@article{BruttelGuethNithammeretal.2022,
  author    = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and G{\"u}th, Werner and Nithammer, Juri and Orland, Andreas},
  title     = {Inefficient cooperation under stochastic and strategic uncertainty},
  series = {Conflict resolution},
  volume    = {66},
  journal   = {Conflict resolution},
  number    = {4-5},
  publisher = {Sage Publ.},
  address   = {Thousand Oaks},
  issn      = {0022-0027},
  doi       = {10.1177/00220027211066614},
  pages     = {755 -- 782},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {Stochastic uncertainty can cause coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can increase efficiency. To test this transfer mechanism, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeated Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not lead to an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two major reasons for this failure: first, stochastic uncertainty forces proposers intending to cooperate to accept high strategic uncertainty, which many proposers avoid; second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperatively, which hinders cooperation in future periods.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{Franzmann2017,
  author    = {Franzmann, Simon T.},
  title     = {Competition, contest, and cooperation},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-402961},
  pages     = {27},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {Although party competition is widely regarded as an important part of a working democracy, it is rarely analysed in political science literature. This article discusses the basic properties of party competition, especially the patterns of interaction in contemporary party systems. Competition as a phenomenon at the macro level has to be carefully distinguished from contest and cooperation as the forms of interaction at the micro level. The article gives special attention to the creation of issue innovations. Contrary to existing approaches, I argue that not only responsiveness but also innovation are necessary to guarantee a workable democratic competition. Competition takes place on an issue market, where parties can discover voters' demands. Combined with the concept of institutional veto points, the article presents hypotheses on how institutions shape the possibility for programmatic innovations.},
  language  = {en}
}