55384
2017
2017
eng
169
186
18
1
56
article
Wiley
Hoboken
1
2016-10-06
2016-10-06
--
Institutional veto players and cabinet formation
Are potential cabinets more likely to form when they control institutional veto players such as symmetric second chambers or minority vetoes? Existing evidence for a causal effect of veto control has been weak. This article presents evidence for this effect on the basis of conditional and mixed logit analyses of government formations in 21 parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies between 1955 and 2012. It also shows that the size of the effect varies systematically across political-institutional contexts. The estimated causal effect was greater in countries that eventually abolished the relevant veto institutions. It is suggested that the incidence of constitutional reform is a proxy for context-specific factors that increased the incentives for veto control and simultaneously provided a stimulus for the weakening of institutional veto power.
European journal of political research : official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research
the veto control hypothesis reconsidered
10.1111/1475-6765.12172
0304-4130
1475-6765
wos:2017
WOS:000394458300009
Eppner, S (reprint author), Univ Potsdam, Dept Econ & Social Sci, August Bebel Str 89, D-14482 Potsdam, Germany., sebastian.eppner@gmail.com
2022-06-29T11:15:12+00:00
sword
importub
filename=package.tar
3ae41b325aad6207cc5047fca625b9b9
Eppner, Sebastian
false
true
Sebastian Eppner
Steffen Ganghof
eng
uncontrolled
government formation
eng
uncontrolled
veto players
eng
uncontrolled
second chambers
Politikwissenschaft
Sozialwissenschaften
Referiert
Import
54565
2018
2018
eng
211
233
23
2
53
article
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group
Abingdon
1
2018-04-09
2018-04-09
--
Australian bicameralism as semi-parliamentarism
The article analyses the type of bicameralism we find in Australia as a distinct executive-legislative system – a hybrid between parliamentary and presidential government – which we call ‘semi-parliamentary government’. We argue that this hybrid presents an important and underappreciated alternative to pure parliamentary government as well as presidential forms of the power-separation, and that it can achieve a certain balance between competing models or visions of democracy. We specify theoretically how the semi-parliamentary separation of powers contributes to the balancing of democratic visions and propose a conceptual framework for comparing democratic visions. We use this framework to locate the Australian Commonwealth, all Australian states and 22 advanced democratic nation-states on a two-dimensional empirical map of democratic patterns for the period from 1995 to 2015.
Australian Journal of Political Science
patterns of majority formation in 29 democracies
10.1080/10361146.2018.1451487
1036-1146
1363-030X
wos:2018
WOS:000429593700005
Ganghof, S (reprint author), Univ Potsdam, Fac Econ & Social Sci, Potsdam, Germany., ganghof@uni-potsdam.de
Deutsche ForschungsgemeinschaftGerman Research Foundation (DFG) [GA 1696/2-1]
2022-03-31T06:43:59+00:00
sword
importub
filename=package.tar
379c2143bcb915489848e8cefe816cf4
<a href="https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-412984">Zweitveröffentlichung in der Schriftenreihe Postprints der Universität Potsdam : Postprints der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschaft- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe ; 95 </a>
CC-BY-NC-ND - Namensnennung, nicht kommerziell, keine Bearbeitungen 4.0 International
Steffen Ganghof
Sebastian Eppner
Alexander Pörschke
eng
uncontrolled
Executive-legislative relations
eng
uncontrolled
bicameralism
eng
uncontrolled
parliamentary government
eng
uncontrolled
presidential government
eng
uncontrolled
visions of democracy
Politikwissenschaft
Sozialwissenschaften
Referiert
Import
Bronze Open-Access
54566
2018
2018
eng
264
269
6
2
53
article
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group
Abingdon
1
2018-04-09
2018-04-09
--
Semi-parliamentary government in perspective
The article responds to four commentaries on the concept of semi-parliamentary government and its application to Australian bicameralism. It highlights four main points: (1) Our preferred typology is not more ‘normative’ than existing approaches, but applies the criterion of ‘direct election’ equally to executive and legislature; (2) While the evolution of semi-parliamentary government had contingent elements, it plausibly also reflects the ‘equilibrium’ nature of certain institutional configurations; (3) The idea that a pure parliamentary system with pure proportional representation has absolute normative priority over ‘instrumentalist’ concerns about cabinet stability, identifiability and responsibility is questionable; and (4) The reforms we discuss may be unlikely to occur in Australia, but deserve consideration by scholars and institutional reformers in other democratic systems.
Australian Journal of Political Science
concepts, values, and designs
10.1080/10361146.2018.1451488
1036-1146
1363-030X
wos:2018
WOS:000429593700010
Ganghof, S (reprint author), Univ Potsdam, Fac Econ & Social Sci, Potsdam, Germany., ganghof@uni-potsdam.de
Deutsche ForschungsgemeinschaftGerman Research Foundation (DFG) [GA 1696/2-1]
2022-03-31T06:55:28+00:00
sword
importub
filename=package.tar
60844f972fc0dd03b1b97f917bc171a5
Ganghof, Steffen
false
true
Steffen Ganghof
Sebastian Eppner
Alexander Pörschke
eng
uncontrolled
Executive-legislative relations
eng
uncontrolled
bicameralism
eng
uncontrolled
visions of democracy
eng
uncontrolled
parliamentary government
eng
uncontrolled
presidential government
Politikwissenschaft
Sozialwissenschaften
Referiert
Import
50358
2017
2017
eng
113
130
18
1
39
article
Sage Publ.
London
1
2017-06-20
2017-06-20
--
Patterns of accountability and representation
Arend Lijphart uses an average of five standardized variables – the executive-parties dimension (EPD) – to describe patterns of democracy and explain differences in democracies’ performance. The article suggests ways to improve the descriptive part of the project. It argues that the EPD maps different approaches to achieving accountability and representation, rather than differences in consensus. This re-conceptualization leads to a more coherent and valid measurement. It is also argued that more systematic adjustments are needed for differences in constitutional structures (presidentialism and bicameralism). The article presents data on a revised EPD and its components for 36 democracies in the period from 1981 to 2010. As to the explanatory part of the project, we contend that the EPD often hinders adequate causal analysis rather than facilitating it. We show this by re-analysing democracies’ performance with respect to turnout and capital punishment.
Politics
Why the executive-parties dimension cannot explain democratic performance
10.1177/0263395717710566
0263-3957
1467-9256
wos:2019
WOS:000457633300009
Ganghof, S (reprint author), Univ Potsdam, Chair Comparat Polit, August Bebel Str 89, D-14482 Potsdam, Brandenburg, Germany., eppner@uni-potsdam.de
German Research Foundation (DFG)German Research Foundation (DFG) [GA 1696/2-1]
2021-04-15T12:26:20+00:00
sword
importub
filename=package.tar
cf49cb0d02831f78e16333c9cc9d463e
Ganghof, Steffen
false
true
CC-BY - Namensnennung 4.0 International
Steffen Ganghof
Sebastian Eppner
eng
uncontrolled
bicameralism
eng
uncontrolled
consensus democracy
eng
uncontrolled
death penalty
eng
uncontrolled
democratic performance
eng
uncontrolled
effective district magnitude
eng
uncontrolled
executive-parties dimension
eng
uncontrolled
turnout
Politikwissenschaft
Import
Fachgruppe Politik- & Verwaltungswissenschaft
Hybrid Open-Access
44539
2019
2019
eng
243
253
11
4
7
article
Cogitatio Press
Lisbon
1
2019-11-25
2019-11-25
--
Designing Democratic Constitutions
This article analyses salient trade-offs in the design of democracy. It grounds this analysis in a distinction between two basic models of democracy: simple and complex majoritarianism. These models differ not only in their electoral and party systems, but also in the style of coalition-building. Simple majoritarianism concentrates executive power in a single majority party; complex majoritarianism envisions the formation of shifting, issue-specific coalitions among multiple parties whose programs differ across multiple conflict dimensions. The latter pattern of coalition formation is very difficult to create and sustain under pure parliamentary government. A separation of powers between executive and legislature can facilitate such a pattern, while also achieving central goals of simple majoritarianism: identifiable cabinet alternatives before the election and stable cabinets afterward. The separation of powers can thus balance simple and complex majoritarianism in ways that are unavailable under parliamentarism. The article also compares the presidential and semi-parliamentary versions of the separation of powers. It argues that the latter has important advantages, e.g., when it comes to resolving inter-branch deadlock, as it avoids the concentration of executive power in a single human being.
Politics and Governance
The Search for Optimality
10.17645/pag.v7i4.2239
2183-2463
Universität Potsdam
PA 2019_135
856.80
<a href=" https://doi.org/10.25932/publishup-44540">Zweitveröffentlichung in der Schriftenreihe Postprints der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe ; 120</a>
false
false
CC-BY - Namensnennung 4.0 International
Steffen Ganghof
eng
uncontrolled
electoral systems
eng
uncontrolled
parliamentary government
eng
uncontrolled
presidential government
eng
uncontrolled
semi-parliamentary government
Politikwissenschaft
open_access
Sozialwissenschaften
Referiert
Publikationsfonds der Universität Potsdam
Open Access
53946
2021
2021
eng
1
199
199
book
Oxford University Press
Oxford
1
2021-12-17
2021-12-17
--
Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism
In a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not. The book defends this thesis and explores ‘semi-parliamentary government’ as an alternative to presidential government. Semi-parliamentarism avoids power concentration in one person by shifting the separation of powers into the democratic assembly. The executive becomes fused with only one part of the assembly, even though the other part has at least equal democratic legitimacy and robust veto power on ordinary legislation. The book identifies the Australian Commonwealth and Japan, as well as the Australian states of New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia, as semi-parliamentary systems. Using data from 23 countries and 6 Australian states, it maps how parliamentary and semi-parliamentary systems balance competing visions of democracy; it analyzes patterns of electoral and party systems, cabinet formation, legislative coalition-building, and constitutional reforms; it systematically compares the semi-parliamentary and presidential separation of powers; and it develops new and innovative semi-parliamentary designs, some of which do not require two separate chambers.
Democratic Design and the Separation of Powers
10.1093/oso/9780192897145.001.0001
978-0-19-289714-5
Steffen Ganghof
<a href="https://doi.org/10.25932/publishup-53783">Zweitveröffentlichung in der Schriftenreihe Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe ; 194</a>
CC-BY-NC-ND - Namensnennung, nicht kommerziell, keine Bearbeitungen 4.0 International
Steffen Ganghof
eng
uncontrolled
presidential government
eng
uncontrolled
parliamentary government
eng
uncontrolled
semi-parliamentary government
eng
uncontrolled
separation of powers
eng
uncontrolled
executive personalism
eng
uncontrolled
bicameralism
eng
uncontrolled
constitutional design
eng
uncontrolled
democratic theory
eng
uncontrolled
patterns of democracy
eng
uncontrolled
Australia
Politikwissenschaft
Referiert
Fachgruppe Politik- & Verwaltungswissenschaft
Gold Open-Access
62204
2023
2023
eng
1
12
12
article
Routledge
London
1
2023-01-27
2023-01-27
--
Justifying types of representative democracy
This article responds to critical reflections on my Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism by Sarah Birch, Kevin J. Elliott, Claudia Landwehr and James L. Wilson. It discusses how different types of representative democracy, especially different forms of government (presidential, parliamentary or hybrid), can be justified. It clarifies, among other things, the distinction between procedural and process equality, the strengths of semi-parliamentary government, the potential instability of constitutional designs, and the difference that theories can make in actual processes of constitutional reform.
Critical review of international social and political philosophy
a response
1369-8230
10.1080/13698230.2022.2159665
1743-8772
@articleGanghof.2023, author = Ganghof, Steffen, year = 2023, title = Justifying types of representative democracy: a response, pages = 1–12, issn = 1369-8230, journal = Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, doi = 10.1080/13698230.2022.2159665
md5:e9f6ace86569ff8fb733fe2c8958df90
2024-01-18T13:47:01+00:00
/tmp/phpWxIN1B
bibtex
65a92bd537dde6.06628577
2119478-6
1412253-4
Ganghof, Steffen
false
true
CC-BY-NC-ND - Namensnennung, nicht kommerziell, keine Bearbeitungen 4.0 International
Steffen Ganghof
eng
uncontrolled
political equality
eng
uncontrolled
semi-parliamentarism
eng
uncontrolled
presidentialism
eng
uncontrolled
institutional design
eng
uncontrolled
executive personalism
Philosophie und Psychologie
Sozialwissenschaften
Politikwissenschaft
Sozialwissenschaften
Referiert
Fachgruppe Politik- & Verwaltungswissenschaft
Hybrid Open-Access
62196
2023
2023
eng
20
article
Palgrave Macmillan
Basingstoke
1
2023-05-08
2023-05-08
--
Review symposium
Steffen Ganghof’s Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: Democratic Design and the Separation of Powers (Oxford University Press, 2021) posits that “in a democracy, a constitutional separation of powers between the executive and the assembly may be desirable, but the constitutional concentration of executive power in a single human being is not” (Ganghof, 2021). To consider, examine and theorise about this, Ganghof urges engagement with semi-parliamentarism. As explained by Ganghof, legislative power is shared between two democratically legitimate sections of parliament in a semi-parliamentary system, but only one of those sections selects the government and can remove it in a no-confidence vote. Consequently, power is dispersed and not concentrated in the hands of any one person, which, Ganghof argues, can lead to an enhanced form of parliamentary democracy. In this book review symposium, George Tsebelis, Michael Thies, José Antonio Cheibub, Rosalind Dixon and Daniel Bogéa review Steffen Ganghof’s book and engage with the author about aspects of research design, case selection and theoretical argument. This symposium arose from an engaging and constructive discussion of the book at a seminar hosted by Texas A&M University in 2022. We thank Prof José Cheibub (Texas A&M) for organising that seminar and Dr Anna Fruhstorfer (University of Potsdam) for initiating this book review symposium.
European political science
beyond presidentialism and parliamentarism
1680-4333
10.1057/s41304-023-00426-9
1682-0983
@articleTsebelis.2023, author = Tsebelis, George and Thies, Michael and Cheibub, José Antonio and Dixon, Rosalind and Bogéa, Daniel and Ganghof, Steffen, year = 2023, title = Review symposium: Beyond presidentialism and parliamentarism, issn = 1680-4333, journal = European Political Science, doi = 10.1057/s41304-023-00426-9
md5:538e530ceca27608ed55f44906e50820
2024-01-18T10:16:19+00:00
/tmp/phpJjAxCS
bibtex
65a8fa733c1bf3.74246768
Ganghof, Steffen
2082889-5
2074406-7
false
true
CC-BY - Namensnennung 4.0 International
George Tsebelis
Michael Thies
José Antonio Cheibub
Rosalind Dixon
Daniel Bogéa
Steffen Ganghof
eng
uncontrolled
semi-parliamentary government
eng
uncontrolled
presidentialism
eng
uncontrolled
parliamentary government
eng
uncontrolled
separation of powers
eng
uncontrolled
legislatures
eng
uncontrolled
executives
eng
uncontrolled
parliamentary democracy
Sozialwissenschaften
Politikwissenschaft
Sozialwissenschaften
Referiert
Fachgruppe Politik- & Verwaltungswissenschaft
Hybrid Open-Access