A1 - Oberauer, Klaus T1 - Resource limitations and process dissociations in individual differences research Y1 - 2000 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Lange, Elke B. A1 - Oberauer, Klaus T1 - Overwriting of phonemic features in serial recall N2 - We tested explanations of the phonological similarity effect in verbal short-term memory: the confusion hypothesis assumes that serial positions of similar items are confused. The overwriting hypothesis states that similar items share feature representations, which are overwritten. Participants memorised a phonologically dissimilar list of CVC-trigrams (Experiment 1) or words (Experiment 2 and 3) for serial recall. In the retention interval they real aloud other items. The material of the distractor task jointly overlapped one item of the memory list. The recall of this item was impaired, and the effect was not based on intrusions from the distractor task alone. The results provide evidence for feature overwriting as one potential mechanism contributing to the phonological similarity effect Y1 - 2005 SN - 0965-8211 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Lewandowsky, Stephan A1 - Stritzke, W. G. K. A1 - Oberauer, Klaus A1 - Morales, M. T1 - Memory for fact, fiction, and misinformation : the Iraq War 2003 N2 - Media coverage of the 2003 Iraq War frequently contained corrections and retractions of earlier information. For example, claims that Iraqi forces executed coalition prisoners of war after they surrendered were retracted the day after the claims were made. Similarly, tentative initial reports about the discovery of weapons of mass destruction were all later disconfirmed. We investigated the effects of these retractions and disconfirmations on people's memory for and beliefs about war-related events in two coalition countries (Australia and the United States) and one country that opposed the war (Germany). Participants were queried about (a) true events, (b) events initially presented as fact but subsequently retracted, and (c) fictional events. Participants in the United States did not show sensitivity to the correction of misinformation, whereas participants in Australia and Germany discounted corrected misinformation. Our results are consistent with previous findings in that the differences between samples reflect greater suspicion about the motives underlying the war among people in Australia and Germany than among people in the United States Y1 - 2005 SN - 0956-7976 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Lewandowsky, Stephan A1 - Stritzke, W. g. k. A1 - Oberauer, Klaus A1 - Morales, M. T1 - Memory for fact, fiction, and misinformation : the Iraq War 2003 Y1 - 2004 SN - 0020-7594 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Oberauer, Klaus T1 - Reasoning with conditionals: A test of formal models of four theories JF - Cognitive psychology N2 - The four dominant theories of reasoning from conditionals are translated into formal models: The theory of mental models (Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2002). Conditionals: a theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference. Psychological Review, 109, 646-678), the suppositional theory (Evans, J. S. B. T., & Over, D. E. (2004). If. Oxford: Oxford University Press), a dual-process variant of the model theory (Verschueren, N., Schaeken, W., & d'Ydewalle, G. (2005). A dual-process specification of causal conditional reasoning. Thinking & Reasoning, 11, 278-293), and the probabilistic theory (Oaksford, M., Chater, N., & Larkin, J. (2000). Probabilities and polarity biases in conditional inference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 26, 883-899). The first three theories are formalized as multinomial models. The models are applied to the frequencies of patterns of acceptance or rejection across the four basic inferences modus ponens, acceptance of the consequent, denial of the antecedent, and modus tollens. Model fits are assessed for two large data sets, one representing reasoning with abstract, basic conditionals, the other reflecting reasoning with pseudo-realistic causal and non-causal conditionals. The best account of the data was provided by a modified version of the mental-model theory, augmented by directionality, and by the dual-process model. KW - conditionals KW - reasoning KW - multinomial models Y1 - 2006 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2006.04.001 SN - 0010-0285 VL - 53 IS - 3 SP - 238 EP - 283 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER -