@misc{Ganghof2019,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Designing Democratic Constitutions},
  series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  journal   = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe},
  number    = {120},
  issn      = {1867-5808},
  doi       = {10.25932/publishup-44540},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-445408},
  pages     = {13},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {This article analyses salient trade-offs in the design of democracy. It grounds this analysis in a distinction between two basic models of democracy: simple and complex majoritarianism. These models differ not only in their electoral and party systems, but also in the style of coalition-building. Simple majoritarianism concentrates executive power in a single majority party; complex majoritarianism envisions the formation of shifting, issue-specific coalitions among multiple parties whose programs differ across multiple conflict dimensions. The latter pattern of coalition formation is very difficult to create and sustain under pure parliamentary government. A separation of powers between executive and legislature can facilitate such a pattern, while also achieving central goals of simple majoritarianism: identifiable cabinet alternatives before the election and stable cabinets afterward. The separation of powers can thus balance simple and complex majoritarianism in ways that are unavailable under parliamentarism. The article also compares the presidential and semi-parliamentary versions of the separation of powers. It argues that the latter has important advantages, e.g., when it comes to resolving inter-branch deadlock, as it avoids the concentration of executive power in a single human being.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{Ganghof2016,
  author    = {Ganghof, Steffen},
  title     = {Reconciling representation and accountability},
  series = {Government and Opposition},
  journal   = {Government and Opposition},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-413456},
  pages     = {25},
  year      = {2016},
  abstract  = {An egalitarian approach to the fair representation of voters specifies three main institutional requirements: proportional representation, legislative majority rule and a parliamentary system of government. This approach faces two challenges: the under-determination of the resulting democratic process and the idea of a trade-off between equal voter representation and government accountability. Linking conceptual with comparative analysis, the article argues that we can distinguish three ideal-typical varieties of the egalitarian vision of democracy, based on the stages at which majorities are formed. These varieties do not put different relative normative weight onto equality and accountability, but have different conceptions of both values and their reconciliation. The view that accountability is necessarily linked to clarity of responsibility', widespread in the comparative literature, is questioned - as is the idea of a general trade-off between representation and accountability. Depending on the vision of democracy, the two values need not be in conflict.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{Franzmann2017,
  author    = {Franzmann, Simon T.},
  title     = {Competition, contest, and cooperation},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-402961},
  pages     = {27},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {Although party competition is widely regarded as an important part of a working democracy, it is rarely analysed in political science literature. This article discusses the basic properties of party competition, especially the patterns of interaction in contemporary party systems. Competition as a phenomenon at the macro level has to be carefully distinguished from contest and cooperation as the forms of interaction at the micro level. The article gives special attention to the creation of issue innovations. Contrary to existing approaches, I argue that not only responsiveness but also innovation are necessary to guarantee a workable democratic competition. Competition takes place on an issue market, where parties can discover voters' demands. Combined with the concept of institutional veto points, the article presents hypotheses on how institutions shape the possibility for programmatic innovations.},
  language  = {en}
}
@misc{OPUS4-40766,
  title     = {The future of local government in Europe},
  series = {Modernisierung des {\"o}ffentlichen Sektors},
  journal   = {Modernisierung des {\"o}ffentlichen Sektors},
  editor    = {Schwab, Christian and Bouckaert, Geert and Kuhlmann, Sabine},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-407661},
  pages     = {129},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {kein abstract vorhanden},
  language  = {en}
}