53946
2021
2021
eng
1
199
199
book
Oxford University Press
Oxford
1
2021-12-17
2021-12-17
--
Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism
In a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not. The book defends this thesis and explores ‘semi-parliamentary government’ as an alternative to presidential government. Semi-parliamentarism avoids power concentration in one person by shifting the separation of powers into the democratic assembly. The executive becomes fused with only one part of the assembly, even though the other part has at least equal democratic legitimacy and robust veto power on ordinary legislation. The book identifies the Australian Commonwealth and Japan, as well as the Australian states of New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia, as semi-parliamentary systems. Using data from 23 countries and 6 Australian states, it maps how parliamentary and semi-parliamentary systems balance competing visions of democracy; it analyzes patterns of electoral and party systems, cabinet formation, legislative coalition-building, and constitutional reforms; it systematically compares the semi-parliamentary and presidential separation of powers; and it develops new and innovative semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require two separate chambers.
Democratic Design and the Separation of Powers
10.1093/oso/9780192897145.001.0001
978-0-19-289714-5
Steffen Ganghof
<a href="https://doi.org/10.25932/publishup-53783">Zweitveröffentlichung in der Schriftenreihe Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe ; 194</a>
CC-BY-NC-ND - Namensnennung, nicht kommerziell, keine Bearbeitungen 4.0 International
Steffen Ganghof
eng
uncontrolled
presidential government
eng
uncontrolled
parliamentary government
eng
uncontrolled
semi-parliamentary government
eng
uncontrolled
separation of powers
eng
uncontrolled
executive personalism
eng
uncontrolled
bicameralism
eng
uncontrolled
constitutional design
eng
uncontrolled
democratic theory
eng
uncontrolled
patterns of democracy
eng
uncontrolled
Australia
Politikwissenschaft
Referiert
Fachgruppe Politik- & Verwaltungswissenschaft
Gold Open-Access
44540
2019
2020
eng
13
120
postprint
1
2020-03-02
2020-03-02
--
Designing Democratic Constitutions
This article analyses salient trade-offs in the design of democracy. It grounds this analysis in a distinction between two basic models of democracy: simple and complex majoritarianism. These models differ not only in their electoral and party systems, but also in the style of coalition-building. Simple majoritarianism concentrates executive power in a single majority party; complex majoritarianism envisions the formation of shifting, issue-specific coalitions among multiple parties whose programs differ across multiple conflict dimensions. The latter pattern of coalition formation is very difficult to create and sustain under pure parliamentary government. A separation of powers between executive and legislature can facilitate such a pattern, while also achieving central goals of simple majoritarianism: identifiable cabinet alternatives before the election and stable cabinets afterward. The separation of powers can thus balance simple and complex majoritarianism in ways that are unavailable under parliamentarism. The article also compares the presidential and semi-parliamentary versions of the separation of powers. It argues that the latter has important advantages, e.g., when it comes to resolving inter-branch deadlock, as it avoids the concentration of executive power in a single human being.
Postprints der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe
The Search for Optimality
10.25932/publishup-44540
urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-445408
1867-5808
Politics and Governance 7 (2019) 4 DOI: 10.17645/pag.v7i4.2239
<a href="http://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/44539">Bibliographieeintrag der Originalveröffentlichung/Quelle</a>
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true
CC-BY - Namensnennung 4.0 International
Steffen Ganghof
Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe
120
eng
uncontrolled
electoral systems
eng
uncontrolled
parliamentary government
eng
uncontrolled
presidential government
eng
uncontrolled
semi-parliamentary government
Politikwissenschaft
open_access
Sozialwissenschaften
Referiert
Open Access
Universität Potsdam
https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/files/44540/pwsr120.pdf
44539
2019
2019
eng
243
253
11
4
7
article
Cogitatio Press
Lisbon
1
2019-11-25
2019-11-25
--
Designing Democratic Constitutions
This article analyses salient trade-offs in the design of democracy. It grounds this analysis in a distinction between two basic models of democracy: simple and complex majoritarianism. These models differ not only in their electoral and party systems, but also in the style of coalition-building. Simple majoritarianism concentrates executive power in a single majority party; complex majoritarianism envisions the formation of shifting, issue-specific coalitions among multiple parties whose programs differ across multiple conflict dimensions. The latter pattern of coalition formation is very difficult to create and sustain under pure parliamentary government. A separation of powers between executive and legislature can facilitate such a pattern, while also achieving central goals of simple majoritarianism: identifiable cabinet alternatives before the election and stable cabinets afterward. The separation of powers can thus balance simple and complex majoritarianism in ways that are unavailable under parliamentarism. The article also compares the presidential and semi-parliamentary versions of the separation of powers. It argues that the latter has important advantages, e.g., when it comes to resolving inter-branch deadlock, as it avoids the concentration of executive power in a single human being.
Politics and Governance
The Search for Optimality
10.17645/pag.v7i4.2239
2183-2463
Universität Potsdam
PA 2019_135
856.80
<a href=" https://doi.org/10.25932/publishup-44540">Zweitveröffentlichung in der Schriftenreihe Postprints der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe ; 120</a>
false
false
CC-BY - Namensnennung 4.0 International
Steffen Ganghof
eng
uncontrolled
electoral systems
eng
uncontrolled
parliamentary government
eng
uncontrolled
presidential government
eng
uncontrolled
semi-parliamentary government
Politikwissenschaft
open_access
Sozialwissenschaften
Referiert
Publikationsfonds der Universität Potsdam
Open Access
62196
2023
2023
eng
20
article
Palgrave Macmillan
Basingstoke
1
2023-05-08
2023-05-08
--
Review symposium
Steffen Ganghof’s Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: Democratic Design and the Separation of Powers (Oxford University Press, 2021) posits that “in a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not” (Ganghof, 2021). To consider, examine and theorise about this, Ganghof urges engagement with semi-parliamentarism. As explained by Ganghof, legislative power is shared between two democratically legitimate sections of parliament in a semi-parliamentary system, but only one of those sections selects the government and can remove it in a no-confidence vote. Consequently, power is dispersed and not concentrated in the hands of any one person, which, Ganghof argues, can lead to an enhanced form of parliamentary democracy. In this book review symposium, George Tsebelis, Michael Thies, José Antonio Cheibub, Rosalind Dixon and Daniel Bogéa review Steffen Ganghof’s book and engage with the author about aspects of research design, case selection and theoretical argument. This symposium arose from an engaging and constructive discussion of the book at a seminar hosted by Texas A&M University in 2022. We thank Prof José Cheibub (Texas A&M) for organising that seminar and Dr Anna Fruhstorfer (University of Potsdam) for initiating this book review symposium.
European political science
beyond presidentialism and parliamentarism
1680-4333
10.1057/s41304-023-00426-9
1682-0983
@articleTsebelis.2023, author = Tsebelis, George and Thies, Michael and Cheibub, José Antonio and Dixon, Rosalind and Bogéa, Daniel and Ganghof, Steffen, year = 2023, title = Review symposium: Beyond presidentialism and parliamentarism, issn = 1680-4333, journal = European Political Science, doi = 10.1057/s41304-023-00426-9
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bibtex
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Ganghof, Steffen
2082889-5
2074406-7
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true
CC-BY - Namensnennung 4.0 International
George Tsebelis
Michael Thies
José Antonio Cheibub
Rosalind Dixon
Daniel Bogéa
Steffen Ganghof
eng
uncontrolled
semi-parliamentary government
eng
uncontrolled
presidentialism
eng
uncontrolled
parliamentary government
eng
uncontrolled
separation of powers
eng
uncontrolled
legislatures
eng
uncontrolled
executives
eng
uncontrolled
parliamentary democracy
Sozialwissenschaften
Politikwissenschaft
Sozialwissenschaften
Referiert
Fachgruppe Politik- & Verwaltungswissenschaft
Hybrid Open-Access