44540
2019
2020
eng
13
120
postprint
1
2020-03-02
2020-03-02
--
Designing Democratic Constitutions
This article analyses salient trade-offs in the design of democracy. It grounds this analysis in a distinction between two basic models of democracy: simple and complex majoritarianism. These models differ not only in their electoral and party systems, but also in the style of coalition-building. Simple majoritarianism concentrates executive power in a single majority party; complex majoritarianism envisions the formation of shifting, issue-specific coalitions among multiple parties whose programs differ across multiple conflict dimensions. The latter pattern of coalition formation is very difficult to create and sustain under pure parliamentary government. A separation of powers between executive and legislature can facilitate such a pattern, while also achieving central goals of simple majoritarianism: identifiable cabinet alternatives before the election and stable cabinets afterward. The separation of powers can thus balance simple and complex majoritarianism in ways that are unavailable under parliamentarism. The article also compares the presidential and semi-parliamentary versions of the separation of powers. It argues that the latter has important advantages, e.g., when it comes to resolving inter-branch deadlock, as it avoids the concentration of executive power in a single human being.
Postprints der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe
The Search for Optimality
10.25932/publishup-44540
urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-445408
1867-5808
Politics and Governance 7 (2019) 4 DOI: 10.17645/pag.v7i4.2239
<a href="http://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/44539">Bibliographieeintrag der Originalveröffentlichung/Quelle</a>
false
true
CC-BY - Namensnennung 4.0 International
Steffen Ganghof
Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe
120
eng
uncontrolled
electoral systems
eng
uncontrolled
parliamentary government
eng
uncontrolled
presidential government
eng
uncontrolled
semi-parliamentary government
Politikwissenschaft
open_access
Sozialwissenschaften
Referiert
Open Access
Universität Potsdam
https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/files/44540/pwsr120.pdf
43417
2019
2019
eng
541
561
22
114
postprint
1
2019-10-25
2019-10-25
--
Do minority cabinets govern more flexibly and inclusively?
A widespread view in political science is that minority cabinets govern more flexibly and inclusively, more in line with a median-oriented and 'consensual' vision of democracy. Yet there is only little empirical evidence for it. We study legislative coalition-building in the German state of North-Rhine-Westphalia, which was ruled by a minority government between 2010 and 2012. We compare the inclusiveness of legislative coalitions under minority and majority cabinets, based on 1028 laws passed in the 1985–2017 period, and analyze in detail the flexibility of legislative coalition formation under the minority government. Both quantitative analyses are complemented with brief case studies of specific legislation. We find, first, that the minority cabinet did not rule more inclusively. Second, the minority cabinet’s legislative flexibility was fairly limited; to the extent that it existed, it follows a pattern that cannot be explained on the basis of the standard spatial model with policy-seeking parties.
Postprints der Universität Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe
evidence from Germany
urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-434175
10.25932/publishup-43417
1867-5808
online registration
German Politics 28 (2019) 4, S. 541–561 DOI: 10.1080/09644008.2019.1635120
false
true
CC-BY-NC-ND - Namensnennung, nicht kommerziell, keine Bearbeitungen 4.0 International
Steffen Ganghof
Sebastian Eppner
Christian Stecker
Katja Heeß
Stefan Schukraft
Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe
114
eng
uncontrolled
Australian bicameralism
eng
uncontrolled
pledge fulfillment
eng
uncontrolled
majority formation
eng
uncontrolled
veto players
eng
uncontrolled
patterns
eng
uncontrolled
coalitions
eng
uncontrolled
consensus
eng
uncontrolled
democracy
eng
uncontrolled
parties
eng
uncontrolled
policy
Politikwissenschaft
Geschichte Europas
open_access
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Referiert
Open Access
Taylor & Francis Open Access Agreement
Universität Potsdam
https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/files/43417/pwsr114.pdf
41298
2018
2018
eng
24
postprint
1
2018-07-10
2018-07-10
--
Australian bicameralism as semi-parliamentarism
The article analyses the type of bicameralism we find in Australia as
a distinct executive-legislative system – a hybrid between
parliamentary and presidential government – which we call ‘semi-
parliamentary government’. We argue that this hybrid presents an
important and underappreciated alternative to pure parliamentary
government as well as presidential forms of the power-separation,
and that it can achieve a certain balance between competing
models or visions of democracy. We specify theoretically how the
semi-parliamentary separation of powers contributes to the
balancing of democratic visions and propose a conceptual
framework for comparing democratic visions. We use this
framework to locate the Australian Commonwealth, all Australian
states and 22 advanced democratic nation-states on a two-
dimensional empirical map of democratic patterns for the period
from 1995 to 2015.
Australian Journal of Political Science
patterns of majority formation in 29 democracies
urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-412984
online registration
Australian Journal of Political Science 53 (2018) Nr. 2, S. 211–233 DOI: 10.1080/10361146.2018.1451487
<a href="http://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/54565">Bibliographieeintrag der Originalveröffentlichung/Quelle</a>
CC-BY-NC-ND - Namensnennung, nicht kommerziell, keine Bearbeitungen 4.0 International
Steffen Ganghof
Sebastian Eppner
Alexander Pörschke
Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe
95
eng
uncontrolled
executive-legislative relations
eng
uncontrolled
bicameralism
eng
uncontrolled
parliamentary government
eng
uncontrolled
presidential government
eng
uncontrolled
visions of democracy
Politikwissenschaft
open_access
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Referiert
Open Access
Taylor & Francis Open Access Agreement
Universität Potsdam
https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/files/41298/pwsr95.online.pdf
41345
2016
2018
eng
25
postprint
1
2018-07-23
2018-07-23
--
Reconciling representation and accountability
An egalitarian approach to the fair representation of voters specifies three main institutional requirements: proportional representation, legislative majority rule and a parliamentary system of government. This approach faces two challenges: the under-determination of the resulting democratic process and the idea of a trade-off between equal voter representation and government accountability. Linking conceptual with comparative analysis, the article argues that we can distinguish three ideal-typical varieties of the egalitarian vision of democracy, based on the stages at which majorities are formed. These varieties do not put different relative normative weight onto equality and accountability, but have different conceptions of both values and their reconciliation. The view that accountability is necessarily linked to clarity of responsibility', widespread in the comparative literature, is questioned - as is the idea of a general trade-off between representation and accountability. Depending on the vision of democracy, the two values need not be in conflict.
Government and Opposition
three visions of democracy compared
urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-413456
online registration
Government and Opposition Vol. 51, No. 2 (2016); DOI: 10.1017/gov.2015.15
Keine öffentliche Lizenz: Unter Urheberrechtsschutz
Steffen Ganghof
Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe
96
eng
uncontrolled
visions of democracy
eng
uncontrolled
political equality
eng
uncontrolled
accountability
Politikwissenschaft
open_access
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Sozialwissenschaften
Referiert
Open Access
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Universität Potsdam
https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/files/41345/pwsr_96.online.pdf
40407
2012
2018
eng
18
2
12
postprint
1
2018-03-29
2018-03-29
--
Does public reason require super-majoritarian democracy?
The project of public-reason liberalism faces a basic problem: publicly justified principles are typically too abstract and vague to be directly applied to practical political disputes, whereas applicable specifications of these principles are not uniquely publicly justified. One solution could be a legislative procedure that selects one member from the eligible set of inconclusively justified proposals. Yet if liberal principles are too vague to select sufficiently specific legislative proposals, can they, nevertheless, select specific legislative procedures? Based on the work of Gerald Gaus, this article argues that the only candidate for a conclusively justified decision procedure is a majoritarian or otherwise ‘neutral’ democracy. If the justification of democracy requires an equality baseline in the design of political regimes and if justifications for departure from this baseline are subject to reasonable disagreement, a majoritarian design is justified by default. Gaus’s own preference for super-majoritarian procedures is based on disputable specifications of justified liberal principles. These procedures can only be defended as a sectarian preference if the equality baseline is rejected, but then it is not clear how the set of justifiable political regimes can be restricted to full democracies.
Politics, philosophy & economics
Liberty, equality, and history in the justification of political institutions
urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-477860
online registration
Politics, philosophy & economics, (2012), Nr. 12(2), S. 179–196 DOI: 10.1177/1470594X12447786
<a href="http://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/opus4-ubp/frontdoor/index/index/docId/35042">Bibliographieeintrag der Originalveröffentlichung/Quelle</a>
Keine öffentliche Lizenz: Unter Urheberrechtsschutz
Steffen Ganghof
Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe
86
eng
uncontrolled
public-reason liberalism
eng
uncontrolled
democracy
eng
uncontrolled
coercion
eng
uncontrolled
political equality
eng
uncontrolled
majority rule
eng
uncontrolled
Gerald Gaus
Philosophie
Politikwissenschaft
Wirtschaft
open_access
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Referiert
Open Access
Sage
Universität Potsdam
https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/files/40407/pwsr86.online.pdf