@article{GehringDoerfler2019,
  author    = {Gehring, Thomas and D{\"o}rfler, Thomas},
  title     = {Constitutive mechanisms of UN Security Council practices},
  series = {Review of International Studies},
  volume    = {45},
  journal   = {Review of International Studies},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Univ.},
  address   = {Cambridge},
  issn      = {0260-2105},
  doi       = {10.1017/S0260210518000268},
  pages     = {120 -- 140},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {Based upon the current debate on international practices with its focus on taken-for-granted everyday practices, we examine how Security Council practices may affect member state action and collective decisions on intrastate conflicts. We outline a concept that integrates the structuring effect of practices and their emergence from interaction among reflective actors. It promises to overcome the unresolved tension between understanding practices as a social regularity and as a fluid entity. We analyse the constitutive mechanisms of two Council practices that affect collective decisions on intrastate conflicts and elucidate how even reflective Council members become enmeshed with the constraining implications of evolving practices and their normative implications. (1) Previous Council decisions create precedent pressure and give rise to a virtually uncontested permissive Council practice that defines the purview for intervention into such conflicts. (2) A ratcheting practice forces opponents to choose between accepting steadily reinforced Council action, as occurred regarding Sudan/Darfur, and outright blockade, as in the case of Syria. We conclude that practices constitute a source of influence that is not captured by the traditional perspectives on Council activities as the consequence of geopolitical interests or of externally evolving international norms like the 'responsibility to protect' (R2P).},
  language  = {en}
}
@book{Doerfler2019,
  author    = {D{\"o}rfler, Thomas},
  title     = {Security council sanctions governance},
  series = {Routledge research on the United Nations ; 6},
  journal   = {Routledge research on the United Nations ; 6},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  address   = {London},
  isbn      = {978-0-42944-232-2},
  doi       = {10.4324/9780429442322},
  pages     = {xiii, 239},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {Little is known about how far-reaching decisions in UN Security Council sanctions committees are made. Developing a novel committee governance concept and using examples drawn from sanctions imposed on Iraq, Al-Qaida, Congo, Sudan and Iran, this book shows that Council members tend to follow the will of the powerful, whereas sanctions committee members often decide according to the rules. This is surprising since both Council and committees are staffed by the same member states. Offering a fascinating account of Security Council micro-politics and decision-making processes on sanctions, this rigorous comparative and theory-driven analysis treats the Council and its sanctions committees as distinguishable entities that may differ in decision practice despite having the same members. Drawing extensively on primary documents, diplomatic cables, well-informed press coverage, reports by close observers and extensive interviews with committee members, Council diplomats and sanctions experts, it contrasts with the conventional wisdom on decision-making within these bodies, which suggests that the powerful permanent members would not accept rule-based decisions against their interests. This book will be of interest to policy practitioners and scholars working in the broad field of international organizations and international relations theory as well as those specializing in sanctions, international law, the Security Council and counter-terrorism.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{GehringDorschDoerfler2019,
  author    = {Gehring, Thomas and Dorsch, Christian and D{\"o}rfler, Thomas},
  title     = {Precedent and doctrine in organisational decision-making},
  series = {Journal of international relations and development},
  volume    = {22},
  journal   = {Journal of international relations and development},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan},
  address   = {Basingstoke},
  issn      = {1581-1980},
  doi       = {10.1057/s41268-017-0101-5},
  pages     = {107 -- 135},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {We examine how and under what conditions informal institutional constraints, such as precedent and doctrine, are likely to affect collective choice within international organisations even in the absence of powerful bureaucratic agents. With a particular focus on the United Nations Security Council, we first develop a theoretical account of why such informal constraints might affect collective decisions even of powerful and strategically behaving actors. We show that precedents provide focal points that allow adopting collective decisions in coordination situations despite diverging preferences. Reliance on previous cases creates tacitly evolving doctrine that may develop incrementally. Council decision-making is also likely to be facilitated by an institutional logic of escalation driven by institutional constraints following from the typically staged response to crisis situations. We explore the usefulness of our theoretical argument with evidence from the Council doctrine on terrorism that has evolved since 1985. The key decisions studied include the 1992 sanctions resolution against Libya and the 2001 Council response to the 9/11 attacks. We conclude that, even within intergovernmentally structured international organisations, member states do not operate on a clean slate, but in a highly institutionalised environment that shapes their opportunities for action.},
  language  = {en}
}